









D I S S E R T A T I O N 
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades 
Doktorin der Philosophie 
(Dr. phil.) 





der Sprach- und literaturwissenschaftlichen Fakultät 
der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
von 
 








Präsidentin der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
Prof. Dr.-Ing. Dr. Sabine Kunst 
 
Dekan der Sprach- und literaturwissenschaftlichen Fakultät 




1. Prof. Dr. Helga Schwalm, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
2. Prof. Dr. Neil Vickers, King’s College London 
 
























A thesis submitted for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy  
in English  
 
Joint PhD 
King’s College London 









The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information 




This thesis is an examination of Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s revisionary activity from 1814 
to 1818, considering the integral role of William Wordsworth’s The Excursion, published 
as part of The Recluse in 1814, on Coleridge’s conception of his discrete oeuvre. It is via a 
detailed analysis of the way Coleridge ceased to speak “through” Wordsworth that this 
thesis unfolds its principal argument on Coleridge’s revisionary activity. I principally 
consider the revisions at work in the Biographia Literaria (1817), Sibylline Leaves (1817) 
and the 1818 rifacciamento to The Friend (the periodical originally issued in 1809-1810). 
  
Taking into account Coleridge’s newly-emerging and subsequently evolving responses to 
Immanuel Kant’s critical philosophy in the 1790s and 1800s, I will argue that the already-
existing “radical Difference” between Coleridge and Wordsworth ever since the Lyrical 
Ballads (1798) and the “Preface” (1800) further intensified following Wordsworth’s 
failure to bring their grand scheme for a “first genuine philosophical poem”, The Recluse, 
into completion. Especially after The Prelude Coleridge heard in 1807, The Excursion by 
means of his “comparative censure” fell short of meeting the long-cherished expectations. 
Whereas Coleridge’s organic view of the world involved the recognition of an active mind 
seeking universal “Truth” through the inner synthetic faculties as well as the empirical 
laws in nature, Wordsworth’s poem was founded upon an obscurely precarious ground 
between the phenomenal world and the inner self. Ultimately, Coleridge’s disappointment 
with The Excursion on the basis of his theories on language and imagination, and the 
ensuing detachment from Wordsworth and their joint oeuvre gave him the autonomy to 
revise his past works in a way that ensured formation of a more sober relationship with his 
own past and a dialogic friendship with Wordsworth in which Coleridge came to realise 
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This thesis seeks to trace the integral role William Wordsworth’s The Excursion (1814) 
played in Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s revisionary activity from 1814 to 1818, during which 
the latter carried out significant, though unsystematic, alterations on not only his early 
works but also his life and opinions. At the initial stages of this study I aimed, in broad 
strokes, to explore Coleridge’s religious and spiritual commitments vis-à-vis his poetic self 
by especially taking his early poetry as a reference. However, as the work progressed, I 
found my research came up against a previously-unforeseen predicament that Coleridge 
was consistently and notoriously a “myriad-minded” man in the sense that he always 
engaged with incongruous points of view, and not usually in plain sight. From this 
followed the recognition, for example, that “Coleridge’s early poetry” is actually and 
largely constituted by what Leader calls “secondary thoughts”, subsequent insertions and 
immense revisions rather than being the once-and-for-all product of an original moment of 
composition. I hence came to the realisation that what he originally wrote is only one 
aspect of Coleridgean oeuvre, the rest is largely contingent upon his deep-seated 
revisionary activity and volatile self-interpretation that almost always afflicted Coleridge 
throughout his career. Considering, in addition, Coleridge’s symbiotic partnership with 
Wordsworth,1 his non-dualistic and primordial conception of language, his unsystematic 
and “muddled”2 philosophical engagements, his slow and reluctant embrace of Multeity in 
                                                 
1 I take the term symbiotic (or symbiosis) as used by Thomas McFarland in Romanticism and the Forms of 
Ruin (1981), which will be elaborated further throughout this study.  
2 Seamus Perry in Coleridge and the Uses of Division (1999) maintains that in order to understand 
Coleridge’s thought, one must first of all view it as “the experience and exploration of a muddle” rather than 
as “the solution to a problem” (p. 7). By digging out the “laudatory” implication of the word, Perry notes that 
the muddle “has an informal but determining structure, an internal arrangement of conflicting callings or 
visions of reality, and rises above the indignity of a sheerly incoherent conceptual mess: it comes from 




Unity,3 and his legacy that still overwhelms scholars and students alike, I came to 
formulate my current research question: What impact did Coleridge and Wordsworth’s 
joint project, The Recluse, have on Coleridge’s retrospective constitution of a discrete 
oeuvre through his revisionary activity from 1814 to 1818?     
To address this question, the investigation in this work will take into account 
Coleridge’s idiosyncratic responses to Kantian transcendental philosophy (beginning in the 
1790s), the already-existing “radical Difference”4 concerning the linguistic approach 
between Coleridge and Wordsworth in the aftermath of the second edition of Lyrical 
Ballads (1800), Coleridge’s conception of imagination in relation to Kant and 
Wordsworth, the effects of Wordsworth’s failure to bring their grand scheme for a first 
“genuine” philosophical poem, The Recluse, into completion on Coleridge, and the role 
The Excursion (1814) played in Coleridge’s plan for refashioning himself. Whereas 
Coleridge’s organic view of the world involved solid recognition of an active mind seeking 
the universal “Truth” through inner synthetic faculties as well as empirical laws in nature, 
Wordsworth’s poem placed language on an obscurely precarious ground between the 
outside world and the inner self, thereby eventually for Coleridge according with the 
dualistic Kantian approach to language (as seen in his three Critiques) rather than 
Coleridge’s organic and non-dualistic approach.5 In addition, after bringing “that prophetic 
                                                 
3 The term was first presented in the Malta notebooks on 17 December 1804 (CN II, §2344) and obviously 
signalled the critical changes Coleridge had undergone during the two years he spent in the Mediterranean. 
“Multeity” is Coleridge’s preferred word for the diversity or plurality ever-present in the unified whole : “the 
Revelation of the Finite, of the Multeity in the Unity” (Fragments, II: 1320). 
4 In a letter to William Sotheby on 13 July 1802, Coleridge makes an affirmative statement concerning a 
fundamental divergence in their opinions, which they discovered “lately”: “…we begin to suspect, that there 
is, somewhere or other, a radical Difference [in our] opinions” (CL V.II, p. 812). Two weeks later, he wrote 
another letter to Southey, talking about the “radical Difference in our theoretical opinions respecting Poetry” 
(CL V.II, p. 830.) 
5 Very broadly, Coleridge’s organic theory relied on the fundamental idea that “the living whole is prior to 
the parts” (Lectures I, p. 196), hence each part is intrinsically bound up with one another. The organicism of 
Coleridge originated, as Perry states, from the “One Life vision” of Coleridge (1999, pp. 78 -80). 
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Lay” (PW I.II, p. 816) into the open in The Prelude of 1807, Wordsworth’s conception of 
imagination and fancy, terms of vital importance to his former symbiotic partner’s poetics 
as well as his philosophical and theological views, gradually differed from that of 
Coleridge’s. The Excursion is a distinctive case in terms of being yet another part of The 
Recluse project, but almost levelling imagination with its associative counterpart, fancy - a 
case which was fairly resolved through Coleridge’s desynonymization of the word 
“imagination” in the Biographia Literaria (1817). This contributed to Coleridge’s 
estrangement from The Excursion, hence The Recluse project, and his proper detachment 
from Wordsworth which, I maintain, eventually gave him a reactionary impulse and 
autonomy to revise himself to a distinguished effect from 1814 to 1818. 
The connection between Coleridge’s idiosyncratic and uniquely “expedient”6 
engagement with Kant’s critical philosophy from the early years of his career, the grounds 
of his frustration with Wordsworth’s The Excursion of 1814 (as part of The Recluse), and 
subsequent self-revisions in the following years (especially in the Biographia Literaria and 
Sibylline Leaves of 1817, and in the revised version of The Friend in 1818) has so far been 
a comparatively neglected venue in Coleridge studies. This unexplored aspect in the 
scholarship invites further investigation; therefore, my study attempts to address this gap in 
general. Drawing on a massive body of literature about Coleridge, my aim is to describe 
how Coleridge resolved to separate the body of his works from those of Wordsworth as a 
result of his realisation (especially in the mid-1810s) that to secure a proper “dialogue” and 
“friendship” with Wordsworth, it was time to speak to his once-symbiotic partner rather 
than speak through him. Indeed, it was high time he gave up the almost paternal 
investment in the making of Wordsworth’s poetic genius because his own self as a writer 
                                                 
6 See: Class, 2012, pp. 13, 118. 
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was at stake more than ever after the realisation that Wordsworth’s employment of 
language and imagination in The Excursion, which was meant to be a portion of the first 
great philosophical poem Coleridge designed with Wordsworth, turned out to be 
distinctively Wordsworthian and Kantian, but only remotely Coleridgean. 
Coleridge developed a joint oeuvre conception with Wordsworth during their 
symbiosis which, as I will maintain throughout this study, intermittently continued until 
the mid-1810s. A significant product of this joint oeuvre image in later stage of their 
symbiosis was his poem of 1807, “To William Wordsworth”, which I take to be a 
“symbiotic reaction” (as opposed to what I will call “revisionary” or “dialogic reaction” in 
the following chapters). Along this line, my argument about the joint oeuvre image will 
suggest that Coleridge’s perception of his oeuvre in this process often depended on an 
unconscious perception of his relationship with another, preferably superior, figure in his 
life. Once Coleridge discovered the spark of genius in Wordsworth, he was instantly 
compelled to register the discovery on his own body of works as well. In the context of this 
study, Coleridge’s perception of his oeuvre as inextricably connected with the other, 
Wordsworth, is crucial to my consideration of the symbiotic relationship between them and 
its dissolution after The Excursion (1814). I therefore aim to investigate how Coleridge’s 
attitude towards the function of a “friend” underwent a substantial and long-sought change 
in the aftermath of his disappointment with The Recluse project in 1814. 
After The Excursion, Coleridge felt compelled to give up the habit of speaking 
through Wordsworth, and as a consequence he had to realise his independence from 
Wordsworth through elimination of this conception. I argue that Coleridge ultimately 
found himself trapped in loops of revisionary production and, in a way, compensation, 
especially from 1814 to 1818. During this revisionary process, I hold, he prominently 
13 
 
transitioned from a joint oeuvre image into discrete author image with separate name and 
body of works in the absence of both Wordsworth and the expectations Coleridge had 
projected on him for almost as long as they collaborated. These terms will largely 
constitute the typology I will keep referring to as part of my “authorship model” vis-à-vis 
Coleridge and Wordsworth throughout this work. In the centre of my investigation lie 
Coleridge and his revisions from 1814 to 1818; notwithstanding this, his personal and 
professional exchanges with Wordsworth and his interpretation of Kant also lie at the heart 
of my argument. Therefore, the switch between central figures and perspectives in the 




















CHAPTER ONE – KANT, COLERIDGE AND WORDSWORTH ON LINGUISTIC 
DUALISM AND IMAGINATION 
From my early reading of Fairy Tales, & Genii &c &c — my mind had 
been habituated to the Vast — & I never regarded my senses in any way 
as the criteria of my belief. I regulated all my creeds by my conceptions 
not by my sight – even at that age. Should children be permitted to read 
Romances, & Relations of Giants & Magicians and Genii? – I know all 
that has been said against it; but I have formed my faith in the affirmative. 
– I know no other way of giving the mind a love of “the Great,” and “the 
Whole.” – Those who have been led to the same truths step by step thro’ 
the constant testimony of their senses, seem to me to want a sense which I 
possess – They contemplate nothing but parts – and all parts are 
necessarily little – and the Universe to them is but a mass of little things.  
Letter to Thomas Poole, 16 October 1797. (Coleridge, CL I, p. 354)  
Kant’s Copernican Revolution and “Transcendental Turn” in the Three Critiques  
Kant’s “Copernican Revolution” came as a milestone in philosophy as it paved the way for 
reconfiguration of the established parameters of philosophical inquiry. With his approach 
Kant revolutionised the content and grounds of knowledge, radically severing its ties with 
pre-ordained transcendent assumptions. The Critique of Pure Reason (1781)7 clarified his 
critical venture as follows: 
Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the 
objects; but all attempts to find out something about them a priori through 
concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, 
come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with 
the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to 
our cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility of an 
a priori cognition of them, which is to establish something about objects 
before they are given to us. This would be just like the first thoughts of 
Copernicus, who, when he did not make good progress in the explanation of 
the celestial motions if he assumed that the entire celestial host revolves 
around the observer, tried to see if he might not have greater success if he 
made the observer revolve and left the stars at rest. (CPR, B XVI)  
Kant’s enthronement of mind by placing it in the centre of his epistemology was a ground-
breaking moment in philosophy as well as in metaphysics. John R. Silber also explains that 
                                                 
7 First published in 1781, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason was later revised in 1787. There are important 
differences in several sections of the work, and editors today use the second edition as the base while 
providing the original version within the text. Therefore, references to the first Critique are commonly given 
in the form A 123 or B 123, referring to the original and the revised editions respectively.     
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Kant’s “Copernican Revolution” consists, “in the recognition of the knower’s contribution 
to the knowledge of objects. Instead of vainly striving to assure the conformity of our ideas 
to objects, Kant argued that we should rather concern ourselves with the necessary 
conditions of experience to which objects must conform if they are to be known” (1963, p. 
182). Those “necessary conditions of experience” are the a priori forms established in our 
cognition “in advance”, prior to sense experience, and all the objects are subject to such a 
priori mediums as temporality, spatiality and causality so that they are experienceable and 
knowable.8 This radical leap in philosophy aimed to transform our approach to 
epistemology and metaphysics. With his move (or the transcendental method, as explained 
in the first Critique, A 1, B 27), Kant aimed to replace the “transcendent metaphysics” 
with the “transcendental philosophy”. 
Traditional (i.e. transcendent) metaphysics sought to ontologically ground the 
existence of the foundation of being - the principium essendi – on the self-revelation of 
that first principle in the phenomenal world - the principium cognoscendi. It was this 
system of “pseudo-science of metaphysics” that Kant renounced in order to ground 
metaphysics on a more solid ground of philosophy because metaphysics, once “called the 
queen of all the sciences” was at the time “despised on all sides” (CPR, A IX). Kant 
therefore aimed to acknowledge the shortcomings of traditional-dogmatic philosophy and 
metaphysics. He said in the first Critique that it was his utmost duty as the “transcendental 
critique” to come to the scene and obstinately “appeal to healthy human understanding” 
with reference to the power of Reason, instead of “attempt[ing] new dogmatic proofs” 
                                                 
8 Accordingly, time, space and causal order are concepts a priori to human perception, and we make sense of 
the phenomenal world by means of them. They do not, however, have any a posteriori presence beyond 
human perception.  
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(CPR, A 784 / B 812).9 This radical turn, Kant argued, could be possible by replacing the 
concept of “transcendent” with the “transcendental”, which acts as necessary condition for 
the possibility of knowledge of any kind (CPR, A 845 / B 873 - A 848 / B 876). In the first 
Critique, Kant himself gives the definition of “transcendental” as follows: “I call all 
cognition transcendental that is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our a 
priori concepts of objects in general. A system of such concepts would be called 
transcendental philosophy” (CPR, A 12).10  For Kant, this transcendental approach in fact 
safeguards metaphysics since it grounds knowledge of the metaphysical realm as a priori. 
Reversely, as Monika Class states, “If we attempt to infer the existence of God by 
including him within the chain of natural causes, like Hartley or Spinoza, then God too 
must be conditioned rather than unconditioned, limited rather than unlimited” (2012, p. 
21). Metaphysical concepts thus cannot be grasped by looking at the phenomena; and this 
brought Kant to a point where he abandoned the question of whether we can prove that 
God exists or not. Instead, he found it more fitting to his philosophical position to ask 
whether it is necessary for God to exist in the phenomenal world (CPR, B 13-14). 
Renouncing the pseudo-metaphysics that had been insecurely established in previous ages 
therefore enabled Kant to lay the foundations of metaphysics as a solid branch of 
Wissenschaft.   
                                                 
9 As Frank Thilly puts it, “Kant repudiated dogmatic metaphysics, uncritical metaphysics, all  metaphysics 
that attempts to solve the problem of ultimate reality without previous examination of the power of reason. 
The traditional metaphysics offers itself as knowledge of the understanding that is demonstrable a priori. We 
can have such knowledge only in physics and mathematics; we can know a priori only the forms and 
categories of our perceived world. We cannot look for God and the soul in nature: they are not objects of 
experience among other objects, phenomena in the space, time, causal order. We can, therefore, have no such 
a priori knowledge of God, the cosmos, the soul, as the old metaphysics professes to have.” (1925, p. 343) 
10 Kant’s “transcendental philosophy”, Simon Haines in Redemption in Poetry and Philosophy (2013) 
explains, is concerned “not with objects, with how or how far we can be said empirically to ‘know’ or 
experience them, as in Hume and his British predecessors: but with the way things must be, or rather the way 
the mind must be, for it to have experience, or for experience to be had, at all.” (p. 78) 
17 
 
Any quest for a transcendent ground in the acquirement of knowledge was hence 
countered by the Kantian epistemology, established on the tripartite exchange between 
Sense, Understanding and Reason: “All our cognition starts from the senses,” Kant states, 
and it “goes from there to the understanding, and ends with reason, beyond which there is 
nothing higher to be found in us…” (CPR, A 299). Kant hence distinguishes the Senses 
from Understanding and Reason on grounds that the former is not capable of forming 
judgments, hence can lay no claims to Truth: “...it is correctly said that the senses do not 
err; yet not because they always judge correctly, but because they do not judge at all. 
Hence truth, as much as error, and thus also illusion as leading to the latter, are to be found 
only in judgments” (CPR, B 350). According to Kant, therefore, it is both Understanding 
and Reason that can collaboratively have access to the Truth by virtue of forming 
judgements, and providing representations: Whereas understanding is “a faculty of unity of 
appearances by means of rules” called synthesis, Reason as the “supreme faculty of 
cognition” acts as “the faculty of the unity of the rules of understanding under principles”, 
hence never directly applying “to experience or to any object, but instead applies to the 
understanding, in order to give unity a priori through concepts to the understanding’s 
manifold cognitions, which may be called ‘the unity of reason,’ and is of an altogether 
different kind than any unity that can be achieved by the understanding” (CPR, B 359). As 
a result, a unified knowledge of the phenomenal world is synthesised by the mind as long 
as Understanding operates as a constitutive epistemological agent of “manifold cognitions” 
whereas Reason is a regulative and guiding faculty that provides “unity a priori”.11 
                                                 
11 Kant refuses to attribute any sort of independent, superior – hence constitutive – epistemic authority to 
reason over understanding in his transcendental idealism, as he makes clear:  “…the transcendental ideas are 
never of constitutive use…they have an excellent and indispensably necessary regulative use, namely that of 
directing the understanding to a certain goal respecting which the lines of direction of all its rules converge at 
18 
 
Kantian terminology for such division of roles between Sense, Understanding and Reason 
is known as the “transcendental unity of apperception”. 
In the first Critique, after providing descriptions of Sense, Understanding and 
Reason, Kant is quick to counter the metaphysical “misinterpretations and delusions” that 
seek to creep into “the inferences of reason” (CPR, B 366). He points to the 
epistemological error that Reason is “ceaselessly elevated by the powerful though only 
empirical proofs that are always growing in its hands” (CPR, A 624 / B 652). Here, Kant 
draws attention to the transcendental principle that Reason enables the a priori conditions 
through which Understanding is able to operate; however, it does not possess any 
constitutive role in this interaction. As Michael Friedman (1992) explains: 
Although reason too plays an indispensable role in experience, the concepts 
proper to it - the so-called ideas of reason, such as the idea of God, or the 
idea of the world as a complete totality - cannot be realized or instantiated 
in experience at all. Nevertheless, ideas of reason - the idea of a highest 
intelligence or wise Author of the world, for example - still function 
legitimately to guide empirical enquiry into the objects that can be given in 
experience. (p. 73) 
Kant accordingly aims to refute the claims about the metaphysical conundra, which seek to 
apprehend Reason as the highest medium to attain knowledge of the transcendent realm. 
For Kant, by overstepping the transcendental limits he draws, traditional metaphysics 
strives to draw “concepts from pure reason”; however, “they are not merely reflected 
concepts but inferred concepts” (CPR, B 367). In the critical philosophy, therefore, 
whereas senses supply us with the preliminary cognition of the phenomena, constitutive 
Understanding and regulative Reason complement each other since they are mutually 
dependent in conditioning our knowledge of the world as unified as it can be. Metaphysics 
                                                                                                                                                    
one point…it lies entirely outside the bounds of possible experience - nonetheless still serves to obtain for 
these concepts the greatest unity alongside the greatest extension.” (CPR, A 645 / B 673) 
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as the domain of noumena12, on the other hand, though conceivable within the limits of 
Reason alone, cannot claim authority over knowledge. 
In traditional metaphysics, the concept of noumena, thing in itself, is presented as a 
realm independent of experience, but laying claims to reality; and it is claimed to operate 
beyond the temporal, spatial and causal relations.13 Nonetheless, by grounding knowledge 
on the world that can be experienced (phenomena) by the senses and subsequently shaped 
by perceiving mind (by means of Understanding and Reason), Kantian transcendental 
deduction therefore undermines the traditional conception of noumena, relegating it to a 
purely conceptual realm:  
If we understand thereby only objects of a non-sensible intuition, of which 
our categories are certainly not valid, and of which we can therefore never 
have any cognition at all (neither intuition nor concept), then noumena in 
this merely negative sense must of course be allowed… For one must 
concede that the categories alone are not sufficient for the cognition of 
things in themselves, and without the data of sensibility they would be 
merely subjective forms of the unity of the understanding, but without any 
object. Thinking in itself, to be sure, is not a product of the senses, and to 
this extent is also not limited by them, but it is not on that account 
immediately of any independent and pure use, without assistance from 
sensibility, for it is in that case without an object. And one cannot call the 
noumenon such an object, for this signifies precisely the problematic 
concept of an object for an entirely different intuition and an entirely 
different understanding than our own, which is thus a problem itself. (CPR, 
B 343) 
Kant hence provided a clear-cut distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal world, 
and propounded that within the limits of his transcendental method we can only attain 
knowledge by means of synthesising  our perception of the phenomena - noumena being 
by definition beyond the realm of experience and, hence, epistemology. It can only be 
                                                 
12 Whereas phenomena denote anything in the outside world that constitutes our experience (appearance), 
noumena refer to things in themselves, Ding an Sich, released from experience. 
13 See: Chapter Three, "On the ground of the distinction of all objects in general into phenomena and 
noumena” in CPR, B 294-315.  
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conceived within the realm of Reason alone, hence constituting a grey area for Kant’s 
transcendental argument. 
 
Transcendental Method, Kant’s Dualistic Conception of Language and Two Levels of 
Imagination 
In Kant’s transcendental system, the argument about exchanges between a priori forms of 
the mind and the world of senses is closely related with Kant’s view of language. Michael 
Forster in “Kant’s Philosophy of Language?” (2012) holds that during the time he wrote 
the three Critiques (1781-1790) Kant was committed to a fairly traditional form of 
Enlightenment dualism between thought and language, defending the primacy of Reason 
over linguistic forms, and according “no fundamental role to language” in his critical 
philosophy (p. 487). In the Critique of The Power of Judgment (1790), Kant epitomizes 
this view with the assertion that “no language fully attains or can make intelligible” 
aesthetic ideas, i.e. “representation[s] of the imagination”, which occasion “much 
thinking” (CpJ, 5:314). Being always in a subordinate position and falling short of 
supplying the means to properly communicate ideas, linguistic signs for Kant are not 
capable to capture and convey the thoughts in one’s mind. Forster explains that, 
Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason, as well as in his other two 
Critiques…scrupulously avoids using such terms as ‘language’, ‘sentence’, 
and ‘word’ in fundamental explanatory roles, in favor of using...terms 
[such] as ‘thought’, ‘judgment’…[and] when he defines the latter terms, 
again avoids using terms which refer to language…(p. 488) 
In this respect, within the terminology of Kant’s critical philosophy, language is not 
considered as an integral or integrated medium in terms of conveying the products of 
thought, but it is defined necessarily in a dualistic way. This argument is highly important 
in its implications: Assigning priority to thoughts over linguistic forms brings about the 
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idea that language is a product of the a posteriori concepts of the mind and it is made 
possible by thought, not the other way around. This view eventually undermines the idea 
that human thought (or, by extension, aesthetic output) depends on language. Knowledge 
and truth, in this respect, cannot be attained and pursued by means of the precarious 
interplay of signifiers in language. 
In a philosophic tradition from Plato, Aristotle to Descartes, Hume and Kant, 
imagination has been defined in a variety of contesting ways, and attributed relatively 
vague functions, poised somewhere between mind and body (mediating these dualistic 
concepts placed on the mental and physical levels). Whereas for Plato imagination merely 
mimics how the world appears to us, thereby failing to give us the truth itself, Aristotle 
counters this view by arguing that rather than presenting us copies of copies of the actual 
objects, imagination as an indispensable agent of intellectual activity and perception is 
capable of representing universally acceptable aspects of experience. For both Plato and 
Aristotle, however, imagination is still a medium that copies the world, merely acting as a 
reproductive, rather than a productive, agent at its best bridging the gap between sense 
(corporeal nature) and intellect (incorporeal nature). 
Early in the Enlightenment period, René Descartes (1596-1650) considered 
imagination as an agent that gives way to “misleading judgment” due to its “blundering 
constructions” (1931, p. 7), hence constituting an obstacle and irrelevance to intellect’s 
search for knowledge and Truth.14 An examination of his references shows that Descartes 
conceived of imagination as forming images, hence pointing to its necessarily 
reproductive, mimetic, ornamental feature and underscoring its non-functionality in search 
                                                 
14 On this topic, see: Mind's World: Imagination and Subjectivity from Descartes to Romanticism. Alexander 
M. Schlutz, 2009. 
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for the Truth and production of meaning. Later, Edmund Burke (1729-1797) granted 
imagination a sort of creative power, incorporating fancy and invention, but he cautiously 
added that imagination is not able to produce “anything absolutely new” but is merely 
capable of varying “the disposition of those ideas which it has received from the senses” 
(On Taste, p. 17).15 
Especially in the first and third Critiques of Kant, imagination is presented as 
functioning on two levels: It is either reproductive, i.e. based on previous sensual data, or 
productive, which emerges as a significant synthesizer of experience, making it available 
to the mind. In the first Critique, Kant explicitly states that such a synthesis comes as the 
result of imagination, which is “a blind though indispensable function of the soul, without 
which we would have no cognition at all, but of which we are seldom even conscious”; and 
its role of synthesis “pertains to the understanding, and by means of which it first provides 
cognition in the proper sense” (CpR, A 78 / B 103). In the first Critique, as Rudolf A. 
Makkreel maintains, Kant’s conception of imagination serves “the constitutive demands of 
the understanding and the regulative ideals of reason” (1990, p. viiii). Kant hence makes it 
clear that it does not have the power to create totally new experience.16 
It is true that by the third Critique, Kant expanded his definition and moved to “a 
more holistic perspective” (Makkreel p.2). Imagination in the Critique of Judgment, by 
power of its comprehension and creation of aesthetic ideas, re-emerges as a faculty that 
                                                 
15 “Besides the ideas ... which are presented to the senses; the mind of man possesses a sort of creative power 
of its own; either in representing at pleasure the images of things in the order and manner in which they are 
received by the senses, or in combining those images in a new manner, and according to a different order. 
This power is called Imagination; and to this belongs whatever is called wit, fancy, invention and the like. 
But it must be observed, that this power of the imagination is incapable of producing anything absolutely 
new; it can only vary the disposition of those ideas which it has received from the senses.” (Burke, On Taste, 
pp. 16-17) 
16 Kant explicitly remarks that “the temperament as well as the talents that would allow a free and unlimited 
movement (such as imagination and wit) require discipline in many respects” (CPR, A 710 / B 738) 
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“contribute[s] to the interpretation, as well as to the constitution, of experience” by 
presenting “rational ideas to sense” (Makkreel, p.1). But still, in this Critique, although 
imagination “as a productive cognitive faculty” is “very powerful in creating, as it were, 
another nature”, it is – “no doubt always in accordance with analogous laws” – limited by 
“the material which the real one gives it” (CpJ, 5:314). In Kant’s transcendental deduction, 
therefore, whereas reproductive imagination based on “the law of association” is seen as an 
instrument with which “We entertain ourselves…when experience seems too mundane to 
us”, its productive counterpart – bound by the rules of understanding – is able to step 
“beyond nature” (CpJ, 5:314) only to a certain extent.  
 
Kant, Coleridge and the Coleridgean Kant  
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy (1988) assert in The Literary Absolute that 
Kant “opens up the possibility of Romanticism” because the philosopher focused on the 
integral role of the creative self and subjective recreation of the outside world by 
underscoring the view of reality in the image of one’s self (p. 29). On the other hand, 
critics such as Kathleen M. Wheeler (1989) suggest that “Kant’s influence was [n]either 
necessary [n]or decisive for the change from Augustan and Enlightenment attitudes to 
Romantic ones” considering the view that his predecessors “in both the English and the 
German tradition” had achieved a lot of advancements “decades before Kant was well-
known in England” (p. 42). This view is opposed by critics such as Julie Carlson (1990), 
whose trenchant criticism towards the common tendency to “to lose sight of the German 
connection” and to “dismiss Germany as foreign to English sensibilities” (p. 55) aims to 
counteract such scholarly views as Wheeler’s. Instead, Carlson aims to establish in 
Romantic scholarship the view that rather than writing in isolation, the British romantic 
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writers – surely with a few exceptions – were mostly aware of the recent developments in 
Continental philosophy as well as literature. Therefore, recent critics such as Peter 
Mortensen (2004) more openly highlight that “The emergence of Romanticism in Britain 
coincided with a dramatically increased awareness of Continental literature” (p. 1), and 
that the philosophy of Kant is also “known to have initiated, among other philosophical 
and cultural phenomena, an entire movement that became known as early German 
Romanticism” (Class, 2012, p. 1), hence playing an indispensable role in formation of 
British Romanticim as well. When England was first introduced with critical philosophy of 
Kant, Class regonises, “it had a greater impact on the native culture than is commonly 
recognized” (p. 1). The emphasis on “native culture” is crucial here: Class tries to show 
that Kantian ideas were circulated in the cultural milieu of London and Bristol and that 
these ideas were even part of political movements, such as London Corresponding Society. 
Here, the social and political implications of Kantian philosophy are at stake: Class 
integrates Kantian ideas with the movement for constitutional reform in the 1790s and, 
thus, revises views that critical philosophy was alien to or incompatible with English 
reform and Jacobinism (because of alleged tendencies mainly in Kant’s aesthetics to 
eliticism and Romantic conservatism).17 
René Wellek’s Immanuel Kant in England 1793–1838 (1931) is one of the earliest 
works on the history of early reception of Kantian critical philosophy in England. He 
mainly argues that whether they understood or misunderstood Kant, the British reception 
was in the form of either repudiating his system altogether or struggling to adapt it to the 
                                                 
17 For further reading, see: Wheeler, K.M. (1989) “Kant and Romanticism”. Philosophy and Literature 13(1), 
42-56. Micheli, Giuseppe. “The Early Reception of Kant’s Thought in England 1785–1805” in George 
MacDonald Ross and Tony McWalter, eds. Kant and His Influence, Bristol, Thoemmes Press, 1990. pp. 202-
314. Marshall, Donald G. Kant and English Nature Poetry. 1991. 
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British ethical, philosophical as well as religious traditions. For Wellek, and he was right, 
Coleridge himself epitomized the latter camp. However, he undermines Coleridge’s active 
role in the reception of German philosophy to Britain as, for Wellek, Coleridge could not 
but fail to be an innovator in philosophy due to “a fundamental lack of real philosophical 
individuality in Coleridge” (p. 66). However, I line myself with Monika Class (2012) when 
she maintains that Wellek’s approach missed an important point by individually examining 
the actors enabling transmission of Kantian ideas in England, without properly 
investigating other less known but influential actors in the dissemination of ideas at the 
time. 
To address this matter of contention, Class presents a detailed account of the early 
transmitters of Kantian ideas and the factors affecting the misinterpretation or over-
interpretation of Kant’s critical philosophy in England. She puts that the initial 
dissemination of Kantian philosophy in England dates back to 178718, and that there were 
some historically-less-known but very significant figures such as Friedrich August 
Nitsch19, whose interpretations and lectures were influential in making critical philosophy 
spread “especially in the radical and dissenting milieu of England”, and it was thanks to 
these people “that Kant’s principles found a larger English audience and had a greater 
impact on English writers of the period …than has previously been thought” (2012, p. 18). 
                                                 
18 This is the year when Karl Leonhard Reinhold published his “Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie” 
(“Letters about Kantian Philosophy”) from 1786 until 1787 in Germany and, as Class explains, “The initial 
dissemination of Kant’s philosophy in England began at the time of Reinhold’s Briefe in 1787” (2012, p. 18). 
Class adds that “Although translations of Kant’s writings had appeared in English since 1796, knowledge of 
German was necessary to read and study Immanuel Kant’s three critiques...Yet, despite the absence of 
translations of the three critiques in 1790s Britain, one of Kant’s shorter writings as well as expositions of his 
works were readily available in English for non-German speakers like Coleridge before 1798.” (2012, pp. 1-
2) 
19 “In May 1796…Friedrich August Nitsch published his lectures about critical philosophy under the title A 




Although, Class adds, “Nitsch’s name appears…nowhere in Coleridges papers, his work 
left nevertheless an unmistakable mark in Coleridge’s thought” (p. 186).  
It has been a massively-investigated subject in Coleridge studies that his growth of 
mind owes a great deal to his responses to or borrowings from the German critical-
philosophical tradition, including Schiller, Schelling, Lessing, and Kant. In Coleridge and 
German Philosophy Paul Hamilton suggests that such“philosophical adventures” of 
Coleridge are “informal” and adventurous due to the lack of complete “systematic 
presentation” (2007, p. 1). However, considering the topic of this study, I subscribe to the 
idea that ever since his first perusal of the Kantian texts in June 1799,20 it was largely the 
critical philosophy that supplied Coleridge with the means to gradually extricate himself, 
as Engell and Bate put it, “from a primary reliance on materialism, from a view of mind 
and of poetry as largely built on an associative rather than an imaginative facul ty” (1983 , 
p. cxxxiii). Coleridge hence became among the most important contributors to the 
reception of Kant in England, and his idiosyncratic adoption and portrayal of Kant has had 
a lingering influence on Kant’s reception for decades. Early scholarship on the 
dissemination of Kantian ideas in England in the nineteenth century and Coleridge’s 
handling of the critical philosophy was hardly uncontroversial: The scholarly debate 
mainly focused on either Coleridge’s plagiarisms and misinterpretation of Kant (Wellek, 
                                                 
20 This surely does not mean that Coleridge read or knew the Kantian material well at this time (most 
probably he just flicked through them), but that he must have had some notions about Kant in and around this 
time. I subscribe to Monika Class’s (2012) demonstration that “Coleridge read Kant’s Kritik der reinen 
Vernunft in German sometime after his return from Germany in June 1799” (p. 3). In the fifth chapter of her 
book, Class presents the proofs for this argument: “Before Coleridge left Göttingen on 24 June 1799…he 
sent a letter to his sponsor Josiah Wedgwood summarizing his activities. Justifying his expenses, Coleridge 
wrote: ‘I shall have bought 30 pounds worth of books (chiefly metaphysics/ & with a view to the one work, 
to which I hope to dedicate in silence the prime of my life)’ (Letters I, p. 519)” and she also quotes 
“Coleridge’s confession in 1822 that he had bought a pirate copy of Kantian lectures during his first stay in 
Germany: ‘Before I left Germany in 1799, I procured from the Nachdrücker or privileged Book-pirates a thin 
Octavo of two or at most 3 Sheets, under the name of Kant’s Logic – doubtless, published by, or from the 
Notes of, one of his Lecture-pupils’ (Marginalia III, p. 256)” (p. 121). 
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1931), (Fruman, 1971 ), or the defensive confrontation of such charges by recognition of 
Coleridge’s philosophical merits across the ages (Muirhead, 1930). Largely pioneered by 
McFarland , who held in Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition that “we are faced not with 
plagiarism, but with nothing less than a mode of composition - composition by mosaic 
organization rather than by painting on an empty canvas” (1969 , p. 27), recent scholarship 
has drawn more heavily on the transmission of ideas (rather than individual ingeniousness 
and originality), focussing on the contribution Coleridge made as both a poet and yet 
another important transmitter of the continental philosophy (MacKinnon, 1974); (Schulz, 
1985); (Mortensen, 2004); (Hamilton, 2007); (Class, 2012).21 
It is true, as Class informs, that Coleridge read Kant’s first Critique in German 
“sometime after his return from Germany in June 1799”22 but his “perusal of Kantian 
texts” surely precedes this date (2012, p. 3). It was as early as May 1796 that Coleridge 
planned to learn German in Jena so he could read and translate “Kant, the great german 
[sic] Metaphysician”, among other German authors (CL I, p. 209). By the time he decided 
to read Kant in German, as Class informs, Coleridge had been regularly corresponding 
with  
a member of Nitsch’s Kantian Society in London: John Thelwall...This 
leading spokesman…wrote on the margins of his copy of Biographia 
Literaria that he had several philosophical discussions with 
Nitsch...Another supporter of Nitsch’s work was Coleridge’s Bristol 
mentor, Dr Thomas Beddoes (1760– 1808). He reviewed Nitsch’s 
exposition in the Monthly Magazine and advocated the translation of Kant’s 
works in a letter to the editor written on 28 March and published in May 
1796…Beddoes had discussed Kant’s epistemology three years earlier in 
                                                 
21 Also see: Lovejoy, A. O. (1940). ‘Coleridge and Kant’s Two World’. Essays in the History of Ideas, 7, 
341–62. Orsini, G. N. G. (1969) Coleridge and German Idealism (Carbondale, Ill). Loades, A. (1978). 
‘Coleridge as Theologian: Some Comments on His Reading of Kant’. Journal of Theological Studies 29, 
410–26. Ashton, Rosemary (1980) The German Idea: Four English Writers and the Reception of German 
Thought, 1800-1860. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Shaffer, E. (2004). ‘Coleridge and Kant’s 
“Giant Hand” ’, in R. Görner (ed.),  Anglo-German Affinities and Antipathies. Munich: Iudicium, pp. 39–56. 
22 Class dates Coleridge’s “initial immersion in Kant’s first critique” to 1801. (2012, p. 122) 
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his Observations on the Nature of Demonstrative Evidence (1793)... (2012, 
p. 2) 
Most probably, Coleridge’s initial desire to study Kant stemmed from his desire to 
reconsolidate the philosophical and theological aporias (e.g. the Hartleyan-associationist 
views and Unitarianism) his mind was occupied with ever since the early years of his 
career. As Alexander M. Schlutz (2009) also emphasizes,  
Kant’s transcendental perspective on epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics 
presented for Coleridge a philosophical means of liberation, for Kant’s 
critical system afforded him a position from which to counter the 
associationism of David Hume and David Hartley, which suggested the 
mechanical determination of the human mind by the empirical forces of 
cause and effect, a philosophical assumption that had at this point become 
as ethically troubling for Coleridge as it had been for Kant. (pp. 214-15) 
As Coleridge in the early stages of his acquaintance with the critical philosophy was 
seeking to make his own philosophical views more consistent and less precarious, and to 
mitigate the metaphysical and religious predicaments he had been inflicted with at the 
time, he aimed to base the foundation of his metaphysical preoccupations and conception 
of “Reason” on an intellectually satisfying philosophical argument.23 Kant’s critical 
philosophy, at least initially, seemed to supply him with the means to participate in this 
disquisition by taking “possession of” Coleridge “as with the giant’s hand” (BL I, p. 153). 
For Coleridge in the 1790s, Kant was a “great” metaphysician whose philosophy would 
potentially guide him through the arduous task of merging his theological convictions with 
philosophy in the long run. However, German and especially Kantian ideas were to be kept 
secret during late 1790s and early 1800s as the philosopher’s name was strongly associated 
                                                 
23 Coleridge in the Biographia Literaria provided a retrospective account of those days as follows: “After I 
had successively studied in the schools of Locke, Berkeley, Leibnitz, and Hartley, and could find in none of 
them an abiding place for my reason, I began to ask myself; is a system of philosophy; as different from mere 
history and historic classification, possible? If possible, what are its necessary conditions? I was for a while 
disposed to answer the first question in the negative, and to admit that the sole practicable employment for 
the human mind was to observe, to collect, and to classify. But I soon felt, that human nature itself fought up 
against this wilful resignation of intellect; and as soon did I find, that the scheme, taken with all its 
consequences and cleared of all inconsistencies, was not less impracticable than contranatural. (BL I, p. 141) 
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with Jacobinism.24 Coleridge therefore took precautions (especially after his return from 
Germany) in the face of attacks by the Anti-Jacobins and studied Kant “in silence” (Vardy 
2010, p. 13; Class 2012, p. 127). The secrecy demanded by his material at hand must have 
inspired Coleridge to use these ideas with hardly any explicit references to Kant. Finding it 
hard, at least initially, to make full sense of the critical philosophy, Coleridge resorted to 
his own interpretive skills and those of others so that he could formulate his own response 
to Kant. 
Two names must be specifically mentioned: Karl Leonhard Reinhold and Friedrich 
August Nitsch. In the process of formulating his doctrine of the unity of Reason, Kant 
famously asserted that theoretical (i.e. speculative) and practical reasons are distinct 
applications of the same Reason.25 According to this, whereas in the former such ideas as 
the soul, the world and God are “regulative principle[s] through which reason, as far as it 
can, extends systematic unity over all experience” (CPR, A 682-6 / B 710-4), its practical 
counterpart has a constitutive role (CPR A 800 / B 828)26 in that these three ideas emerge 
as its postulates (CPR, A 328-9 / B 385-6; CPrR, 5: 134-8). It is, however, only within the 
scope of morality that the practical Reason can take on a constitutive role, and Kant 
                                                 
24 See: Lewis W. Beck (1971) “Kant and the Right of Revolution”, Journal of the History of Ideas Vol. 32, 
No. 3 (Jul. - Sep., 1971), pp. 411-422. Also see: James Schmidt (2003) “Inventing the Enlightenment: Anti-
Jacobins, British Hegelians, and the ‘Oxford English Dictionary’”, Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 64, 
No. 3 (Jul., 2003), pp. 421- 443.  
25 In the first Critique, Kant stressed the unification of “practical with speculative reason” (CPR, A 8I6 / B 
844). In the Groundwork, he required “that the critique of a pure practical reason, if it is to be carried through 
completely, be able at the same time to present the unity of practical with speculative reason in a common 
principle, since there can, in the end, be only one and the same reason, which must be distinguished merely in 
its application” (4:391). Later in the second Critique he emphasized “the union of pure speculative with pure 
practical reason in one cognition.”(CPrR, 5:121) 
26 “…if the conditions for the exercise of our free choice are empirical, then…reason can have none but a 
regulative use, and can only serve to produce the unity of empirical laws…which can therefore provide none 
but pragmatic laws of free conduct for reaching the ends recommended to us by the senses, and therefore can 
provide no pure laws that are determined completely a priori. Pure practical laws, on the contrary, whose end 
is given by reason completely a priori, and which do not command under empirical conditions but 
absolutely, would be products of pure reason. Of this sort…are the moral laws; thus these alone belong to the 
practical use of reason and permit a canon.” 
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therefore firmly stressed that faith can be justified through Reason alone, but it is beyond 
possibility to ground it epistemologically.27 The first Kantian ideas to reach England were 
also filtered through the expositions of Reinhold,28 who largely disregarded Kant’s 
epistemological concerns and focused instead on the practical function of Reason so that 
“he could win massive public interest, especially by those seeking an endorsement of 
rational religion” (Class, 2012, p. 18). Reinhold also turned attention away from Kant’s 
reservations respecting the constitutive role of practical Reason at the end of the first 
Critique and Kant’s ethics, and suppressed “the sceptical dimension of the Critique of Pure 
Reason”; hence “in the mid-1780s… the German reading public associated the name 
‘Kant’ with the debate on rational theology” and Kant’s critical philosophy arrived at 
England “under the same banner” (p. 25). Like Reinhold, Nitsch selectively highlighted the 
constitutive function of practical Reason in critical philosophy. Class explains that 
Coleridge especially followed Nitsch’s interpretation of Kant even after he read the 
philosopher’s works in the original, because Nitsch’s lectures supplied him with “a version 
of the Kantian system” that was relatively more appealing for “Coleridge’s urgent quest for 
metaphysical oneness” than Kant’s transcendental account of the constitutive role of 
practical Reason: “The latter baffled Coleridge in parts and left him wondering what it 
could do for his belief, whereas Nitsch’s introduction had introduced critical philosophy as 
a relatively straightforward defence of rational belief” (p. 183). This interpretive line aided 
and encouraged Coleridge’s metaphysical speculations, by means of which he created a 
                                                 
27 “The Critique of Pure Reason introduced a strict dualism between the realm of knowledge and that of 
ethics, and distinguished sharply between their respective functions of Reason. Only in the realm of morality 
could (practical) Reason play a constitutive role.” (Class, 2012, p. 22)  
28 As Nicholas Adams (2010) states, Kantian philosophy was “corrected and systematized” by means of 
“interpretations” presented by such figures as Reinhold “during Kant’s lifetime”, and Kant’s ideas could not 
evade the “fate” of being “conflated” through these interpretations, though it was partially owing to the 
works of these mediators that Kant “became the towering figure of German philosophy…” (p. 28)  
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“Coleridgean Kant” to make the German philosopher the subject of his personal response. 
During his study of Kant in silence, therefore, Coleridge took his own initiative to 
transform Kant in such a way that he almost “calibrated” the latter’s conception of Reason 
and transcendental metaphysics by responding to the philosopher’s views through the 
selective accounts of the mediators as well as through his own quest for transcendent 
metaphysics. 
Coleridge was in such a process of scrutinizing his deeply-entrenched opinions in 
light of critical views of Kant when he came to the awareness of Wordsworth’s poetic 
genius in 1797 at Racedown.29 His attraction to the critical philosophy, I would like to 
suggest, intensified as he came to recognize the potential in Wordsworth’s poetry, and 
thought he found his other (and better) half with poetic genius, spurring him to design a 
philosophical poem for Wordsworth, later to be named The Recluse, a similar version of 
which he had been working on around 1796-97 (CN I, §213), but due to “Many 
circumstances, evil and good” the poem, “which was to have been entitled ‘THE BROOK’ 
had to be dropped (BL I, pp. 195-196). It was surely the emergence of Wordsworth in his 
life that he refers as a “good” circumstance, and it can be strongly inferred that Coleridge 
gave up his own project, just to assign it to Wordsworth in spring of 1798. 
Drawing attention to Coleridge “the poet” in his analysis of Coleridge’s treatment 
of Kant, Donald M. MacKinnon (1974) argues that his assessment of the philosopher “has 
to do with a poet’s understanding of one of the most commanding figures in the whole 
history of Western philosophy” (p. 183; emphasis added). My argument fundamentally 
differs from MacKinnon since my examination of Coleridge’s initial adoption and 
                                                 
29 It was not until March 1797 that the relationship of Coleridge and Wordsworth commenced, despite their 
prior acquaintance with one another - Coleridge read Wordsworth’s poems as early as 1793, and they once 
had been at the same meeting in Bristol. 
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response to critical philosophy will lay the emphasis on Coleridge-the-philosopher’s 
assessment of Kant to enable his joint project with Wordsworth-the-poet to write a “great 
philosophical poem”, The Recluse. In other words, I will also be investigating how 
Coleridge’s preoccupation with the Kantian philosophy especially after he started 
collaborating with Wordsworth from 1797 shaped his evolving reaction to Wordsworth’s 
The Prelude (1807) and The Excursion (1814) as the only completed parts of The Recluse 
project. 
As Seamus Perry (1999) suggests, we cannot sharply talk about Coleridge’s 
“epistemological” shift from empiricism to German philosophy, as “old ambiguities persist 
in the new German-inflected voice” (p. 5). Accordingly, one of the most definitive aspects 
of Coleridge’s thinking as well as philosophical method stemmed from his circular and 
dual thinking. He was hence able to accommodate incongruent elements in his intellectual 
potpourri, and because of this he could not adhere to any system but questioned it bits by 
bits. Amidst Coleridge’s oscillations between idealism and realism, writes Perry,    
there is a third variation in this divided Coleridgean epistemology, a very 
non-Kantian one, which promises to have things both ways : this finds a 
solving unity already objectively there, in experience, waiting to be 
discovered in the immediacy of perception, not just made up by the 
resourceful, subjective consciousness. This, I need hardly say, is the 
promise of the One Life, here (as elsewhere) holding out the prospect of 
providing the unity…as well as the diversity…all at once. (p. 104) 
In this regard, even though Kant appealed to Coleridge’s philosophical predicaments when 
he first met the philosopher’s works, he gradually became alienated from the definitive 
aspects of the Kantian philosophy, such as the regulative function of the Reason, 
possibility of the noumena, free will, “phenomenality” of religion and God.30 This is why, 
                                                 
30 Kevin Hart in “Religious Experience and the Phenomenality of God” differentiates between “the 
phenomenality of God” and “religious phenonomena”: Whereas the former concept challenges the Kantian 
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Perry goes on to say, “we should not be too simple in our Kantian presumptions” (p. 104). 
Coleridge responded to critical philosophy and played a significant role in its transmission 
to England; however, he had to find in a uniquely Coleridgean way to interpret the material 
to create forking paths for himself: Not necessarily to choose from, but to ensure they 
continue to exist in his philosophical system at once. As he later noted in Biographia, 
“…philosophy is neither a science of the reason or understanding only, nor merely a 
science of morals, but the science of BEING altogether, its primary ground can be neither 
merely speculative or merely practical, but both in one” (BL I, p. 252). 
Coleridge’s central metaphysical concern, according to Perry, was to ensure the 
coexistence of “oneness” in the face of “manifold experiences”, as a notebook entry of 
November 1799 testifies, “I would make a pilgrimage to the burning sands of Arabia, or 
&c &c to find the Man who could explain to me there can be oneness, there being infinite 
Perceptions – yet there must be oneness, not an intense Union but an Absolute Unity, for 
&c” (CN I, §556). Coleridge’s adherence to Multeity in Unity31 enabled him to formulate 
his response to Kantian concept of Reason because, as Perry suggests, “Coleridge seeks a 
brand of unity that will not depend on the renunciation of nature, but will bring the 
plurality of mortal beauty into a more immediate relationship with the unity of God; and 
this breeds a conception of the relationship between Reason’s unity and Understanding’s 
plurality” (1999, pp. 67-68). The route he followed in the process of digesting Kantian 
philosophy is substantially Coleridgean, as Paul Hamilton (2007) explains:  
                                                                                                                                                    
limitation imposed on religious experience “that comes from an acceptance of the critical philosophy”,  the 
latter is characterized by the notions of “the sacred”, “religious acts”, “proclamation”, “religious knowledge”, 
“sin” (2010, p. 134), which are relegated by the critical philosophy to a non-philosophical and therefore 
transcendent realm. For Coleridge, religion could not solely be associated with experience, nor can it be 
consigned to mind only – he had a way of thinking between “realism” and “idealism”, and this way of 
thinking is largely similar to “Phenomenological thinking” which, as Hart informs, takes “the ‘third path’ 
between realism and idealism…” (p. 135) 
31 The term was first presented in the Malta notebooks on 17 December 1804 (CN II, §2344). 
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Epistemological and ethical orientations in [Coleridge’s] writings often 
result from his departure from original sources in order to inflect them with 
a recognizably personal response. Logical categories and categorical 
imperatives are often made to contradict their primary functions by being 
obliged, when Coleridge handles them, to implement strategies…inimical to 
the founding purpose they possessed in their home philosophies. (p. 89) 
With this in mind, I wish to investigate how the underlying dissonance between those 
“original sources” and Coleridge’s personal responses had an effect on Coleridge’s 
philosophical conversations with Wordsworth prior to and after The Excursion (1814). 
 
Coleridge’s Response to Kant’s Transcendental Method, Dualistic Conception of 
Language and Two Levels of Imagination 
According to Kant, metaphysical concepts such as “God” and “free will” are, as Christoph 
Bode (2009) remarks, only “useful assumptions” and “regulative ideas”; they do not have 
any kind of demonstrable existence and, hence, “not constitutive of knowledge” (p. 593). 
Bode therefore emphasizes that Coleridge’s divergence from Kant’s philosophy was 
largely “caused by Coleridge’s religious needs and convictions” (p. 604). Coleridge 
underlined this fundamental divergence in the Opus Maximum: “The points in which I 
disagree with the illustrious sage of Königsberg” are those “in which he differs from the 
Christian code…” (pp. 39-40). For critics such as Wellek (1931), religion and faith 
presuppose renouncement of thought and critical thinking and, hence, Coleridge has been 
severely criticised on grounds of attempting to reconcile Kantian metaphysics with religion 
(or Christianity, to be more precise) in the first place.  
Coleridge revered Kant and mentioned his name with great respect and honour as 
late as 1817 (BL I, pp. 153-156; II, p. 89) and surely long after this date. I therefore differ 
from Bode when he suggests that “he was totally indifferent to Kant’s critical revolution in 
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philosophy” (2009, p. 600). The more acceptable explanation is, as also put by Bode, “that 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge…refused to accept any of the key elements of Kant’s Critical 
Philosophy”, but this does not amount to saying that “Kant’s Copernican Revolution was 
lost on him” (2009, p. 600). Rather, I hold in this study that Coleridge may not have fully 
understood Kant, but he was able to locate the aspects of the philosophy of that “sage of 
Königsberg” which did not accord with his metaphysical convictions and developed his 
response accordingly.32 As he later held in the Biographia, “true metaphysics are nothing 
else but true divinity, and… false metaphysics can be effectually counteracted by true 
metaphysics alone” (BL I, p. 291). As as result, critical philosophy came to be a vital 
reference for, Class maintains, “Coleridge’s deepest theological enquiries throughout his 
life, sometimes as a source of comfort and at other times as a source of frustration” (2012, 
p. 180). Largely by virtue of his muddled way of thinking and ability to adopt parallactic 
and multiple positions simultaneously, Coleridge had to renounce noteworthy and “key” 
parts of the Kantian critical philosophy on grounds of his religious commitments. And his 
idiosyncratic response began to develop from here. 
Coleridge’s essential motivation for philosophical inquiry was, first and foremost, 
to anchor the faith in God on solid philosophical grounds. This is why he had once planned 
his Logosophia to be titled “Christianity the one true Philosophy” (CL III, pp.533-4). As 
John Muirhead noted, “There is a sense in which Coleridge’s whole philosophy was a 
Philosophy of Religion” (1930, p. 217). This is true because Coleridge held that the term 
“Philosophy”, described in ontological terms, is “an affectionate seeking after the truth” 
                                                 
32 Bode argues that “Coleridge knew Kant’s categorical imperative well; he gave it in different versions, 
sometimes watered down to a ‘Do unto others…’ truism…In absolute contrast to the Kant of the Streit der 
Fakultäten, Coleridge saw philosophy not only as a handmaiden to Christian religion, but Christian religion 
as the culmination of all philosophy…” (2009, p. 602) 
36 
 
while keeping in mind that “Truth is the correlative of Being” (BL I, p. 142). Coleridge 
therefore had to differentiate his own philosophy from Kant as they had fundamental and 
methodological divergences of thought in terms of their respective pursuits of knowledge. 
In a letter to Poole in March 1801, Coleridge made a transcendental distinction between 
the passive and active mind by saying: “if the mind be not passive, if it be indeed made in 
God’s Image, & that too in the sublimest sense – the Image of the Creator – there is 
ground for suspicion, that any system built on the passiveness of the mind must be false, as 
a system” (CL II, p. 709). Even though he agrees with Kant respecting the active mind, 
Coleridge’s theological pursuits inevitably clashed with Kant’s transcendental idealism and 
the functions of the mind in his philosophy. In other words, Coleridge’s study and response 
to Kant was bound to show fundamental divergences due to his theological views merged 
with philosophical pursuits.Therefore, Coleridge countered the Kantian views of “Reason” 
as regulative agent of mind and “understanding” as its constitutive counterpart on the 
ground that, in the Kantian philosophy, they were conceived as faculties merely capable of 
producing representations. 
From the early acquaintance with the Kantian texts and ideas around 1799 until The 
Friend of 1809-10, Coleridge - “mediated by English publications” at the time - held 
Understanding predominantly as an empirical agent of knowledge, hence relegating it to a 
relatively lower position compared with Reason (Class, 2012, p. 170). In a letter of 
October 1806, for example, he made an explicit statement about the function of 
Understanding as “that Faculty of the Soul which apprehends and retains the mere notices 
of Experience” whereas Reason was defined as “most eminently the Revelation of an 
immortal soul, and its best Synonime” (CL II, p. 1198). On the other hand, beginning 
especially with the periodical Friend, Coleridge sought after fixed principles in politics, 
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philosophy and poetry, devoting himself to making sense of the background states of mind 
and anchoring due schemata. Coleridge noted in the Biographia that it was also “one main 
object of THE FRIEND” to “establish [the] distinction” between Reason and 
Understanding (BL I, p. 175), which henceforward carried, as Class notes, “enormous 
weight within Coleridge’s thought as a whole and in particular within his morality, 
theology and political philosophy” (2012, p. 171).33  
The Kantian distinction between Sense, Understanding and Reason in their 
respective operations on knowledge hence found a Coleridgean counter-argument in the 
periodical: “Sense” replaced Coleridge’s prior contempt for “Understanding”, and the 
latter was elevated to a higher status, now complementing the exalted faculty of “Reason” 
and functioning as the precondition for experience (pp. 187-190). However, compared to 
Kant’s synthesizing medium, Coleridge’s conception of Understanding still played a 
restrained role vis-à-vis Reason, which for Coleridge was a superior and divine faculty at 
all times. As Roy Park observes, Coleridge pursued “a higher reason capable of intuiting 
ideas as real not merely regulative” (1968, p. 336) whereas in Kant, the ideas are mere 
assumptions (1969, p. 365). By attributing to Reason a fundamentally “productive”, non-
representational and constitutive function, Coleridge was obviously speculating about the 
“highest problem of philosophy”.34 Whereas Kant refused to attribute any sort of 
independent or superior epistemic authority to Reason over Understanding, hence aiming 
to refute the claims about the metaphysical conundra, Coleridge prioritised Reason to such 
                                                 
33 As McFarland (1993) once asserted: “there is an infallible way to distinguish a true Coleridgean from a 
dabbler or from those who have encountered him in survey courses, no matter how enthusiastic these 
dilettantes may seem to be. That shibboleth, that litmus test, is provided by Coleridge’s distinction between 
reason and understanding.” (1993, p. 165) 
34 As he put it in 1817: “Whether ideas are regulative only, according to Aristotle and Kant; or likewise 
constitutive, and one with the power and life of nature, according to Plato, and Plotinus…is the highest 
problem of philosophy.” (Lay Sermons, p. 114) 
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an extent that “he even claimed that it was capable of revelation” (Class, p. 182) – hence 
simultaneously making an overt pronouncement about his own metaphysical agenda, as he 
occasionally but boldly stated, “Reason is from God, and God is Reason” as a recurring 
statement in several works (Fragments II, 1995, p. 128). Coleridge therefore made use of 
these concepts for his own theologically-attuned theories on language and imagination.   
As Philipp Hunnekuhl (2017) argues, after having his “empiricism undone by 
[Kant’s] critical philosophy”, Coleridge went beyond Kant’s view that ideas of the mind 
are only “regulative” and complete knowledge of the outside world is never possible as we 
only have access to the world of (finite) phenomena and human beings are not able to 
access to the world of noumena (pp. 51-52). As Schlutz also observes,  
For Kant, however, things as they might be in themselves, independent of 
the categories our consciousness imposes on them, let alone ‘The unity of 
all’, are categorically out of our cognitive reach and cannot become objects 
of knowledge at all. In a Kantian framework, no more can be ‘revealed’, 
even by the faculty of reason, than the epistemological boundaries beyond 
which the philosopher dare not and cannot venture. (2015, p. 501) 
Dissatisfied with Kant’s “modest humility with regard to the powers of the intellect” (The 
Philosophical Lectures, p. 538), Coleridge grew more interested, contrary to Kant, in the 
ability of Reason to constitute ideas and its capability to access the noumenal world – 
Dinge an Sich. 
Hamilton (2007) argues that “Coleridge agreed with Kant that ideas of reason were 
uncontainable within our understanding” but he opposed Kant’s restriction of “our 
apprehension of ideas into a sense of their progressiveness and productivity” (p. 4). 
According to Kant’s epistemology, the rational perception of the world demands a 
“synthesis” of understanding through which our inner faculties make sense of the 
phenomenal world. On the other hand, this proved to be an unfavourable aspect of Kantian 
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philosophy for Coleridge, as Schlutz (2009) argues, “Coleridge, much like Kant, saw the 
self’s very essence as residing in its connection to the noumenal law of reason, which for 
Coleridge, however, was not merely a transcendental, but decidedly a divine principle. 
This equation of metaphysics and religion, Coleridge felt, also had to be Kant’s own, albeit 
unexpressed, conviction” (pp. 215-16). Coleridge therefore retrospectively reflected in 
Chapter 9 of his Biographia:  
In spite of [Kant’s] declarations, I could never believe, it was possible for 
him to have meant no more by his Noumenon, or THING IN ITSELF, than 
his mere words express; or that in his own conception he confined the 
whole plastic power to the forms of the intellect, leaving for the external 
cause, for the materiale of our sensations, a matter without form, which is 
doubtless inconceivable. (BL I, p. 155) 
He was instead of the opinion that “Images and Thoughts possess a power in and of 
themselves, independent of that act of the Judgement or Understanding by which we affirm 
or deny the existence of a reality correspondent to them” (CL IV, 641). Coleridge’s method 
in this respect, as Joel Harter (2011) agrees, is “personal and experiential in a way that 
Kant’s is not” (p. 120). As he wrote in a notebook entry of 1809: 
What is the common principle of the Philosophical Systems of Des Cartes, 
(Lock?) Berkley, Hume, and Kant? That Our Senses in no way acquaint us 
with Things, as they are in and of themselves...the properties, which we 
attribute to Things without us...this very Outness, are not strictly properties 
of the things themselves, but either constituents or modifications of our own 
minds...therefore all our Knowledge is confined to Appearances, our 
philosophy a philosophy of Phaenomena...  (CN III, §3605) 
It was hence Coleridge’s aspiration, as Perry also notes, to “rescue one kind of Kantian 
noumena, the ideas of Reason, from their Kantian inaccessibility” because the Coleridgean 
Reason is by no means Kantian as it is “governed by its ideas of ‘allness’ and ‘oneness’” 
(1999, p.128). Even though he may not have access to the noumenal world, Coleridge’s 
recondite relationship with the fragment and the whole (“muddle”, as Perry puts it) and his 
40 
 
views of the transcendent existence of God compelled him to speculate that Reason must 
be constitutive. Coleridge hence crossed the boundary drawn by Kant between the realm of 
phenomena and that of noumena by means of attributing mind a relatively more active role 
so that it can perceive the Truth that is, for him, necessarily beyond our sensations.  
Coleridge’s engagement with the exchange between language and thought, 
combined with his metaphysical investigations, was a prominent factor determining his 
conception of linguistic forms and their formative powers distinctive from Kant’s dualistic 
views. James C. McKusick (2009) presents a comprehensive examination of Coleridge’s 
speculative remarks on “linguistic universals” and suggests that his conception of language 
was distinctively Romantic due to his references to the primordial, “prehistoric origin of 
language” – the so-called Ursprache (p. 575).35 Indeed, even during his early years of 
radical politics in the 1790s, as Tim Fulford (1991) holds it, his political sermons 
“produced different practices of figurative language - scriptural, intimate, satirical. From 
them Coleridge formed a theory by describing such language as an intimation of the 
mind’s unity with God” (p. xvii). Indeed, Coleridge wrote in September 1800 to William 
Godwin:  
‘Is Logic the Essence of Thinking?’ in other words— Is thinking impossible 
without arbitrary signs? &—how far is the word ‘arbitrary’ a misnomer? 
Are not words &c parts & germinations of the Plant? And what is the Law 
of their Growth?—In something of this order I would endeavor to destroy 
the old antithesis of Words & Things , elevating, as it were, words into 
Things, & living Things too. (CL I, pp. 625-26) 
According to this, words are not seen as merely arbitrary signs but their lexicon is 
constituted by the objects they point to in the first place, ultimately being capable of 
expressing the essential characteristics of things: Coleridge conceived of “words” as 
                                                 
35 That is, as McKusick (2009) explains, “the primordial language spoken by Adam and Eve in the Garden of 
Eden, in words believed to express the essential nature of things.” (p. 574)  
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“living powers, not merely articulated air” (Essays II, p. 249).  In a notebook entry of 
April, 1805 Coleridge wrote that  
ln looking at objects of Nature while I am thinking, as at yonder moon dim-
glimmering thro’ the dewy window-pane, I seem rather to be seeking, as it 
were asking, a symbolical language for something within me that already 
and forever exists , than observing any thing new. Even when that latter is 
the case, yet still I have always an obscure feeling as if that new 
phenomenon were the dim Awaking of a forgotten or hidden Truth of my 
inner Nature/ It is still interesting as a Word, a Symbol! It is…the Creator! 
[and the Evolver!]  (CN II, §2546) 
Coleridge’s religious views were hence inextricably connected with his theory of the 
“ultimate” origin of language and “the origin of human consciousness” (McKusick, 2009, 
p. 574). For him, linguistic signs were able to express “certain universal aspects of human 
cognition, and if we could only discover the remote origin of all human languages, we 
would learn something fundamental about human nature” (p. 587). Coleridge therefore 
aimed to handle such views in his works to properly reflect the underlying philosophical 
arguments. In a notebook entry of 1803, Coleridge therefore mentioned his plans to write a 
“philosophical Romance to explain the whole growth of Language” (CN I, §1646). Early 
Coleridge in his poems used “colloquial speech and superstitions as a way of exploring the 
presence of spiritual intimations in ordinary language” so that he could ensure “mental and 
linguistic unity with God” (Fulford, 1991, pp. xvii-xviii). After all, Coleridge from these 
years held that it was through recognition of language’s constitutive function with regards 
to thought and understanding that we could appreciate the “consubstantiality of God and 
the Word” (McKusick, 2009, p. 576). 
The more Coleridge developed his own eclectic and idiosyncratic philosophical 
response to Kantian transcendentalism, the more he sought to establish “new grounds for 
understanding both social and literary discourse” and he expressed this “in opposition… to  
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Immanuel Kant’s views on philosophy” because language “was vital in Coleridge’s 
attempt to show that the mind, contrary to Kant’s critique of its powers, could have a 
priori knowledge of itself and the world” – an attempt which gave rise to the Biographia, 
“which sought to make the creative wordplay of imagination the means by which, contrary 
to Kant, the mind could know itself, and re-create God’s own linguistic creation by the 
Logos”  (Fulford 1991, p. xix). In other words, Coleridge’s investment in linguistic 
speculation culminated in his practice of distinguishing between historical and 
conventional use of words and synonyms, and novel relations as well as associations 
brought about by development of human thought: “Desynonymization”, a term devised by 
Coleridge in 1803 (CN I, §1336). It was indeed Coleridge’s expertise, as he had recognised 
very early in his career, to desynonymize: “bring me two things that seem the very same,” 
he wrote in his notebook on December 1804, “then I am quick enough to shew the 
difference, even to hair-splitting” (CN II, §2372). Hamilton explains that Coleridge treated 
“linguistic usage as philosophical evidence, letting the language ‘think for us’”, which later 
progresses into the idea that language is a “model” for extension of knowledge – an idea 
explained by Coleridge’s “theory of desynonymy” (1983, p. 4). As Nicholas Halmi (2009) 
also observes, for Coleridge, desynonymy was “nothing less than the philosopher’s social 
responsibility”, which “Coleridge himself took seriously, formulating and defending 
distinctions between…imagination and fancy, primary and secondary imagination, reason 
and understanding…” (p. 345). Coleridge held that ordinary language was inadequate for 
conveying thoughts as they are, hence poetic diction and philosophical speculation 
approximated the origins of language, exempt from the wear-and-tear of the mundane 
transactions of life. “Coleridge’s theory of desynonymization”, as McKusick (2009) 
accordingly observes, “provides a central focus for all of his speculations on language 
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theory. It enables him to describe the evolution of language as a process involving both 
conscious volition and the merely functional responses of ordinary discourse to the 
exigencies of everyday life” (p. 585). The “innovations of desynonymy”, in this respect, 
are largely irreconcilable with the common language (Hamilton, 1983, p. 62) because 
desynonymy “is meant to illustrate how knowledge advances: it uses the example of the 
proliferation of language through the discovery that words we had thought were 
synonymous in fact have different meanings” (p. 4). Coleridge’s conception of language 
and the power of words gave way to his special emphasis on poetic diction and 
defamiliarization in poetry, as well as formulation of his idiosyncratic philosophy vis-à-vis 
Kant’s separation of thought and language.  
Coleridge’s response to Kant’s transcendental conception of “productive” 
imagination (which is subject to the rules of constitutive Understanding and regulative 
Reason), on the other hand, originated from his theological pursuits of the noumena, 
whereas non-phenomenal contact with the divine realm fell considerably at odds with 
Kant’s definition of imagination as an agent of the transcendental unity of apperception. 
Coleridge’s own theory of imagination (surely inspired by Schelling) developed in the 
course of years and culminated in his acclaimed definition in the Biographia Literaria 
(1817), I assert, owes much to his transcendent appropriation of the Kantian terms such as 
Sense, Understanding and Reason. 
Prior to The Friend of 1809, however, Coleridge’s conception of imagination was 
not as elaborate or categorical as he later put it in the Biographia. When we look at his 
letters and notebook entries, we can see a variety of references to imagination: He either 
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mourns the loss of imagination (hence loss of poetic powers) in himself as early as 1801,36 
or he considers imagination as a faculty that is able “to send ourselves out of ourselves” in 
1802.37 It was during his Mediterranean years38 that he began to formulate imagination as 
“the modifying Power in that highest sense of the word” distinct from fancy39, and in 1807, 
he calls imagination a “Laboratory, in which Thought elaborates Essence into Existence.”40 
These descriptions mainly point out Coleridge’s evolving conception of the vital role of 
                                                 
36 “…all sounds of similitude keep at such a distance from each other in my mind, that I have forgotten how 
to make a rhyme…The Poet is dead in me - my imagination (or rather the Somewhat that had been 
imaginative) lies, like a Cold Snuff on the circular Rim of a Brass Candle-stick, without even a stink of 
Tallow to remind you that it was once cloathed & mitred with Flame…I was once a Volume of Gold Leaf, 
rising & riding on every breath of Fancy-but I have beaten myself back into weight & density, & now I sink 
in quick-silver, yea, remain squat and square on the earth amid the hurricane, that makes Oaks and Straws 
join in one Dance, fifty yards high in the Element…” A letter to William Godwin, 25 March 1801. (CL II, 
pp. 713-14) 
37 Coleridge says in the letter to Southeby in July 1802, “It is easy to cloathe Imaginary Beings with our own 
Thoughts & Feelings; but to send ourselves out of ourselves, to think ourselves in to the Thoughts and 
Feelings of Beings in circumstances wholly & strangely different from our own/ hoc labor, hoc opus/ and 
who has atchieved it? Perhaps only Shakespere. (CL II, p. 809) 
38 Coleridge left England for Mediterranean in April, 1804 (and he did not return until August 1806) for 
various reasons, as Kooy (1999) outlines: “poor health, a tiresome wife, a love affair with a woman without 
hope of consummation, and failed ‘genial spirits’” (p. 102).  He travelled to Sicily and Malta and in January 
1805, started working as the Acting Public Secretary of Malta under Alexander Ball, a Civil Commissioner. 
A variety of works have so far shed light on the importance of his Mediterranean venture itself on 
Coleridge’s views on art, criticism and philosophy. See: Donald Sultana (Samuel Taylor Coleridge in Malta 
and Italy, 1969), Elinor Shaffer (“Infernal Dreams”, 1989), Eduardo Zuccato (Coleridge in Italy, 1996 ), 
Michael John Kooy (“How Public Service Shaped the Friend”, 1999) and, more recently, Tilar J. Mazzeo 
(“Coleridge’s Travels”, 2009), and Barry Hough and Howard Davis (Coleridge’s Laws: A Study of Coleridge 
in Malta, 2010).  
39 As he wrote in a letter to Richard Sharp on 15 January, 1804: “Wordsworth is a Poet, a most original Poet-
he no more resembles Milton than Milton resembles Shakespere-no more resembles Shakespere than 
Shakespere resembles Milton-he is himself: and I dare affirm that he will hereafter be admitted as the first & 
greatest philosophical Poet-the only man who has effected a compleat and constant synthesis of Thought & 
Feeling and combined them with Poetic Forms, with the music of pleasurable passion and with Imagination 
or the modifying Power in that highest sense of the word in which I have ventured to oppose it to Fancy , or 
the aggregating power-in that sense in which it is a dim Analogue of Creation, not all that we can believe but 
all that we can conceive of creation. Wordsworth is a Poet, and I feel myself a better Poet, in knowing how to 
honour him, than in all my own poetic Compositions, all I have done or hope to do-and I prophesy 
immortality to his Recluse, as the first & finest philosophical Poem, if only it be (as it undoubtedly will be) a 
Faithful Transcript of his own most august & innocent Life, of his own habitual Feelings & Modes of seeing 
and hearing.” (CL II, p. 1034) 
40 In September 1807, he jotted down the following: “Form is factitious Being, and Thinking is the Process. 
Imagination the Laboratory, in which Thought elaborates Essence into Existence.  A Psilosopher, i.e . a 
nominal Ph[ilosopher] without Imagination, is a Coiner-Vanity, the Froth of the molten Mass, is his Stuff and 
Verbiage the Stamp & Impression. This is but a deaf Metaphor-better say , that he is guilty of Forgery-he 
presents the same [sort of] Paper as th e honest Barterer, but when you carry it to the Bank, it is found to be 
drawn on-Outis, Esq. His words had deposited no Forms there, payable at Sight-or even at any imaginable 
Time from the Date of the Draft.” (CN II, §315) 
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imaginative power not only in poetic activity, but also in philosophy and metaphysics: 
While he previously feared at one point in 1801 that “Philosophy & Poetry [could] 
neutralize each other”41 and, therefore, he considered that it was only through 
“disburthen[ing] my self of all my metaphysics” that he could be “in possession of my 
present faculties” and could devote himself “to a long poem” ( CL II, p. 799), Coleridge 
later developed his theory of imagination so much so that he was able to demonstrate the 
integral role of imagination in not only poetry, but also metaphysics and philosophy. 
Eventually, as Myers also confirms, Coleridge’s theory of poetic imagination ended up 
deriving “theoretical coherence from the metaphysical assumptions in which they are 
embedded” (1987, p. 9).  
Considering Coleridge’s recognition of Sense, Understanding and Reason in a 
hierarchical way in The Friend of 1809,42 I aim to demonstrate in the following chapters 
the striking effect of this tripartite category on Coleridge’s conception of imagination and 
fancy in the 1810s, resulting in the two imaginations of the Biographia in 1817. In other 
words, I will be seeking to delineate the similarities between fancy and sense, primary 
imagination and Understanding, and secondary imagination and Reason in terms of their 
respective functions. This is a significant point considering Coleridge’s exchanges with 
Kant because he not only employed the Kantian terms and integrated them into his own 
ontological argument, but he also used those concepts to pave the ground for his theory of 
                                                 
41 In a letter to Poole on 1 February, 1801 Coleridge wrote that “I hope, Philosophy & Poetry will not 
neutralize each other, & leave me an inert mass. But I talk idly-I feel, that I have power within me: and I 
humbly pray to the Great Being, the God & Father who has bidden me ‘rise & walk’ that he will grant me a 
steady mind to employ the health of my youth and manhood in the manifestation of that power.” (CL II, pp. 
668-9) 
42 Here Coleridge unfolded his views as follows: “When we make a threefold distinction in human nature, we 
are fully aware, that it is a distinction not a division, and that in very act of mind the Man unites the 
properties of Sense, Understanding and Reason’ (TF II, p. 104 n). 
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imagination, which constitutes one of the most distinctive backbones of Coleridgean 
legacy.43   
The correspondence between these concepts has been previously scrutinized by the 
critics as well. Kathleen Wheeler (1986), for example, brings up the argument that 
Coleridge’s definition of imagination in the Biographia adopts “almost entirely the 
character of…reason” (p. 32). Schlutz (2009) has more recently argued that “The 
distinction between fancy and imagination” has its correspondent equivalence in “the 
distinction between the mechanical and empirical philosophy of association and the 
transcendental principles of Kantian and Idealist systems”, informing the underlying 
arguments of the Biographia and The Friend (p. 229). What I am suggesting here differs 
from these views because they exclusively focus on the discrepancy between the functions 
of fancy and imagination, and the latter’s association with Reason. On the other hand, I 
propose further differences in this context with the conviction that the formulation of 
imagination’s distinctive functions (i.e. primary and secondary) and their different 
characteristics from fancy outlined in the Biographia must be read through the spectacles 
of Coleridge’s idiosyncratic response to Kantian transcendental concepts - Sense, 
Understanding and Reason.  
 
Coleridge and Wordsworth: From Symbiosis to Friendship and Dialogue  
Coleridge had always been a figure in need of a friend, a guide, not only as a preceptor but 
also as a person to transform and be transformed by. He desperately needed someone to 
depend on not only in his private but also professional life, and Wordsworth became a 
                                                 
43 Wellek criticized Coleridge’s interpretation accordingly: “Reason under Coleridge’s hands returned to its 
old meaning of intellectual intuition, the limits between practical and theoretical reason are erased thereby 
and the whole flood of traditional metaphysics can again celebrate its triumphant entry.” (1931, p. 108) 
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friend and partner to reciprocate this lack. Prior to the publication of The Excursion in 
1814, a date which I take as the conscious emergence of Coleridge’s self-centred revisions, 
he was preoccupied with instilling much of his “bold Optimism” (PW I.I, p. 280) into 
Wordsworth and, for this reason, the literary partnership between Coleridge and 
Wordsworth has been subject to numerous scholarly works. To date, however, there have 
been few works focusing on the impact of Coleridge’s disillusionment with The Recluse 
project in general and The Excursion in particular. As far as I am aware of, there has not 
been a single monograph presenting Coleridge’s determination in the aftermath of 1814 to 
reconsider his previous symbiosis with Wordsworth to eventually establish proper dialogue 
with him as a “friend”. My distinct argument aims to fill in the gap that the critical 
attention to Coleridge and Wordsworth collaboration falls short of a comprehensive 
analysis of Coleridge’s estrangement from Kant on one hand and Wordsworth’s Kantian 
tendencies in The Excursion (1814) on the other - which, I suggest, had a permanent effect 
on his revisionary activity from 1814 to 1818.  
The symbiosis of Coleridge and Wordsworth was systematically described by 
Thomas McFarland (1981) in Romanticism and the Forms of Ruin. Through his argument 
that in the symbiosis of Wordsworth and Coleridge the latter acted as the sublimated-
masochistic partner (1981, p. 69), I think McFarland automatically (but probably not so 
consciously) suggests that it was Coleridge’s somewhat “pathological” dependence on 
others and continual self-loathing, which went back to his childhood, that resulted in his 
symbiosis with Wordsworth, especially during the annus mirabilis. Accordingly, 
“Coleridge’s varied miseries” including his procrastination, unstable will, infamous 
addiction and plagiarisms stemmed not necessarily from any specific “physical ailment” 
but from “a massive anxiety”, which originated from not only the feeling that he was 
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abandoned by his mother but also from the psychological “castration anxiety” he suffered 
because of his brothers (1981, pp. 112-116). Coleridge, according to McFarland, was 
hence psychologically compelled to merge himself with another – and superior44 – person, 
especially with surrogate “brothers”. This led Coleridge to idealise his relationship with 
Wordsworth through his conception of a joint oeuvre.  
Whatever the grounds of this dependence were, Coleridge at least in the early 
stages of his life indeed seems obsessed with self-annihilation by means of affect so that, 
as he addressed to Wordsworth in a notebook jotting of 1805, his “Spirit” could be “purged 
by Death of its Weaknesses” and his “identity might flow into thine, & live and act in thee, 
& be Thou” (CN II §2712). According to McFarland, this is symbiosis, and the symbiosis 
of Coleridge and Wordsworth at times resulted in a tangled partnership and convoluted 
productions: “Although most intellectual relationships mutually fecundate their 
participants at least to some extent,” says McFarland (1981), “that of Wordsworth and 
Coleridge was…a development of attitude so complellingly intertwined that in some 
instances not even the participants themselves could discern their respective contributions” 
(pp. 56-57).45 Lyrical Ballads (1798) was the first tangible output of this partnership (as 
well as the ensuing “misunderstandings”, as put by Newlyn (1986)), between the so-called 
symbiotic partners.  
Throughout this symbiosis, Coleridge shaped the philosophical views of 
Wordsworth – which is largely incontrovertible, though not wholly uncontroversial. Some 
critics bring attention to Coleridge’s immense impinge upon the development of 
                                                 
44 As he wrote in July, 1797: “Wordsworth is a very great man - the only man, to whom at all times & in all 
modes of excellence I feel myself inferior.” (CL I, p. 334) 
45 As Gravil exemplifies, The Monk “has appeared in both authors’ collected works, because it is written in a 
style that might have been produced by either”. (2009, p. 25) 
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Wordsworth’s philosophical views46, whereas others contend this view by holding that 
Wordsworth’s intellectual development was already in the making when he met Coleridge 
in 1797;47 that it is misguiding to attribute every line of novelty in his philosophical 
thought and originality to Coleridge as the latter was, in fact, on the weaker side of this 
relationship and did not have much to offer for Wordsworth48; or that such an assertion 
(i.e. Coleridge must have informed Wordsworth’s new ideas in poetry or prose) overlooks 
the materialism and empiricism at times implicit in Wordsworth’s thoughts and works.49 
I hold that whether Wordsworth was a philosophical figure before meeting 
Coleridge is irrelevant for this study, the focus here should be on what Coleridge thought 
Wordsworth would philosophically achieve through The Recluse. When Coleridge in a 
letter of August 1803 to Wordsworth advised him to move towards philosophy through 
poetry,50 he was most probably expecting that his symbiotic partner would follow his lead 
in philosophy and compose their joint project accordingly. Therefore, considering the 
overall argument in this study, I maintain that it was at Coleridge’s instigation for the sake 
                                                 
46 H. M. Margoliouth (1953 ), for example, puts that but for Coleridge’s intellectual assistance, Wordsworth 
would have achieved “no philosophy worthy of the name. As Dorothy opened the eye of his imagination to 
the small and tender, so Coleridge provided that imagination with structure and order” (p. 78). Jonathan 
Wordsworth (1969) maintains that it was largely Coleridge’s philosophical views that he supported prior to 
1798 (e.g. pantheism, nature speaking divine language…) that had constituted the basis for Wordsworth’s 
conception of nature in his poetry: Assimilating Coleridge’s philosophical thought enabled Wordsworth to 
formulate “the doctrine of the One Life” and to paint “the way towards Tintern Abbey (pp. 193, 199). 
Stillinger (1994) also holds that “Coleridge was the more dominant of the two at this time, and it is becoming 
increasingly clear that when he and Wordsworth, in their joint efforts to reform the style and subject matter 
of English poetry, wrote the same kinds of poem and had the same ideas about literature, it was usually 
Coleridge who was the innovator” (p.11).  
47 See: Bruhn, Mark J., Wordsworth Before Coleridge: The Growth of the Poet’s Philosophical Mind. 2018. 
Class also states that “Wordsworth was a philosophical thinker in his own right” (2012, p. 162). 
48 “Coleridge induced in the much stronger Wordsworth” says Bloom (1973), “no anxieties of poetic 
influence” (p. 57). Also see: Gravil, 2009. 
49 See: Fruman, (1971) Coleridge, the Damaged Archangel. p. 524.  
50 “Sir G. B. and his wife both say, that the Picture [a portrait by Hazlitt] gives them an idea of you as a 
profound strong-minded Philosopher, not as a Poet. I answered (and I believe, truly—) that so it must needs 
do, if it were a good Portrait—for that you were a great Poet by inspirations, and in the moments of 
revelation, but that you were a thinking feeling Philosopher habitually—that your Poetry was your 
Philosophy under the action of strong winds of Feeling—a sea rolling high.” (CL II, p. 957) 
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of The Recluse that Wordsworth must have become familiar with the Kantian critical 
philosophy. However, this study is not concerned either with the controversial issue of 
whether Wordsworth came to direct contact with the Kantian texts or not.51 I am more 
interested in discovering how Coleridge with his philosophical pursuits informed 
Wordsworth in the making of The Recluse.   
In terms of philosophy, Wordsworth was most certainly not only indifferent but 
also non-speculative as his poetic powers outweighed any learned intellectual speculation 
coming from books: in his “Tables Turned”, for example, Matthew is advised that it is 
nature, not books, that nourishes poetic composition, because “Sweet is the lore which 
nature brings” (2010, p. 48). My position here is that Coleridge passionately aimed to 
instruct Wordsworth in his journey of writing the philosophical poem of The Recluse, and 
shared his philosophical research and increasingly idiosyncratic (though not original) 
speculations with his friend beginning from 1797. Coleridge must have thought it plausible 
to make a “division of labours” with Wordsworth; that is, the former was meant to be a 
“metaphysician” with distinctive philosophical views whereas the latter had the true poetic 
genius.52 As Class (2012) also notes, “the poets had worked together on fairly equal 
grounds, as Coleridge had been solely able to claim the role as the philosophical thinker 
and literary critic. Philosophy was the area in which he could shine when he compared 
himself to Wordsworth” (p. 162). Coleridge must have thought they were to complement 
each other through their separate interests and strength; hence his acknowledgment of 
                                                 
51 Despite the lack of concrete evidence at hand, critics holding the idea that Wordsworth must have read 
Kant at some point in his life more often than not base their arguments on the link between Wordsworth’s 
essay “The Sublime and the Beautiful” (1811-1812) and Kant’s discussion of “the sublime” in The Critique 
of Judgement (Modiano, 1985; pp.128-129). It is not certain, however, whether Wordsworth read Kant 
himself or not; neither is it determinable with the evidence at hand. 
52 In a letter to Francis Wrangham on December 19, 1800 he said, “Wordsworth & I have never resided 
together…As to our literary occupations they are still more distant than our residences – He is a great, true 
poet – I am only a kind of Metaphysician.” (CL I, p. 658) 
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being a mere “metaphysician” pursuing philosophical verification of his ideas, and 
generous exaltation of Wordsworth during and even after their collaboration.  
 
The Recluse Project (1798-1814) 
The Recluse, jointly conceived by Coleridge and Wordsworth in March 1798, was planned 
to be “a literary Work that might live” (The Excursion, p. 38). As Coleridge wrote to 
Wordsworth in September 1799:  
I am anxiously eager to have you steadily employed on “The Recluse”...My 
dear friend, I do entreat you go on with “The Recluse”; and I wish you 
would write a poem, in blank verse, addressed to those, who, in 
consequence of the complete failure of the French Revolution, have thrown 
up all hopes of the amelioration of mankind, and are sinking into an almost 
epicurean selfishness, disguising the same under the soft titles of domestic 
attachment and contempt for visionary philosophies. It would do great 
good, and might form a part of “The Recluse”.... (CL I, p. 527)  
Coleridge’s expectations of the poem were decidedly overwhelming,53 and he obviously 
had a high opinion of this chiasmatic54 poetical venture because, as McFarland also 
suggests, it was “projected as an alternative version of Coleridge’s own system of 
philosophy” (2002, p. ccxxix). It was such a philosophical initiative and what I would say 
a bafflingly self-centred aspiration for dissemination of profound ideas that encouraged 
                                                 
53 As Perry (2014) summarizes, “…it would begin with the local verses of what is known as “Home at 
Grasmere” and then expand to include an anti-Lockean account of human nature; a rebuttal of empiricist 
epistemology; a refutation of theories of human evolution from the apes; a demonstration of the Fallenness of 
man as exemplified across the ages and the globe; an account of the hope of redemption; and finally a “grand 
didactic swell on the necessary identity of a true Philosophy with true Religion” and the metaphysical 
resolution of realism and idealism.” (p. 148) 
54 Jerome Christensen (1981) states that “For the amicable chiasmus is the figure of method … Partaking of 
both poles, distinct from either, method is both the crossing plank from one side of the stream to the other 
and the eddy where circulates the proprieties of intention and act: a in b, b in a. Translucent, provisional, 
faultlessly deferential to the truth it serves—method follows the track of the chiasmus” (p. 258). Also see: 
Christensen, 1994, “The Method of The Friend” in Rhetorical Traditions and British Romantic Literature . 
ed. Don H. Bialostosky and Lawrence D. Needham. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 
pp. 11-27.  
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Coleridge’s investment in Wordsworth’s poetical powers to write a great philosophical 
poem, to be called The Recluse, on “Man, Nature and Society” (The Excursion, p. 38). 
Paul Cheshire (2009) in his “Coleridge’s Notebooks” provides an analysis of two 
entries by Coleridge, and in these jottings we can trace, through analogies and underlying 
ambitions on the part of Coleridge, his agenda with regards to The Recluse. The first one is 
an entry of September–October 1802, where Coleridge complains that he laid “too many 
Eggs with Ostrich Carelessness” (CN 1: §1248), and the other quotation is a jotting of 
October 1803, where Coleridge appreciates Wordsworth for “devoting himself to his great 
work” (CN 1: §1546). Cheshire draws an analogy between the “single great egg” 
conceived by Coleridge and The Recluse: Although the first impression when two entries 
are compared might be “of Coleridge’s self-deprecation”, Cheshire notes, there is a 
reversal once we uncover “an underlying identification with Shakespeare” as his “ostrich 
eggs passage was adapted from Edward Capell’s recently reprinted preface to an edition of 
Shakespeare, who seemed bafflingly careless about the printing of his works” (2009, p 
303). This is a great analysis, and I would like to answer Cheshire’s question “If Coleridge 
the careless ostrich is the genius, what does that make Wordsworth?” and contravene his 
own answer “Given that Coleridge felt he had conceived the plan for The Recluse, it 
follows that Wordsworth had been allocated the ‘dull work of incubation’” (p. 303). I do 
not believe that for Coleridge writing poetry was a tedious task whatsoever55, nor do I 
think that for Coleridge the “egg” symbolizes only poetical or philosophical  creations. In 
other words, Coleridge the “careless” ostrich is not different from Wordsworth in 
                                                 
55 As Coleridge himself associated “composition” of poetry with “pleasure”, “delight” and “gratification” in 
the Biographia: “A poem is that species of composition, which is opposed to works of science, by proposing 
for its immediate object pleasure, not truth; and from all other species (having this object in common with it) 
it is discriminated by proposing to itself such delight from the whole, as is compatible with a distinct 
gratification from each component part.” (BL II, p.13)  
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conceiving eggs of another kind, it was just an issue of dividing labours and producing 
multiple “eggs”, though different in kind, through reciprocity. Cheshire’s later addition 
seems to support my view here: “The ostrich allusion has other resonances…ostriches do 
not distinguish between their own eggs and those of others” (p. 303). This amounts to 
saying, in the context of The Recluse, that Coleridge could not but carelessly scatter his 
philosophical views and it is through the poetry of Wordsworth that his views would turn 
into tangible productions. Wordsworth did not merely incubate, he conceived an “egg” 
which, but for the views of Coleridge, would hatch but might not have survived long. The 
Recluse project is hence the embodiment of Coleridge’s conception of a joint oeuvre. I 
argue that this was an effect Coleridge aimed to achieve so that he could continue speaking 
through Wordsworth, a strong wish that lingered in some form or other up until 1814. 
One feels compelled to ask at this point: Why did not Coleridge himself devote his 
time to create such a project? Why did he find it convenient to set out on a great 
philosophical poem with Wordsworth? First of all, Coleridge had previously planned to 
write a philosophical poem (to be named “The Brook”) but could not finalise it.56 
Secondly, when they met, Coleridge was so overwhelmed by the poetic genius of 
Wordsworth that he felt the latter would be the perfect poetic outlet for his philosophical 
ideas, hence he vigorously assigned this sublime task to him. The project therefore was, to 
a large extent, “Coleridge’s own aspiration” but “had been projected into Wordsworth’s 
venture” (McFarland, 2002, p. ccxxxi). This line of thought does not, nevertheless, amount 
to saying that Wordsworth’s poetry on its own merely consisted of such primitive pursuits 
                                                 
56 As Coleridge mentioned in the Biographia: “I sought for a subject, that should give equal room and 
freedom for description, incident, and impassioned reflections on men, nature, and society, yet supply in 
itself a natural connection to the parts, and unity to the whole...Many circumstances, evil and good, 




as retreat to pastoral landscape or simplicity. On the contrary, as Stephen Gill (2003) also 
confirms, Wordsworth had been a “philosophic poet” ever since the annus mirabilis, and 
“philosophical aspiration was integral to Wordsworth’s sense of his poetic vocation” (p. 
143).57 However, both Wordsworth and Coleridge from the outset had divergent opinions 
as to how to compose a philosophical poem, differing “without knowing how crucially 
they differed”: “Coleridge looked for Wordsworth to pronounce ‘upon authority’ a ‘system 
of philosophy’, whereas Wordsworth had declared only that his ‘object’ was ‘to give 
pictures of Nature, Man, and Society’ (6 March 1798)” (Gill, 2003, p. 144). Coleridge’s 
conception of a joint oeuvre and his professional and psychological motivations behind 
this idea largely explains the way he came to guide and even overwhelm Wordsworth’s 
idiosyncratic composition of philosophical poetry – at least to a certain extent until The 
Excursion (1814).  
If we follow what Coleridge thought at the time, it becomes clear that The Recluse 
was to be the ultimate product of Coleridge philosophically speaking through Wordsworth. 
Whereas Coleridge previously failed to undertake such a comprehensively ambitious 
project, he sought to make himself an inalienable part of what would be Wordsworth’s 
biggest poetic mission.58 In other words, this project for Coleridge was meant to make 
Wordsworth follow his own mostly idiosyncratic philosophical synthesis. This was not a 
strategy per se, but an indispensable instinct for Coleridge of speaking through another.59 
                                                 
57 Gill adds that “in Wordsworth’s case…the philosophical poetry underpins everything else. The Ruined 
Cottage and ‘Tintern Abbey’; much, perhaps most, of The Prelude…much of The Excursion…To ‘do 
justice’ to all of Wordsworth’s poetry, the challenge of the philosophic verse must be embraced.” (p. 149)  
58 Wordsworth in 1804 wrote to De Quincey, underlining the importance of The Recluse for him, and stated it 
was such a work that he could “devote the Prime of my life and the chief force of my mind” to it. (WL I, p. 
454)   
59 He occasionally wrote to Wordsworth such letters as follows: “I long to see what you have been doing. O 
let it be the tail-piece of 'The Recluse'! for of nothing but 'The Recluse' can I hear patiently…” (12 October 
1799, CL I, p.538)  
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His seemingly-disparaging remarks in comparison with Wordsworth’s poetic genius were 
not mere self-abasements but the means for personal as well as professional survival for 
him to cope with and compensate for the lack since he believed that “every generous mind 
. . . feels its Halfness” (CN III, §3325). McFarland, talking about “Coleridge’s intense 
psychological need for collaborative support in almost anything he did”, describes this lack 
as Coleridge’s “masochistic and psychically clinging” reliance on Wordsworth (1981, p. 
94). However, in my opinion this very tendency points to a more profound need for 
Coleridge: the need for a complementary counterpart so that he could react symbiotically 
and interact chiasmatically. For instance, Coleridge in “The Blossoming Of The Solitary 
Date-Tree” (originally written prior to and around The Prelude of 1807)60 with the line 
“The buoyant child surviving in the man” (PW I.II, p. 811) seems to be addressing 
Wordsworth as such a partner that he wished, if he could, to maintain as part of his own 
body. This was also the case when he assigned The Recluse to Wordsworth back in 1798. 
We can say that Coleridge right at the onset aimed to erase the distinctions between his 
own contributions to the project and those of Wordsworth in order to seamlessly merge his 
philosophical thoughts with the verse of his symbiotic partner. Therefore, rather than 
making Coleridge dependent on Wordsworth only, this process proved that by subscribing 
to Coleridge’s grand scheme, Wordsworth also acknowledged his philosophical 
dependence on Coleridge to write the poem, especially the central philosophical sections of 
it. This is why when Wordsworth heard in March 1804 that his friend was intent on leaving 
the country for Malta, he wrote nervously to Coleridge: “I am very anxious to have your 
notes for The Recluse. I cannot say how much importance I attach to this. If it should 
please God that I survive you, I should reproach myself for ever in writing the work if I 
                                                 
60 In the Poetical Works, the poem is dated as “1807-8? 1802-4?” See: PW I.II, p. 808. 
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had neglected to procure this help” (WL I, p. 452).61 However, it was not until 30 May 
1815, eleven years belatedly, that Coleridge wrote about the content of The Recluse he had 
projected at the time of their collaboration (CL IV 574-5). Wordsworth hence had to 
proceed to writing the parts he single-handedly could compose. 
 
The Prelude (1807) 
Wordsworth began writing the preliminary version of The Prelude in and around 
September 1798, after the publication of the Lyrical Ballads. Coleridge got him to embark 
upon a truly major task of writing the first philosophical poem ever and Wordsworth was 
at first not aware how big the venture was and how overwhelming the project would be.62. 
He was surely worried whether he could manage to do justice to such a big undertaking, 
but as we see in The Prelude, he wished to create the poem as expected.63 Coleridge read 
the first two books of The Prelude in January 4, 1804, before he headed for the 
Mediterranean. As he recorded in his notebook, “in the highest & outermost of Grasmere 
Wordsworth read to me the second Part of his divine Self-biography” (CN I §1801). I think 
the words presumably highlighted by Coleridge here are “divine” and “Self-biography”: 
The project, as a “prelude” to The Recluse, emerged as the intertwinement of 
Wordsworth’s poetic genius and intellect with the hopes of producing a grand poem 
                                                 
61 In another letter of 29 March, 1804, Wordsworth asked Coleridge for immediate action of sending his 
notes on The Recluse: “Your last letter but one, informing us of your late attack, was the severest shock to 
me, I think, I have ever received… I cannot help saying that I would gladly have given three fourths of my 
possessions for your letter on The Recluse at that time. I cannot say what a load it would be to me, should I 
survive you and you die without this memorial left behind. Do for Heaven’s sake put this out of the reach of 
accident immediately.” (WL I, p. 464) 
62 In May 1838, in a retrospective confession to George Ticknor, Wordsworth admitted that he “had 
undertaken something beyond his powers to accomplish”. (Life, Letters, and Journals of George Ticknor, p. 
167)  
63 “Oh, that I had a music and a voice 
Harmonious as your own, that I might tell 
What ye have done for me.” (Book XI: 20-22) 
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through the philosophical views of Coleridge. In other words, Coleridge expected that his 
partner could accomplish writing The Recluse in a way that blended his autobiographical 
narrative with themes pointing to philosophical and divine truths all across the ages. 
However, Wordsworth had to learn how to be at ease with the autobiographical voice he 
was meant to adopt in The Recluse as he initially did not like the idea of talking too much 
of himself. He thought the personal details mentioned in The Prelude could only be 
justified with publication of The Recluse so the reader could see the larger picture.64 
Coleridge was re-introduced to another version of the poem after his return from 
Malta at Coleorton in January 1807 (the thirteen-book Prelude as Wordsworth completed 
in 1805-06). Despite the divergences with Coleridge especially on the power of language 
in constitution of thought, The Prelude of 1807 made a considerably reassuring effect on 
Coleridge in terms of his expectations of a joint project, a philosophical poem. It was, after 
all, the “Poem to Coleridge”, which strongly and profoundly stimulated him to respond 
with another poem, “To William Wordsworth”, in which he extravagantly praised the 
poetic genius of his symbiotic partner.65 James Heffernan once suggested that The Prelude 
was “Wordsworth’s letter to Coleridge, and the Biographia Literaria was Coleridge’s 
reply” (1969, p. 5). Mileur (1982) similarly suggests that Biographia is “a reply to 
Wordsworth’s ‘Growth of a Poet’s Mind’” (102). I challenge this view with the following 
                                                 
64 In a letter of April 29, 1804 to Richard Sharp, Wordsworth mentioned having written “between two and 
three thousand lines…”, and added that “It seems a frightful deal to say about oneself, and of course will 
never be published (during my lifetime I mean) till another work [The Recluse] has been written and 
published, of sufficient importance to justify me in giving my own history to the world.” (WL I, p. 470) 
65 This is a crucial turn in my argument about their lingering symbiosis: Coleridge was instigated to write a 
fairly major poem in his career as a reaction to another poem which was written by Wordsworth at 
Coleridge’s own instigation so that the latter could speak through the former. This must be why Coleridge at 
the time cherished high hopes that his friend, the “great bard”, was close to completing “An Orphic Tale 
indeed / A Tale divine of high and passionate thoughts”, and gave his heart a “More than historic…prophetic 
Lay” as Wordsworth was the divine singer of a “high theme…sung aright” for the first time (PW II.II, p. 
1031). The poem indeed seemed to Coleridge as a proper preamble to their joint project itself and he felt 
compelled to reciprocate duly.    
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proposition: The Prelude was indeed Wordsworth’s letter, but the reply was apparently 
“To William Wordsworth” (1807) which, I argue, is a poem of “symbiotic reaction” 
because, taken together, the two texts reveal no dialogue as it would be the case if we took 
the terms “letter” and “reply” for granted. Instead, in order to understand the relationship 
between Wordsworth and Coleridge, the works must be considered as complementary 
voices of two writers, one of whom recently claimed to have lost his poetic powers 
(“Dejection: An Ode” of 1802), conferring them all on Wordsworth’s verse.66 I suggest 
that the poem was Coleridge’s last tangible – and candidly hopeful – attempt to retain the 
division of labours he had long envisaged for himself and Wordsworth. This must be why, 
for example, Coleridge in 1807 promised posthumous fame and immortality to 
Wordsworth as long as he remained loyal to the themes Coleridge envisaged for him: 
O great Bard!  
Ere yet that last strain dying awed the air,  
With stedfast eye I viewed thee in the choir  
Of ever-enduring men. The truly Great  
Have all one age, and from one visible space  
Shed influence! They, both in power and act,  
Are permanent, and Time is not with them,  
Save as it worketh for them, not in it. (PW I.II, p. 817) 
 
Here, Coleridge does not solely and self-renouncingly assign the role of “great Bard” who 
will join the “permanent” company of “ever-enduring” authors to Wordsworth; he 
simultaneously (but not overtly) attributes the role of a mentor, the man of guidance and 
influence, to himself. Upon hearing the poem, The Prelude, Coleridge was hence proud 
that he was the moving spirit behind Wordsworth’s masterpiece which, as Kenneth 
Johnston (2003) tells us, is “very much a modern epic, with its emphasis on the growing 
                                                 
66 This is one of the reasons Morton D. Paley (1996) takes “To William Wordsworth” as a work marking 
Coleridge’s transition to “Later Poetry” because “it renounces the grand poetry of public statement that had 
been so important to him from the late 1780s onwards.” (p. 12)  
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selfconsciousness of its hero, more central to its story than all the mighty places and events 
through which he passes…” (p. 70). Coleridge in “To William Wordsworth” similarly 
pointed out that with The Prelude, Wordsworth was able to reflect “the foundations and the 
building up / Of a Human Spirit”, which acted as a medium pointing to the intrinsic 
relationship between the mind and the phenomenal world, and revealed the latter to the 
“understanding mind” (PW I.II, p. 816). In the following part, I aim to read The Prelude 
through Coleridge’s spectacles and demonstrate the grounds for his passionate appraisal in 
“To William Wordsworth”. 
One of the most fundamental distinctions between Coleridge’s and Kant’s 
philosophical views concerned the place of metaphysics, God, religion and noumena in 
their respective philosophies, and the question of whether human beings are capable of 
seeing into the existence of such concepts. For Coleridge, establishing his thought “by 
habituating philosophy to religion, and making religion amenable to philosophy” was of 
central importance to this thought; such a “marriage” enabled him to hold the view, as he 
expressed it in Philosophical Lectures of 1818-19, that “religion never can be philosophy, 
because the only true philosophy proposes religion as its end and supplement” and 
therefore, he held, “there can be no true religion without philosophy…” (p. 264). On the 
other hand, as Jonathan Roberts (2015) remarks, Wordsworth’s attitude towards religion 
“might include matters such as his fluctuating relationship to the church, the baptism and 
burial of his children, his theological outlook, and his impact on religious debate in the 
nineteenth century”, and his “religious experience” is constituted by such “first-person 
epiphanies (‘spots of time’)” as we can see in The Prelude (p. 694). Despite his relative 
distance from religion and philosophy, Wordsworth handled these topics in a way that, to a 
certain extent, satisfied Coleridge in 1807. The lines “I yearn towards some philosophic 
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song / Of truth that cherishes our daily life, / With meditations passionate from deep / 
Recesses in man’s heart, immortal verse / Thoughtfully fitted to the Orphean lyre” (Book I: 
232-236) illustrate the merging of Coleridge’s philosophical, hence religious, agenda with 
Wordsworth’s spiritual austerity vis-à-vis nature. At times, the religious tone in The 
Prelude is so strong (e.g. “When God, the giver of all joy, is thanked / Religiously in silent 
blessedness” (Book VI: 617-618)) that one may even think the lines could have been 
written by Coleridge himself.  
“[H]ad he evaded Coleridge’s sway” Perry (2009) asserts, Wordsworth “would not 
have become Wordsworth, most particularly not the author of The Prelude” (p. 661). I 
would like to slightly contravene Perry’s suggestion because I hold that Wordsworth could 
have written the poem, and it would be The Excursion written seven years prematurely. 
What I mean is that the persisting symbiotic relationship between Coleridge and 
Wordsworth, combined with the overwhelming expectations about The Recluse, created 
such a pressure on Wordsworth in The Prelude that he seems to be alternating between his 
own voice and the invisible (but “reliably present”) voice of Coleridge. In other words, for 
Coleridge, the reason The Prelude was so much of a success was because in the poem he 
could see the glimpses of the philosophical system he had been forging by himself – and 
Wordsworth was hence sometimes a devout religious man, sometimes almost a pantheist 
deriving religious experience from nature throughout the poem. 
Another fundamental aspect of Coleridge’s thinking in relation to the critical 
philosophy of Kant was that although he defended the constitutive mind, his metaphysical 
quest did not merely depend on the mind because nature (or the phenomenal world) also 
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partook in it.67 As Tim Milnes (1999) also maintains, Coleridge sought to achieve a 
“harmonization” so that he could eventually “defeat the philosophies of mechanism and 
complete the logical propaedeutic of Kant without succumbing to the impieties of absolute 
idealism” (p. 310). The harmony he was looking for could be realised through commitment 
to the idea that nature and human mind are continuous with each other, being actively 
engaged in one another’s realm in a non-dualistic way.68 Considering that Coleridge could 
not conceive of the mind without transcendent references, its phenomenal correlative 
would definitely also be abound with divine characteristics. 
In The Prelude, nature is therefore almost divine, as “her works…hold forth a 
genuine counterpart / And softening mirror of the moral world” (Book XIII: 287-289). 
Wordsworth talks about contently “mingling with the world”, which at once makes him 
commune “With God and Nature” (Book II: 449-454). However, nature is not merely a 
reflection of the mind, the mind is also actively interacting with nature, and one can gain 
consciousness of it through contemplation. The poet hence is able to profoundly interact 
with it. This is a considerable contrast with the Kantian view of the phenomena because 
nature is not restricted by the boundaries of the human mind as a transcendental agent. The 
following passage illustrates the way Wordsworth’s lines coincide with Coleridge’s 
conception of the mind: 
… yet the mind is to herself 
                                                 
67 See: Modiano, 1985, pp. 154-160. 
68 As Wheeler (1986) suggests, “Coleridge insisted that this view makes it impossible to account for 
knowledge or to have any knowledge, and that the idealist solution is nonsensical, giving too much 
constructive power, or the wrong kind of power, to an externally conceived mind. Alternatively, we can see 
mind as a natural part of the course of natural events, with experience as neither subjective nor private nor 
mental, but the interactions and interrelations of natural objects, including minds. Imagination and 
intelligence are not, then, thought to 'create' the world of subjective experience based on some unknowable 
objective reality, thus denying the force of a natural world constantly at odds with, and pressing itself upon, 
intelligence. Imagination and intelligence are basic aspects of experience which can profoundly affect and 
alter experience for the better or the worse.” (“Coleridge’s Theory of Imagination”, p. 31) 
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Witness and judge, and I remember well 
That in life’s everyday appearances  
I seemed about this period to have sight 
Of a new world—a world, too, that was fit 
To be transmitted and made visible 
To other eyes, as having for its base 
That whence our dignity originates,  
That which both gives it being, and maintains 
A balance, an ennobling interchange 
Of action from within and from without: 
The excellence, pure spirit, and best power, 
Both of the object seen, and eye that sees. (Book XII: 368-380) 
In such a landscape, nature is not only an external object, it also acts upon mind in a way 
that informs it. In this respect, it is this exchange that makes Wordsworth the genuine poet 
of The Prelude:  
When, as becomes a man who would prepare 
For such a glorious work, I through myself 
Make rigorous inquisition, the report  
Is often chearing; for I neither seem 
To lack that first great gift, the vital soul, 
Nor general truths which are themselves a sort 
Of elements and agents, under-powers, 
Subordinate helpers of the living mind.  
Nor am I naked in external things, 
Forms, images, nor numerous other aids 
Of less regard, though won perhaps with toil, 
And needful to build up a poet’s praise. (Book I:159-169) 
Although such valences may bring pantheistic undertones into mind, I do not subscribe to 
the idea that Wordsworth is a thorough pantheist (or panentheist, for that matter) in these 
lines. Rather, I see here a Wordsworth dutifully struggling to combine his own 
autobiographical account with the expectations of Coleridge for the joint oeuvre.    
Kant asserts that mind contains the (synthetic-)a priori notions (such as the laws of 
space and time as well as arithmetics and geometry) and God as a metaphysical concept  
must belong in the realm that is unknowable by the parameters of epistemology. Although 
we can conceive of metaphysical notions, they are not directly derived from any empirical 
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evidence in nature: Because our mind has a priori the sense of “time” and “space”, and 
applies them onto objects of experience, as Kant puts it, “…we ourselves bring into the 
appearances that order and regularity in them that we call nature, and moreover we would 
not be able to find it there if we, or the nature of our mind, had not originally put it there” 
(CL II, p. 241). According to Kant’s proposition, then, it is perception that determines the 
nature of experience in the phenomenal world, and apart from that, nothing can be the 
object of knowledge. In The Prelude, however, nature takes an active action, for example, 
to arouse emotions in us: 
The morning shines, 
Nor heedeth man’s perverseness; spring returns— 
I saw the spring return, when I was dead 
To deeper hope, yet had I joy for her… (Book XI: 22-25) 
Nature and the inner life, in The Prelude, are not superior to one another; they are 
complementary to human beings’ cognition of the phenomenal (as well as the noumenal, 
Coleridge would assert) and can alternately work together. 
The mind hence divinely ordained in The Prelude points to harmonious unity out of 
multiple forms in nature, as the poet confirms:     
…in all things  
I saw one life, and felt that it was joy. 
One song they sang, and it was audible, 
Most audible then when the fleshly ear, 
O’ercome by grosser prelude of that strain, 
Forgot its functions, and slept undisturb’d. (Book  II: 435- 440) 
Once the poet eclipses the automatized effects of the sensually informed external stimuli, 
the “fleshly” organs, he can reflect more focusedly on the workings of his mind, and the 
exchange between Reason and Understanding. However, this does not mean blocking the 
sense completely out and confining oneself to the machinations and perceptions of the 
mind. Both must be engaged in order to activate the mind’s receptivity to not only its own 
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conceptions but also to nature as it is.  Coleridge’s solution to these multiple forms of 
nature is “multeity in unity”, a Coleridgean term denoting a reconciliation of “multeity” of 
those “motions of the sense / Which seem, in their simplicity, to own / An intellectual 
charm…” (Book I: 582-584) with an all-pervading unity originating in the mind. This is 
how the multeity in unity functions in our struggle to make sense of the world and our 
experience of it. Wordsworth’s following lines bear testimony to the influence of this 
crucial concept on The Prelude:      
Add also, that among the multitudes  
Of that great city oftentimes was seen 
Affectingly set forth, more than elsewhere 
Is possible, the unity of man, 
One spirit over ignorance and vice 
Predominant, in good and evil hearts  
One sense for moral judgments, as one eye 
For the sun’s light. When strongly breathed upon 
By this sensation—whencesoe’er it comes, 
Of union or communion— doth the soul 
Rejoice as in her highest joy; for there,  
There chiefly, hath she feeling whence she is, 
And passing through all Nature rests with God. (Book VIII: 830-842) 
The poetic voice here explicitly affirms the role of the transcendent entity in ensuring the 
harmonious coexistence of multiplicities and unity. In other words, “Multeity” is not a case 
to be tackled with, or to be ruled out. The “muddle” per se in the sense Perry uses it serves 
well to understanding the lines above: refusal of mind’s complete dominance over nature 
requires one to recognise the reciprocal and a not-necessarily-hierarchical nurturing 
process between them. One may, as in the case of Coleridge, make a lifelong effort to 
arrive at unity, but multeity has a simultaneous reality.  
It is through the divine blessing of God that Wordsworth thinks we can get a 
glimpse of the “one”. I suggest that we can trace Coleridge’s line of thought in the 
following piece of The Prelude:  
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The mind of Man is fram’d even like the breath  
And harmony of music. There is a dark  
Invisible workmanship that reconciles  
Discordant elements, and makes them move  
In one society. (Book I: 354-358) 
The “workmanship”, though non-graspable through the senses and is not visible (hence 
“dark” and belonging to the noumenal), is able to exert control over “Nature” which, “by 
extrinsic passion… / Peopled my mind with beauteous forms or grand, / And made me 
love them” (Book I: 576-578). Wordsworth’s account in The Prelude of a realm which – 
though “Invisible” to the “human eye” lives yet “to the heart” – exists “beyond the reach 
of” knowledge69 is therefore definitely the locus of noumena. The enquiry into the 
metaphysical (hence transcendent) conception of noumena was laid substantial emphasis in 
Coleridge’s transcendent philosophy due to the idea that once we relegate the noumenal 
world to an unknown realm, religion would automatically go under erasure. Coleridge 
therefore strictly questioned the Kantian idealist system which, he thought, relied too 
heavily on the machinations of the mind. This idea could be the moving impetus behind 
Wordsworth’s composition of the following lines while Coleridge was in Malta: “What 
[would] then [remain] in such eclipse, what light / To guide or chear? The laws of things 
which lie / Beyond the reach of human will or power, / The life of Nature, by the God of 
love / Inspired—celestial presence ever pure” (Book XI: 96-100). That is to say, we can 
hold that the philosophical inspiration informing these lines of the thirteen-book Prelude 
                                                 
69 “I was only then 
Contented when with bliss ineffable  
I felt the sentiment of Being spread 
O’er all that moves, and all that seemeth still, 
O’er all, that, lost beyond the reach of thought 
And human knowledge, to the human eye 
Invisible, yet liveth to the heart” (Book II: 424-430) 
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can be inferred on the basis of Coleridge’s philosophical concerns and religious agenda at 
the time.   
Considering the literature on Wordsworth’s relationship with language as a 
medium of expressing his personal history in The Prelude, we can see that it is 
predominantly centred around the idea of language as incapable of verbalising his thoughts 
(See: Borck, 1973; Lee, 2019). This view is largely grounded upon Wordsworth’s theory 
of ordinary language in the 1800 “Preface” to the Lyrical Ballads. However, I must note 
here that whereas the Lyrical Ballads itself was a joint project of two poets, The Prelude is 
the product of a bigger project designed by a poet and a philosophically-attuned 
“metaphysician”. Therefore, Wordsworth here was meant to be guided by the 
philosophical precepts communicated to him by Coleridge, as well as still having his own 
theory of ordinary language in mind. This aspect of collaboration resulted in a curious case 
in The Prelude: Wordsworth at times suffered from inaction and inexpression in the face of 
language, as the following lines from the poem illustrate:  
Oh mystery of man, from what a depth 
Proceed thy honours! I am lost, but see 
In simple childhood something of the base 
On which thy greatness stands… 
(…) 
I see by glimpses now, when age comes on 
May scarcely see at all; and I would give  
While yet we may, as far as words can give, 
A substance and a life to what I feel (Book XI: 330-344) 
The poetic voice here nostalgically reminisces the days he thought “words” were able to 
express and give meaning to his inner thoughts, hinting at the idea that Wordsworth has 
already lost his faith in language’s divine power to constitute and express thoughts through 
the filters of the mind. On the other hand, most probably when he feels the strong presence 
of Coleridge, we see the poet’s faith in the linguistic signs to convey just the right meaning 
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– as if he is letting Coleridge speak through him. In this part of my demonstration, it is the 
“speak through” moment that I would like to focus on in order to highlight the parts that 
appealed to Coleridge in the thirteen-book Prelude in 1807. 
Words and their immediate correspondence with the referents was the most 
defining characteristic of Coleridge’s conception of language rooted in his religious 
orientation. As discussed previously, this topic is also another matter of divergence from 
Kant, whose dualism vis-à-vis words and thought radically clashed with Coleridge’s 
organicism. He therefore believed that language could be the medium to ensure the unity 
with the Absolute, divine presence of God. I hold that Wordsworth in The Prelude, 
especially in parts that he is addressing Coleridge, dealt with words and the images they 
correspond in a way that highlighted the spiritual and Godly bond between them. In this 
respect, when Wordsworth says “…Thou, my Friend…art no slave / Of that false 
secondary power, by which, / In weakness, we create distinctions, then / Deem that our 
puny boundaries are things / Which we perceive, and not which we have made. / To thee, 
unblinded by these outward shows, / The unity of all has been reveal’d” (Book II: 216-
227), he refers to arbitrary relationship between linguistic signs and corresponding objects. 
This dualistic approach does not appeal to Coleridge, according to whom words have 
divine origins, organically producing thoughts. Wordsworth in The Prelude makes a 
similar point when he writes that it is not “in a mystical and idle sense” but “in the words 
of reason” that “each most obvious and particular thought” is “deeply weigh’d” (Book II: 
235-238). Elsewhere, Wordsworth goes back to his adolescent years and excitedly 
remembers his first recognition of the divine power of words by writing that his “ears 
began to open to the charm / Of words in tuneful order, found them sweet /For their own 
sakes…”  (Book V: 580-582). 
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I therefore hold that in The Prelude (in thirteen books) the words designated the 
immediate presence of language in constitution of thought and its transcendent origin: In 
the first Book, Wordsworth underscores the vitality of “Wisdom and Spirit of the universe” 
which as the “Soul that art the eternity of thought” give “breath” and “everlasting motion” 
to “forms and images” (431-434) – which I take as reference to words and linguistic signs, 
exemplifying the way Wordsworth conceived of “forms and images” bearing divine and 
eternal elements. Wordsworth in the subsequent lines makes it clear that it is this 
“Wisdom” and “Spirit” that ubiquitously lays bare “feeling and thought” by intertwining 
“The passions that build up our human Soul”: “Not with the mean and vulgar works of 
Man, / But with high objects, with enduring things, / With life and nature” (Book I: 436-
441). In The Prelude, Wordsworth’s treatment of language reaches even such a point that 
we can see conspicuous lines in which he almost pays homage to language in general and 
poetry in particular as the intermediary channel to make him gain recognition of the 
language in the phenomenal reality “abroad”:  
…through this verse my mind hath looked 
Upon the speaking face of earth and heaven 
As her prime teacher, intercourse with man 
Established by the Sovereign Intellect, 
Who through that bodily image hath diffused  
A soul divine which we participate, 
A deathless spirit. (Book V: 11-17) 
In these terms, poetic language consisting of “forms and images” as such spurs the mind to 
cognise the bodily forms and brings thoughts into existence. I hence maintain that while 
writing The Prelude in the late 1790s and early 1800s, Wordsworth’s faith in language was 
relatively more straightforward than, as we will see later, his relationship with language 
and its immediate presence in thought while writing The Excursion (1814).  
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One of the elements that impressed Coleridge when he heard The Prelude in 1807 
was the individuality of autobiographical narrative voice, with “high theme…sung aright” 
by Wordsworth for the first time (PW II.II, p. 1029). Wordsworth in his self-biography 
expresses the most intense moments of his childhood and youth through words solidly 
capable of conveying individual and authentic voice and thoughts. We can trace this idea 
in The Prelude in the lines, “A Traveller I am, / And all my Tale is of myself” (Book III: 
196-197). Perry (2014) agrees that “The power of Wordsworth’s autobiographical poetry 
lay partly in his ability to capture an experience that was generational, true; but it stemmed, 
too, from an audacious originality of purpose that was Wordsworth’s and no-one else’s” 
(p. 147). It was in this individual genius that Coleridge found himself and his own 
aspirations of a grand philosophical poem. This is confirmed by Wordsworth in the 
following lines:  
…and thou, O honoured friend, 
Who in my thoughts art ever at my side,  
Uphold as heretofore my fainting steps. 
It hath been told already how my sight 
Was dazzled by the novel show, and how 
Erelong, I did into myself return. (Book III: 199-204) 
It was this aspect of his poem, on the other hand, that gave Wordsworth concerns about 
talking too much about himself: He wrote to Sir George Beaumont on 1 May 1805 that it 
was “a thing unprecedented in literary history that a man should talk so much about 
himself” (WL I, pp. 586-87). However, for Coleridge, individuality was inextricably 
connected with the “genius” of Wordsworth because, as he believed, only Wordsworth 
possessed the poetic genius to compose this philosophical poem. We can sense that 
language for Wordsworth especially when he is in an intimate dialogue with Coleridge in 
the poem emerges as capable of expressing his authenticity: It is not “unknown to thee”, 
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Wordsworth addresses Coleridge in Book XII, that although he may have composed “some 
imperfect verse…/ Upon the vulgar forms of present things” Coleridge kept reminding him 
“A higher power” that found out of those forms “ a tone, / An image, and a character, by 
books / Not hitherto reflected” (Book XII: 357-366). Such was the power of words for 
Coleridge (and for Wordsworth, for that matter): Originality could be achieved by 
assuming the narrative voice and language that was thoroughly generative, hence uniquely 
untrodden. 
In The Prelude we can trace the reflections of the Coleridgean imagination, so 
much so that some parts seem as if written by Coleridge himself. As Paul Magnuson 
(2002) puts it:   
Wordsworth is a friend, a ‘comforter and guide’, yet the voice of The 
Prelude is, in part, Coleridge’s creation, since its blank verse and theme of 
imagination’s growth through memory originated in Coleridge’s earlier 
‘Conversation’ poems. The Prelude is ample evidence of Coleridge’s claim 
of originality for creating the ‘blank verse poem’ not in the sense that his 
poetry is unique and or inimitable…but that it was generative. What 
Coleridge heard in December 1806 was Wordsworth’s individual voice, yet 
that voice was an echo of his own. (p. 43) 
Therefore, Coleridgean idea of imagination springing forth out of the infinite power of 
God and “lifting up itself / Before the eye and progress of my song” (Book VI: 528-29) has 
a solid presence in The Prelude. The poet testifies that “here that power, / In all the might 
of its endowments, came / Athwart me” (Book VI: 530-32). Just as Coleridge saw and as 
Wordsworth understood it, this regenerative power partakes in the divine, the transcendent 
God:70 
I was lost as in a cloud, 
Halted without a struggle to break through, 
And now, recovering, to my soul I say 
                                                 
70 In a 1807 letter, Wordsworth also invites such religious connotations when he tells Lady Beaumont that “to 
be incapable of a feeling of Poetry in my sense of the word is to be without love of human nature and 
reverence for God.” (WL II, p. 146) 
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‘I recognise thy glory’. In such strength  
Of usurpation, in such visitings 
Of awful promise, when the light of sense 
Goes out in flashes that have shewn to us 
The invisible world, doth greatness make abode, 
There harbours whether we be young or old.  
Our destiny, our nature, and our home, 
Is with infinitude—and only there; 
With hope it is, hope that can never die (Book VI: 532-43) 
Imagination here, through its productive power, is able to transcend what is given by 
nature and transform it in order to see into the origin of things: The Absolute, divine 
existence. In addition, before the tripartite separation of Sense, Understanding and Reason 
in 1809, as discussed earlier in this chapter, Coleridge held that Reason was the primary 
divine force that has constitutive function in terms of attaining knowledge. Therefore, in 
The Prelude, imagination emerged as “another name for absolute strength / And clearest 
insight, amplitude of mind, / And reason in her most exalted mood” (Book XIII: 166-170). 
Wordsworth’s reference to imagination as the highest rank of Reason coincides with 
Coleridge’s evolving views of correspondence between Reason and imagination from 1806 
to 1809-10. 
The epistemic status of imagination is also affirmed and foregrounded in The 
Prelude, which perfectly coincides with Coleridge’s conception of the mind as a response 
to the epistemological predicament that disturbed him most in Kant’s philosophy: The 
ruling out of “thing in itself”, noumena, from the sphere in question. On the other hand, 
Reason (and hence imagination) is in the centre of Coleridge’s epistemological query 
established on the parameters of philosophy and theology. In Wordsworth’s poem, 
imagination is repeatedly associated with such productive and recreative terms as 
“conception” and “pregnancy” vis-à-vis knowledge. Consider the following lines:       
Thus here imagination also found 
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An element that pleased her, tried her strength 
Among new objects, simplified, arranged,  
Impregnated my knowledge, made it live— 
And the result was elevating thoughts 
Of human nature. Neither guilt nor vice, 
Debasement of the body or the mind, 
Nor all the misery forced upon my sight (Book VIII: 803-810) 
Here, imagination emerges as the regenerative power activating the thinking process in 
human mind. It is in this respect closely associated with the Truth arrived through the 
intellect, Reason, and as a poet, he is even more “pregnant with” the “absolute truth” 
(Book XI: (92). 
As a result, The Prelude in thirteen books, as Coleridge heard it recited in 1807, 
met his expectations to a large extent:  It was in this poem that Coleridge’s idiosyncratic 
response to Kantian philosophy as well as his views on language and imagination was 
largely reciprocated in poetic form, mostly because the boundaries and themes of it had 
already been determined, as Wordsworth states at the end of the first book:  
One end hereby at least hath been attain’d, 
My mind hath been revived, and if this mood  
Desert me not, I will forthwith bring down, 
Through later years, the story of my life. 
The road lies plain before me; ’tis a theme 
Single and of determined bounds; and hence 
I chuse it rather at this time, than work  
Of ampler or more varied argument. (Book I, 669-676) 
The Prelude therefore can be considered as the the most distinguished product of Coleridge 
speaking through Wordsworth, which fell into a relative decline afterwards. Richard Gravil 
(2015) proposes that it was in fact in The Prelude that Wordsworth and Coleridge’s initial 
agenda for The Recluse (as outlined in the “Prospectus” which was composed in 1800 but 
not published until 1814, in the preface to The Excursion) came closest to fulfilment (p. 
362). The Prelude (1807) was a demonstration on Wordsworth’s part that he still largely 
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sought the themes and ideas Coleridge instructed him in the preceding decade, thereby 
maintaining the symbiotic relationship, though in a slightly different way from the time of 
annus mirabilis. I suggest that The Prelude and Coleridge’s subsequent response, “To 
William Wordsworth”, marked the waning process of their symbiosis as their collaborative 
interaction was visibly on the decline. From then on, Wordsworth was expected to finish 
the bigger project, The Recluse, and unable to do so, he published a less appreciated and 
highly criticized work71, The Excursion, in 1814. 
 
The Excursion (1814)  
Coleridge’s palpably self-deprecatory admiration for and investment in Wordsworth during 
the annus mirabilis gradually and involuntarily began to shatter with their “radical 
Difference” that emerged after the 1800 “Preface” to the Lyrical Ballads, and also 
following his settling with the Wordsworths after his public service in Malta from 1804 
to1806. In the seven-year gap between the The Prelude and The Excursion, Coleridge and 
Wordsworth’s relationship and collaboration fairly transformed. Coleridge and 
Wordsworth to a certain extent continued to co-produce and actively inspire each other up 
until The Friend project came to an end in 1810 and Coleridge heard the disparaging 
remarks of Wordsworth about himself. The breakup of their friendship in 1810 had led to 
“no coolness in Coleridge’s respect for Wordsworth as a poet” (Engell & Bate, 1983 , pp. 
xlix-l) but definitely left him thoroughly resented. 
Even though Wordsworth had recently recited The Prelude (1807) to Coleridge and 
he most delightedly responded with the poem “To William Wordsworth”, the publication 
                                                 
71 See: Jeffrey, Francis. “Review of The Excursion, being a portion of the Recluse, a Poem”. Edinburgh 
Review, No.24 (November 1814). pp 1-30.  
Also see: Milnes, The Prelude 2009. p. 14. 
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process of The Friend (1809-10), followed by the debacle of 1810, all contributed to 
Coleridge’s gradual disillusionment with Wordsworth and partial disintegration of his faith 
in their joint oeuvre – with the consequence that Coleridge’s faithful “hope” in his partner 
of such lifelong ambitions as The Recluse had lost its previous bearing on Coleridge.72 As 
he wrote to Richard Sharp on 24 April 1812, 
I had scarcely arrived in London, last October twelvemonth, before the 
conviction was forced on me, say rather, pierced thro’ my very soul with the 
suddenness of a Flash of Lightning, that [Wordsworth] had become my 
bitterest Calumniator whom to that very moment I had cherished in my 
Heart’s Heart. – The benumbing Despondency relieved by no gleam of 
Hope, and only alternating with fits of (truly may I call it) mental agony, I 
even now scarcely dare look back on. (CL III, p. 389)  
Coleridge also added that he was now able to obtain “the conquest over [his] own 
Feelings” and he could now “call [him]self a freeman”.73 Coleridge now visibly became 
intensely engaged with, as he wrote in a subsequent letter, “plans of more permanent 
literature” (CL III, p. 390). However, for Coleridge, the symbiosis did not, and could not, 
end there because Coleridge’s hope for the philosophical poem did not take the same 
nosedive as their personal relationship at the time: whatever their professional 
disagreements and personal clashes were, Coleridge continued to cherish hopes for 
“speaking through” Wordsworth by means of his partner’s impending great philosophical 
poem, The Recluse, which was to be the “litmus test” of their symbiotic collaboration and 
Coleridge’s philosophical investment in Wordsworth’s poetry.74 I therefore hold that up 
until 1814 Coleridge compellingly continued to speak through Wordsworth or the 
Wordsworthian period of his life. 
                                                 
72 “Loss of Hope”, Coleridge once noted in October 1803, is nothing but “castration of the self-generating 
Organ of the Soul.” (CN I, §1552) 
73 Despite their reconciliation in the same year, neither their friendship nor collaboration could be recaptured 
– at least not until the late 1820s. (See: Bloom, 2010 , p. 3). 
74 As Philip Aherne states, “Wordsworth was a primitive model for Coleridge’s greater intellectual project” 
(2018, p. 96) . 
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What eventually brought the symbiosis to a proper finale was not the end of annus 
mirabilis; we can safely assert this seeing that both The Prelude and “To William 
Wordsworth” (1807) were products of a sort of lingering symbiosis between Coleridge and 
Wordsworth.75 Instead, I maintain that what enabled Coleridge to reclaim his separate 
identity in mid-1810s was his disillusionment with Wordsworth’s The Excursion (1814) 
and with the “great philosophical poem” project of The Recluse.76 For years deeply, though 
intermittently, occupying himself “in Wordsworth’s aspiration towards great poetry” 
(McFarland, 2002, p. ccxxx), Coleridge then became firmly assured that it was no longer 
possible to speak through his symbiotic partner. According to Sally Bushell (2002), the 
stages both Coleridge and Wordsworth went through while The Excursion was being 
composed “run parallel to the shifting poetic relationship between Coleridge and 
Wordsworth until the poem itself, in its distance from the original conception, comes to 
represent the division between them” (p. 23). I contest Bushell’s argument here with the 
proposition that after the era of symbiosis and “speaking through” came to an end, for 
Coleridge there remained yet another mode of relationship he could build with 
Wordsworth: “dialogue” and “speaking to”.   
In the context of this study, I totally align my argument with the idea that some 
deeply-entrenched anxieties both poets suffered from preceded the symbiosis of Coleridge 
and Wordsworth and, in a way, made it possible. As I will discuss and demonstrate in the 
following chapters, however, the symbiosis especially on Coleridge’s part was anything 
but dialogical in the sense of listening and responding to a dialogue partner. In a dialogue, 
                                                 
75 A few years ago Wordsworth had recited to Coleridge his Prelude (1807), lifting Coleridge’s spirits to 
respond with “To William Wordsworth”, “Composed on the Night After His Recitation of a Poem on the 
Growth of an Individual Mind.” (PW II.II, p. 1029) 
76 Planned as early as March 6th, 1804 (PW II, p. 368), The Excursion was published in 1814 and advertised 
as “A Portion of The Recluse” on its title page. 
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there must be two distinct voices, but in Coleridge’s aspiration to “live and act in thee, & 
be Thou” I cannot see a simultaneously separate self, although it must be noted that this 
was not a total submission on Coleridge’s part, neither did the symbiosis without a proper 
dialogue make Coleridge less successful in his career.77 The symbiosis in fact enabled 
Coleridge to establish the philosophical agenda for The Recluse and adapt philosophical 
views of others, especially the Kantian critical philosophy, largely in his own way in order 
to, by implication, guide Wordsworth according to his own philosophical position.  
In the absence of Wordsworth, for whose fame Coleridge, as he wrote in a letter of 
February 1818, had “fought with an ardour that amounted to absolute Self-oblivion” (CL 
IV, p. 839), Coleridge was compelled to build a dialogic relationship with his former 
partner through what I want to call “revisionary reaction”. In other words, it was time to 
invest in his own reputation, especially after realizing the previous self-oblivion and “a 
readiness to prefer him to myself, yea, even if Life & outward Reputation itself had been 
the pledge required” (CL III, p. 396). Coleridge hence began to revise his works to re-
record the once-interdependent relationship with Wordsworth and to underscore his 
distinct poetic and critical genius.78 
                                                 
77 McFarland makes it clear that “Coleridge’s reliance on Wordsworth, though masochistic and psychically 
clinging, was not accompanied by reliance in the realm of thought. In that realm, indeed, the reliance was 
reversed. It is significant that Wordsworth never lost his enormous respect for his friend’s mental powers, 
despite his growing disgust at Coleridge’s weaknesses, despondency, and self-indulgence. If Coleridge was 
overwhelmed by Wordsworth, Wordsworth, in another way, was no less impressed by Coleridge.” 
(Romanticism and the Forms of Ruin, 1981, p. 94). 
78 As Class also outlines the source of Coleridge’s uneasiness in the face of Wordsworth’s genial writing:  
“Wordsworth’s aspiration to match Milton with his own verse epic and his image of himself as a prodigal son 
are well known…Wordsworth’s poetry and prose, particularly when concerned with himself and his vocation 
as a poet, convey at times striking parallels with Kant’s concept of genius as delineated in the Critique of the 
Power of Judgment…Kant was also a great admirer of Milton….After the return from Germany in 1799, 
Wordsworth was the only person besides Poole with whom Coleridge shared his Kantian studies…In 1805, 
when Wordsworth read out The Prelude…[Coleridge] was struck by despondency as he felt that 
Wordsworth’s great philosophic long poem had anticipated his future work. The desire to compete with 
Wordsworth slowly began to grow in Coleridge. So far the poets had worked together on fairly equal 
grounds, as Coleridge had been solely able to claim the role as the philosophical thinker and literary critic. 
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Coleridge, ever since he met Wordsworth, in a way besieged Wordsworth on all 
sides: As early as 13 May 1796 he referred to Wordsworth as “the best poet of the age,” 
(CL I 215) and with this entitlement, McFarland argues, “he gained an enormous and on 
the whole salubrious purchase on Wordsworth’s subsequent career” (2002, p. ccxxx). I 
wholly subscribe to this view; however, my argument differs from the rest of McFarland’s 
discussion when he adds, “But this influence, so benign and so important, became alien 
when it led him to demand of the by then wholly acquiescent Wordsworth, ‘a philosophical 
poem, containing views of Man, Nature and Society’.” As I have attempted to demonstrate 
so far, what made their intellectual break, in the context of their joint project of The 
Recluse, was not because Coleridge entrusted Wordsworth with a project as grand as this, 
but because (on Coleridge’s part) Wordsworth failed to follow his advice and began to 
form his own path.  
Sally Bushell in Re-Reading The Excursion (2002) suggests that the reason for 
unfavourable critical judgment towards The Excursion throughout the twentieth century 
was the dominating critical remarks of Coleridge, through which Wordsworth’s second 
longest poem was assessed (pp. 13-14). And I assert that the primary ground for 
Coleridge’s adverse criticism was that Wordsworth diverged from Coleridge’s 
philosophical guidance on language and imagination, depending on his poetic “genius”. 
That is, as Class maintains, he “endorsed the concept that nature gave rules to poetry 
through the genial poet: so much so that the poet claimed he could not explain his own 
inspiration” and, as a claim, it was palpably strategic as “The sense of condescension to 
knowledge acquired from books, study or other conscious efforts” was always present in 
                                                                                                                                                    
Philosophy was the area in which he could shine when he compared himself to Wordsworth. Yet The Prelude 




Wordsworth’s writing, which is also in line with the Kantian conception of “genius” (p. 
165). The process, I assert, eventually and inevitably brought Wordsworth to a realm 
where the ideas conveyed by his verse echoed the transcendental philosophy of Kant. 
Although, following Modiano (1985), it admittedly seems “rather indecorous” to 
make a connection between “the poet who made no secret of his distaste for books and 
formal training and who often criticized Coleridge for his devotion to metaphysics in lieu 
of nature” and such a “radical a thinker as Kant”, we surely know that “Wordsworth 
frequently discussed the subject of the sublime with Coleridge” who was very “well versed 
in Kantian philosophy” (pp.128-129). As Nicola Trott (1998) holds, “Just how much 
Wordsworth picked up from Coleridge”, we cannot know, but we can see that something 
of the Kantian philosophy is “continuously present in Wordsworth” (p. 90). Modiano also 
controversially asserts that “If Coleridge was in fact Wordsworth’s instructor in 
transcendental philosophy, he managed to turn Wordsworth into a far more faithful 
disciple of Kant than he was himself” (129). 
This is why Coleridge remonstrated with Wordsworth in the letter of 30 May 1815 
because of the adherence in The Excursion to Kantian understanding of the mind and the 
senses, hinting at his friend’s leanings towards a non-transcendent conception of the mind:   
I supposed you first to have meditated the faculties of Man in the abstract, 
in their correspondence with his Sphere of action, and first, in the Feeling, 
Touch, and Taste, then in the Eye, & last in the Ear, to have laid a solid and 
immoveable foundation for the Edifice by removing the sandy Sophisms of 
Locke, and the Mechanic Dogmatists, and demonstrating that the Senses 
were living growths and developements of the Mind & Spirit in a much 
juster as well as higher sense, than the mind can be said to be formed by the 
Senses...Such or something like this was the Plan, I had supposed that you 
were engaged on. (CL IV 574-575) 
Philosophically speaking, Coleridge thought that in the 1814 poem, the components of 
which were meant to constitute “one compleat Whole” (CL IV, p. 573), Wordsworth 
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treated senses and elements of Understanding (not the “Reason”) as constitutive agents in 
knowledge-formation. As he talked in 1832 about his frustration with the latest-published 
part of The Recluse project, The Excursion of 1814, he retrospectively disclosed the 
justifications for his dispraise of the poem:  
Wordsworth should have first published his thirteen books on the growth of 
an individual mind, far superior to any part of the Excursion: then the plan 
suggested and laid out by me was – that he should assume the station of a 
man in repose, whose mind was made up, and so prepared to deliver upon 
authority a system of philosophy. He was to treat man as man – subject of 
eye, ear, touch, taste, in contact with external nature – informing the senses 
from the mind and not compounding a mind out of the senses – then the 
pastoral and other states – assuming a satiric or Juvenalian spirit as he 
approached the high civilization of cities and towns, and then opening a 
melancholy picture of the present state of degeneracy and vice –thence 
revealing the necessity for and proof of the whole state of man and society 
being subject to and illustrative of a redemptive process in operation-
showing how this Idea reconciled all the anomalies, and how it promised 
future glory and restoration. Something of this sort I suggested-and it was 
agreed on. It is, in substance, what I have been all my life doing in my 
system of philosophy. (Table Talk I, pp. 307-308)79  
With regard to my overall investigation, it can be asserted that Kant’s resonances in The 
Excursion (1814) contradict with Coleridge’s expectations from Wordsworth and their 
joint oeuvre. Back in 1807, Coleridge wrote “To William Wordsworth” as a response to 
Wordsworth’s The Prelude because, I argue, he found the poem largely promising in terms 
of reflecting his own metaphysical and philosophical views vis-à-vis language and 
imagination. However Wordsworth, not through a studious opposition but through his 
poetic practice, eventually fell at stark odds with Coleridge’s expectations with The 
Excursion of 1814 and came to depart from the Coleridgean philosophy, at times applying 
his theory of “ordinary language”, and at times even ending up inadvertently reflecting a 
                                                 
79 A year earlier, Coleridge had proudly told H.N. Coleridge that “My system is the only attempt that I know 
of ever made to reduce all knowledges into harmony” because “it opposes no other system, but shows what 
was true in each, and how that which was true in the particular in each of them became error because it was 
only half the truth. I have endeavoured to unite the insulated fragments of truth and frame a perfect mirror” 
(Table Talk I, p. 248). 
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Kantian strain in terms of language and imagination, which came to be the source of 
Coleridge’s eventual dismay, frustration and termination of symbiosis in his mind. After 
all Coleridge believed, as Hamilton (1983) also states, in the unique power of poetry, and 
his “quarrel with Wordsworth in Biographia mostly arises from the fear that Wordsworth 
was doing away with the devices and conventions which signal this awareness” (p. 4).  
 According to Perry (2014), among the factors contributing to Coleridge’s 
disappointment with The Excursion was decidedly “Wordsworth’s piety”, looming large 
especially “in the latter parts of the poem”:  
In a long career of admiring Wordsworth, Coleridge never thought much of 
the quality of Wordsworth’s Christianity, which had an unscrutinised 
ecumenical ease naturally irritating to someone who had wrestled with the 
Trinity on innumerable dark nights. As far as Wordsworth was concerned, 
Coleridge evidently shared with his theologically savvy son Hartley a 
distaste for ‘the odd occasional introduction of the popular, almost the 
vulgar, Religion in his later publications’…and at one point even admitted 
‘the painful suspicion of worldly prudence’… (p. 147) 
The lines Wordsworth used to depict nature in The Excursion turned out so disturbing for 
Coleridge’s profound religious pursuits in poetry that, as he would later put it in a letter of 
1820, they simply remained “the vague misty, rather than mystic, Confusion of God with 
the World & the accompanying Nature-worship” which for Coleridge was “the trait of 
Wordsworth’s poetic Works that I most dislike as unhealthful, & denounce as contagious” 
(CL V, p. 95). In the poem, the “heart” is the locus “Where Fear sate” but it is “wanting” a 
“cherished visitant”, and in the “the universal face / Of earth and sky” one can only feel 
“the power / Of Nature” and it is through this powerful agent that one can also be “taught / 
To feel intensely” (Book I: 204-214). We can therefore no longer feel the blissful 
adherence to religious and divine elements in the poetry, but we see that the previous faith 
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has been shattered. Having served “Nature” and “Truth”, the narrator confirms that “their 
DIVINITY”did nothing but “offended the ways of men” through employment of  
Philosophers, who, though the human soul /  
Be of a thousand faculties composed, 
And twice ten thousand interests, do yet prize 
This soul, and the transcendent universe, 
No more than as a mirror that reflects 
To proud Self-love her own intelligence; 
That one, poor, finite object, in the abyss 
Of infinite Being, twinkling restlessly! (Book IV: 870-881)! 
Human beings or those preoccupied with philosophical inquisitions seem no longer 
partaking the divine creativity, they emerge as as restless, finite beings lost in the 
overwhelming infinitude of the divine Being in the universe of The Excursion.  
The point Coleridge insisted on in the extended comments on The Recluse project 
in general was the idea that mind is not a regulative medium processing the empirical data 
into knowledge (as Kant propounded it was) but it actively produces, through Reason and 
Understanding, new meanings and recreates unique works of art. As Coleridge made it 
clear in a letter of April 3rd, 1815 to Lady Beaumont:  
Of the Excursion, excluding the tale of the ruined Cottage…I do not think, I 
did not feel, it equal to the Work on the Growth of [Wordsworth’s] own 
spirit. As proofs meet me in every part of the Excursion, that the poet’s 
genius has not flagged, I have sometimes fancied, that having by the 
conjoint operation of his own experiences, feelings and reason himself 
convinced himself of Truths, which the generality of persons have either 
taken for granted from their Infancy, or at least adopted in early life, he has 
attached all their own depth and weight to doctrines and words, which come 
almost as Truisms or Common-place to others. (CL IV, p. 564) 
On the other hand, Stephen M. Parrish (1958) suggests about the Wordsworth-Coleridge 
controversy that “what was clearly on the surface a disagreement about poetic diction may, 
underneath, have been a disagreement about dramatic method” (p. 367). In The Excursion, 
Wordsworth seems to be looking at the importance, as Bushell puts it,  
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of mental activity in the non-poetic mind, as a record of the ‘more lowly 
matter” of ordinary lives. The effect of this is that [The Excursion] is 
concerned with the operations of the receptive mind which is acted upon as 
much as the mind which acts. This apparent shift towards passivity 
underlies much of the critical dissatisfaction with The Excursion in 
comparison with The Prelude. (2002, p. 231)  
Whereas in The Prelude Wordsworth indeed actively generates the recollections regarding 
his poetic genius on the individual - authentic level and retrospectively narrated them, The 
Excursion predominantly deals with the “wisdom” in personal and ordinary lives of his 
dramatic characters:  
From his native hills 
He wandered far; much did he see of men, 
Their manners, their enjoyments, and pursuits, 
Their passions and their feelings; chiefly those 
Essential and eternal in the heart, 
That, ‘mid the simpler forms of rural life, 
Exist more simple in their elements, 
And speak a plainer language. In the woods, 
A lone Enthusiast, and among the fields, 
Itinerant in this labour, he had passed 
The better portion of his time… (Book I: 369-379) 
Coleridge does not like the matter-of-factness exalted in the poem because it is not the 
growth of the poet’s mind any more, neither is it the creative story of his friend’s physical 
as well as spiritual growth: Sally Bushell’s assessment is relevant here:     
Attempts to involve the reader in the third person narratives of The Prelude 
are limited by an autobiographical control of narrative presentation which is 
essential to the kind of poetic act that the poet performs in this work, and to 
his addressing of a particular readership. The Excursion is able to undertake 
a completely different approach to the relationship between poet and 
ordinary man. The stories of others do not have to be validated as suitable 
subjects for poetry because of their part in the development of the ‘higher’ 
imaginative powers of the poet, but can be valued instead in their own right. 
(2002, p. 232)80 
                                                 
80 Bushell also compares the two poems and the narrative voice in them: “…in the earlier poem, such tales 
[of others] are not intended to have any particular significance beyond their personal importance for the poet 
and within the autobiographical structure of the poem. They are not required to be operative. It is  only in the 
later text that the sharing of narratives comes to be seen as a means of communicating ideas and values 
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Instead of the poetic mind, language and divine power of imagination, The Excursion 
dwells on the appraisal of mundane exchanges and power of the ordinary – which for 
Coleridge fails to lead to universal Truths and merely presents “accidents” of life. In a 
letter of May 22nd, 1815, Wordsworth asked Coleridge what exactly he did not like about 
The Excursion, and Coleridge’s reply of May 30, 1815 casually presents the reasons for his 
“Dispraise” by outlining the expectations of the great philosophical epic poem of The 
Recluse he had entertained up to then: “It is for the Biographer, not the Poet,” wrote 
Coleridge, “to give the accidents of individual Life. Whatever is not representative, 
generic, may indeed be most poetically exprest, but it is not Poetry” (CL IV, p. 572). 
In such a case, we end up with the finite conception of the outside world and there 
are pluralities of which the mind cannot properly make sense. Whereas it was the idea of 
“Multeity in Unity” that was celebrated and made possible in The Prelude, The Excursion 
emerges as endorsing the idea of divergences and dissipations without the strong and 
necessary presence of a unifying principle: Even if human beings “Enquire of ancient 
Wisdom” and “demand…/ if 'twas ever meant / That we should pry far off yet be unraised; 
/ That we should pore, and dwindle as we pore”, they end up  
Viewing all objects unremittingly 
In disconnection dead and spiritless; 
And still dividing, and dividing still, 
Break down all grandeur, still unsatisfied 
With the perverse attempt, while littleness 
May yet become more little; waging thus 
An impious warfare with the very life 
Of our own souls! (Book IV: 802-813)  
                                                                                                                                                    
directly to the reader. In such a work these tales function poetically in a very different way. In The Prelude 
the poem is concerned with self-education, in The Excursion with how we can educate each other and with 
the structures through which to communicate such teaching.” (2002, p. 231) 
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Eventually, as Perry suggests, “A work that sets out to confirm the merits of some 
metaphysical unity to everything is, at several points, strikingly drawn by the thought of 
things being plural” (2014, p. 149). Through the dramatic voices in The Excursion, hence, 
we get a glimpse of the world shattered, fractured and gloomy. 
According to Coleridge, because The Excursion narrates the stories and growth of 
others’ minds as well, the characters and descriptions Wordsworth “renders”, as he put in 
the Biographia are “specific and individual, even to a degree of portraiture”, hence the 
result is that “he is comparatively careless” with “his diction and metre”  as well (BL II, p. 
29). Coleridge then thought that the language in The Excursion is therefore largely 
mundane, and unable to convey that special and unfamiliar “prophetic lay” any longer:  
The measure is either constructed on no previous system, and acknowledges 
no justifying principle but that of the writer’s convenience; or else some 
mechanical movement is adopted, of which one couplet or stanza is so far 
an adequate specimen, as that the occasional differences appear evidently to 
arise from accident, or the qualities of the language itself, not from 
meditation and an intelligent purpose. (BL V.II, p. 29) 
Coleridge’s reaction to the ordinary and even mechanical language of Wordsworth has its 
origin in the idea of the intellectual transformative power of words, and Wordsworth’s 
approach leads one to underestimate the dependability of linguistic tools, giving way in 
The Excursion to ideas that “cannot be reviewed in thought; / Much less, retraced in 
words” (Book III: 689-690). Indeed, the following lines demonstrate Wordsworth’s sway 
(vis-à-vis The Prelude as Coleridge heard it in 1807) after being preoccupied with the 
ordinary language:  
The intellectual power, through words and things, 
Went sounding on, a dim and perilous way! 
And from those transports, and these toils abstruse, 
Some trace am I enabled to retain 
Of time, else lost; – existing unto me 
Only by records in myself not found. (Book III: 709-714) 
85 
 
Wordsworth is obviously not sure whether words will be able to communicate his thoughts 
when he says “I will here record in verse” observations and thoughts the mind deals with, 
but the poet is not sure whether his words will “correspond” with “truth”.81 
Contrary to The Prelude, the poem of 1814 failed to reflect “imagination” as a 
faculty that not only re-creates and transforms the elements in nature but has the capacity 
to transcend the empirical observations altogether. Instead, the narrator in Book III 
“languidly” turns towards “this visible fabric of the world” (Book III: 970) and the 
“imaginative faculty” is held as the “lord / Of observations natural” (Book IV: 693-94). 
Hence, the faculty so extolled by Coleridge is almost reduced to fancy:    
…and, thus 
Led on, those shepherds made report of stars 
In set rotation passing to and fro, 
Between the orbs of our apparent sphere 
And its invisible counterpart, adorned 
With answering constellations, under earth, 
Removed from all approach of living sight 
But present to the dead; who, so they deemed, 
Like those celestial messengers beheld 
All accidents, and judges were of all. (Book IV: 695-703) 
Whereas Coleridge had found in The Prelude not only the poetical but also the spiritual 
and philosophical arguments he had been looking for in their joint project, The Excursion 
                                                 
81 And some small portion of his eloquent speech, 
And something that may serve to set in view 
The feeling pleasures of his loneliness, 
His observations, and the thoughts his mind 
Had dealt with – I will here record in verse; 
Which, if with truth it correspond, and sink 
Or rise as venerable Nature leads, 
The high and tender Muses shall accept 
With gracious smile, deliberately pleased, 
And listening Time reward with sacred praise. (Book I: 94-103) 
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was largely about the pedantic way of talking about mundane “truisms” in verse, mostly 
with limited or reduced recourse to imagination.82 
Having presented in this part the grounds for Coleridge’s favourable approach to 
The Prelude in 1807 and later discontent with The Excursion in 1814, and noted that 
publication of the latter marked the beginning of a “dialogic process” in the relationship of 
Coleridge and Wordsworth, I will now draw on the post-Excursion revisionary period of 



















                                                 
82 See: Bushell, 2002, Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER TWO – ON COLERIDGE’S REVISIONS IN GENERAL 
My heart plays an incessant music, for which I need an outward 
Interpreter / -words halt over & over again! - and each time - I feel 
differently, tho’ / children of one family. 
Coleridge, Notebooks II, p. 2035 (19-20 April 1804) 
 
Having established in the previous chapter the philosophical and professional 
entanglements as well as the ensuing faultlines between Coleridge and Wordsworth 
especially after The Excursion (1814), which ultimately made the former realise that it was 
high time he invested in his discrete oeuvre, in this chapter I aim to deal with the grounds 
for Coleridge’s revisionary and dialogic reaction from 1814 up until the year 1818 to 
Wordsworth and their previous collaboration. 
Considering my overall argument that Coleridge in this process had transitioned 
from “speaking through” a symbiotic partner to “speaking to” his friend on personal and 
professional level, it is now time to demonstrate the revisionary repercussions of the failure 
of Coleridge’s joint project with Wordsworth, The Recluse. Following the radical 
differences and Wordsworth’s failure to bring The Recluse into completion as Coleridge 
designed and expected it, the latter became thoroughly convinced that his aspirations and 
plans for a “great” philosophical poem would not be realised by Wordsworth on his own 
terms. Between the years 1814 and 1818, I argue, Coleridge therefore was able to revive 
and revise his life and opinions (in the Biographia Literaria, 1817), his poetical works (in 
the Sibylline Leaves, 1817) and his periodical of 1809-10 (in the rifacciamento of The 
Friend, 1818). 
 My main objective in this part is to demonstrate the way Coleridge’s revisionary 
activity from 1814 to 1818 enabled him to foreground his own theory of language as well 
as literary persona, the way his idiosyncratic definition of the Kantian concepts such as 
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Sense, Understanding and Reason helped him relate his linguistic pursuits to the theory of 
imagination, and how revisions contributed to his conception of a separately unified self, 
whereas simultaneously and inadvertently revealing what Seamus Perry calls the 
“Coleridgean muddle”. Perry, referring to Coleridge’s writings up to 1818, argues that 
rather than “any abiding unity it synthesises out of its recalcitrant elements”, the claim of 
Coleridge’s mind lay in “the scrupulous energy of its inconsequence” (1999, p. 2). Here, 
Perry does not clearly explain what these scruples are in the service of. In this chapter, I 
aim to show that it was Coleridge’s muddled revisionary activity that made this process 
unique and noteworthy. Therefore, following Perry, instead of looking for “a systematic 
and orderly intellectual structure lurking within only apparently erratic writing,” I aim to 
inquire “a genuine pattern of oppositions, a consistent double-mindedness (‘division’, 
fancifully, as ‘di-vision’, ‘twofold vision’), the effects of which extend from Shandyesque 
comedy to self-alienating angst, and which create a kind of enabling inconsistency” (p. 3). 
The investigation here aims to present an exploration of how such a muddled mind could 
have guided Coleridge’s revisions from 1814 to 1818, largely determining the Coleridgean 
canon still appreciated today.  
The aim here is not to introduce any of the revised works in this period as part of a 
continuous literary undertaking. Neither do I think Coleridge had some kind of a grand 
project in mind when he embarked on his revisionary activity after 1814. I argue that 
Coleridge in this process of rewriting himself and his works presented himself in such a 
way that his revisionary activity could be seen as a long-delayed reconsideration of his 
engagement with Wordsworth and investment in his reputation for years.  
To this end, in what follows, I will be first presenting a short review of the recent 
critical trends in Romanticism, the place of revisions in the scholarship and, particularly, in 
89 
 
Coleridge studies. Then I will elaborate on my own position and my contribution to the 
critical debate concerning Coleridge’s motivations while carrying out his revisions from 
1814 to 1818. The following literature review is hence the foundation and the frame to 
confirm and demonstrate my own critical intervention in the field. 
 
Romanticism and Revision: Literature Review 
Beginning from the 1980s, a series of critical changes took place in Romantic scholarship 
so as to redefine Romanticism in less conventional terms. Repercussions of the Marxist-
inflected New Historicism in the 1980s was promising in terms of recapturing forgotten 
identities, suppressed voices, banished texts, as well as neglected aspects of literary 
compositions so that their historical moments could also be recaptured. This shift of 
perspective entailed turning the gaze from the conventional to the marginal; i.e. the 
marginalised populations, identities, aspects, and practices of the Romantic era. The new-
historicist handling of the Romantic age hence transformed the previous commonplace 
terms greatly. Such works as Tilottama Rajan’s Dark Interpreter (1980), Marilyn Butler’s 
Romantics, Rebels and Reactionaries (1981), and Jerome McGann’s The Romantic 
Ideology ( 1983) consolidated the canon reform initiated by such movements as feminism, 
Marxist historical materialism, and theory-based analyses of literary texts. Especially 
Jerome McGann’s trilogy, The Romantic Ideology: A Critical Investigation ( 1983), A 
Critique of Modern Textual Criticism (1983) and The Beauty of Inflections: Literary 
Investigations in Historical Method and Theory (1985) can be considered as one of the 
most influential prime-movers of a new critical approach to Romanticism. For example, 
pointing out that the Romantic writing and scholarship at the time were “dominated by an 
uncritical absorption in Romanticism’s own self-representations” ( 1983, p. 137), Jerome 
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McGann proposed a reading of the Romantics that was suspicious of how they described 
themselves, the compositional history of their works, and the ways they defined their own 
era. This is a position Clifford Siskin (1988 ) later named as the “lyric turn”,83 and Paul 
Hamilton more recently (2013) argued that this outlook resulted in a refutation of 
Romanticism on its own terms, “calling the bluff of its ideal authority” in order to “upset 
the hierarchy on which it seemed to depend” (p. 8). This is the time when, for example, 
Hamilton elsewhere aimed to “point up the importance of [Coleridge’s] lines of thought 
which subverted his stated intentions” (1983, p. 1).84 
After the 1980s, therefore, it was no longer fashionable to lump the actors of the 
Romantic Movement into a single category in which their particularities largely went 
under erasure and looked as if their reactions to the era they lived in were synchronious 
and homogenous. Much recent commentary on Romantic Literary Criticism has enabled us 
to consider the writers, thinkers and population of the era with a refreshed outlook and 
awareness of their political, cultural, social and historical contexts. As a result, the myth of 
“solitary” Romantic genius of ephemeral sensations and once-and-for-all literary 
compositions was largely obliterated, hence enabling a move away from the oversimplified 
representation of complex historical processes that are inclined to construct a stabilised and 
identifiable Romantic literary tradition.  
Revision as a fundamental preoccupation of the Romantic era had also been 
simultaneously marginalized, even exiled, because of the period-specific exaltation of 
“spontaneity”. The dominant definition and so-called basic tenets of Romanticism through 
                                                 
83 It is “that feature by which creative and critical narratives, from the past and from the present, veer from 
the generic and the historical to the natural and the transcendent, metamorphosing all analysis into claims of 
Imaginative vision” (Siskin, 1983, p. 19). “Present and Past: The Lyric Turn”, pp. 3-63. 
84 Coleridge had, as Rosemary Ashton (1996) argued, an “uncanny talent for being beforehand with his 
critics in analysing himself” which, inevitably, “has important implications for any consideration of his 
influence.” (p. 274)  
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which, Siskin maintains, “creative and critical narratives, from the past and from the 
present, veer from the generic and historical to the natural and transcendent, 
metamorphosing all analysis into claims for Imaginative vision” (1988 , p. 12) were 
shattered in the 1980s. Re-writing as a reality of Romantic texts was henceforward no 
longer to be banished or deplored. In other words, once it was recognised that critics were 
erroneously subscribing to such mythical and idealised self-descriptions of the Romantics 
as spontaneity, unity and “tales of lyrical development” (p. 170), the determining elements 
of the Romantic Movement including spontaneity and unity came to be seen as products of 
revisions themselves (pp. 27-29). 
The scholarly debate on the concept of “Romantic revision”, on the other hand, is 
wide-ranging: It has been described as deliberate “misreading” of one’s precursors and 
“rewriting” (Bloom, 1973, 1975 and 1976), “secondariness” and “belatedness” as the 
writer himself is preempted by his predecessors (Mileur, 1982), “self-criticism” (McGann, 
1983), “change” and “difference” presented as “development” (Siskin, 1988), dialogue 
between the poet’s early and later self (Galperin 1989), textual “instability” (Stillinger, 
1994), “improvement” and “clarification” (Leader, 1996) or “re-reading” (Bushell, 2014). 
Mileur (1982) regards revisions as “sécondarité,” and “belatedness” vis-à-vis the writer’s 
feeling of being usurped or diminished by his forerunners (pp. vii-ix). Previously, Harold 
Bloom had a palpable impact on the body of literature regarding the Romantic re-reading 
and revision. He held that in the post-Milton era, no poet could be exempt from the 
“anxiety of influence”, hence he characterized revision as reading by “misprision, or strong 
misreading” (A Map of Misreading, 1975, p. 6), leading up to “indeliberate and almost 
unconscious” misinterpretation of previous texts by poets (The Anxiety of Influence, 1973, 
p. 30). Accordingly, every poem is a remake, or “misprision”, of a precursor’s work in a 
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way that they are constituted as misreadings: “Poetic influence - when it involves two 
strong, authentic poets - always proceeds by a misreading of the prior poet, an act of 
creative correction that is actually and necessarily a misinterpretation. The history of 
fruitful poetic influence, which is to say the main tradition of Western poetry since the 
Renaissance, is a history of anxiety and self-saving caricature, of distortion, of perverse, 
wilful revisionism without which modern poetry as such could not exist” (p. 30). Hence 
they cannot be considered as isolated products of a poet’s mind but are formulated as the 
main agents of a relation to another poem as “Any poem is an inter-poem, and…a poem is 
not writing, but rewriting” (Bloom, Poetry and Repression, 1976, p. 3). Revision in this 
regard is a medium to enable relationship between respective writers and their works 
because “…poetic language, is always and necessarily a revision of previous language” 
(p.4). Likewise, writing itself is also considered as a revisionary activity in that it enables 
intentional misinterpretation of the writers of the past ages. William H. Galperin’s 
approach in Revision and Authority in Wordsworth (1989) differs from Bloom as he takes 
revision as a bridge between the early and later poetry of the poet, namely Wordsworth. 
Galperin persistently argues for “the validity of demarcating Wordsworth’s career” (p. 2), 
and he assigns the later poetry the “function” of “writ[ing] over so as to displace the poet’s 
earlier achievement” (p. 218). Galperin also reads Wordsworth as a poet “moving in two 
directions at once: forward toward the fulfilment of an intentional structure, and backward 
toward an exposure of that structure’s intentionality” (p. 24). In this respect, the early work 
is destabilized and dethroned by the later one, at once undermining textual authority of the 
writer. Accordingly, the later Wordsworth writes over the poetic ambitions of his younger 
self and undermines his predecessor’s authority. 
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Ever since the concern for authorial intention was substantially replaced by an 
emphasis on the historicity of textual production - that is, over the past forty years – there 
has been an increasing preoccupation with textual “instability” and multiple versions of 
texts. Jack Stillinger has a strong presence here in terms of focusing in Coleridge and 
Textual Instability (1994) on the Romantic revisions. That multiple texts and inveterate 
revisions conducted on a text create instability, notably giving way to the elusion of a 
stable meaning, constitute Stillinger’s elemental argument in the book. Zachary Leader’s 
Revision and Romantic Authorship (1996), on the other hand, presents revisionary activity 
as a means for clarification of meaning and improvement of texts that need to be ready for 
publication (pp. 35, 37-8). Leader illustrates his point by arguing, for example, that 
Wordsworth’s desire was to be “judged by his accomplishments - final authorized versions 
- of his lifetime” (p. 38) as they are the improved, hence more valid, versions. For Leader, 
revision does not necessarily serve to modify or repudiate ideas of the past but rather has 
the purpose of clarifying the original meaning and intent of the author. In this respect, 
Leader contradicts Galperin in that revision for him is a clarification rather than writing 
over the past self, “for the most part the revisions respect original meanings and effects 
even when they seem to be serving new ones” (p. 42). In the particular context of 
Coleridge’s revisionary activity in his middle years, a short preview of these scholarly 
positions is required so that the controversy and contesting positions in literature can be 
delineated. 
Coleridge had always been an “inveterate reviser” (Stillinger, 1994, 104). At the 
beginning of the Biographia, he provided an account of the publication process of his 
small volume of juvenile poems and the period in which he wrote and subsequently revised 
“Religious Musings” (1794-1796). He confessed that, at the urging of friends and critics, 
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he “pruned” the poems “with no sparing hand” in order to “tame the swell and glitter both 
of thought and diction” and to get rid of the “parasite plants of youthful poetry” (BL I, p. 
7).85 Mentioning a twenty-year plan for a poem in April 1797, Coleridge wrote to Cottle 
that he was bound to devote “Ten to collect materials, & warm my mind with universal 
Science…the next five in the composition of the poem - & the five last in the correction of 
it” (CL I, pp. 320-321). Later, in a letter of 28 February 1804, he was complaining about 
“think[ing] meanly of what I have written, almost immediately after the hot fit of 
composition”, which he thought was “ever a disease of my mind” (CL II, p. 1075). J.C.C. 
Mays (2001) also observes that even though Coleridge “took most care” with his poetic 
collections of 1797 or 1817, he grew “dissatisfied with both collections even before they 
were published” and at best, his satisfaction “often mingled with anxiety” usual ly lasted 
for “a few months or years”, after which “his interest and sense of achievement appear in 
every case to have waned” (p. cxvii). This was mainly the case, Mays states, between not 
only “one version and another, or between several versions, but between several versions 
none of which is complete” (p. cxii). He was therefore seldom content with what he 
produced, as he wrote in a letter of December 1816, “...every year I compose more slowly 
and with greater effort, not from any decrease in the steam of my Thoughts – for the 
contrary is the case; but from the increasing difficulty of satisfying myself, and the 
increasing Self-teizing when I let a sentence go off that I know to be faulty” (CL IV, p. 
692). Coleridge must hence have feared that a finished work, as Zachary Leader (1996) 
argues, would have a self-contained, and hence falsifying, character – like all things 
                                                 
85 “In the after editions, I pruned the double epithets with no sparing hand, and used my best efforts to tame 
the swell and glitter both of thought and diction; though in truth, these parasite plants of youthful poetry had 
insinuated themselves into my longer poems with such intricacy of union, that I was often obliged to omit 
disentangling the weed, from the fear of snapping the flower.” (BL I, p. 7) 
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written (p. 134). This is why Coleridge, once written, could not let go of his works, unlike 
Keats for example.86 As he conceded in another letter of 29 April 1817, such was his 
nature that “the pangs which self-dissatisfaction inflict[ed]” were too “poignant”, and he 
disclosed what I regard as a dictum he already followed throughout his revisionary 
activities: “Find out the best, and turn it to the best purposes...” (CL IV, p. 728).  
Coleridge’s motivations, Stillinger claims, while making changes to his poems 
were “uncertain” and “the most obvious explanations seem to conflict with one another” 
but, he adds, “there is a good chance that all the explanations, even the ones seemingly in 
conflict, are valid” (1994, p. 100). As outlined above, the body of literature on revisionary 
activity in the Romantic period mainly dwells on such revisionary intentions as deliberate 
misreading, denial, concealment, clarification, improvement and instability, and Stillinger 
(1994) also uses the words “correction” and “revision” interchangibly (p. 104). Surely for 
Coleridge, revisions also had the function of correcting, as he wrote in a letter of February 
1797 to Cottle referring to his contribution to The Destiny of Nations, “I torture the poem, 
and myself, with corrections; and what I write in an hour, I sometimes take two or three 
days in correcting…” (CL I, p. 309). With regards to Coleridge’s inveterate revisions, 
scholarship mainly lays the stress on two functions: Non-additive alterations that aim to 
dig out and discover what is already in the text and clarify the meaning, and additive 
revisionary activity aimed at bringing in novel interpretations and insertions to an earlier 
text.    
Coleridge did revise to clarify his texts without necessarily adding new ideas into 
the text. Consider Coleridge’s revisions of “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner” before the 
                                                 
86 “Coleridge is an epitomizing example of the poet who revises; Keats is an epitomizing example of the poet 
who, for both theoretical and practical reasons, does not revise.” (Stillinger, 1994, p. 101)  
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publication of the second volume of the Lyrical Ballads (1800): McGann (1985) shows, 
for instance, that whereas the 1798 version adhered “closely to the conventions of ancient 
balladry”, hence having a “status as an imitation or literary ballad”, its revised version of 
the 1800 version of Lyrical Ballads turned out to be “a conscious attempt…to make the 
‘Rime’ appear less a literary ballad and more a lyrical ballad” (p. 141). Additionally, 
Coleridge eliminated the obscure parts as well as “the most conspicuous archaisms in 
diction and spelling and tone[d] down some of the Gothicism” (Stillinger, 1994, p. 15). 
Leader (1996) also holds that whereas Coleridge’s revisions were carried out towards 
clarification of original meaning, revisionary activity does not require addition and even 
constitution of new meanings, as the meaning is embedded in the work at its inception: It is 
“perfectly sensible to see almost all the alterations…as working towards intentions – 
thematic and formal – present from the poem’s inception” (p. 131). On the other hand, 
critics such as William Empson and David Pirie (1972) argue that Coleridge’s revisions 
served to suppress and compromise the otherwise “ideological embarrassment” caused by 
his revolutionary views in his youth (p. 250). Norman Fruman (1992) asserts that 
Coleridge revised his poems such as “The Ancient Mariner” to address his “insistent need” 
for concealment (p. 155). Stillinger also holds that Coleridge in the subsequent stages of 
re-working on his texts “added authorial intention that was not consciously present in the 
original composition” (1994, p. 107).  
A consideration of Coleridge’s revisions in their totality is barely exhaustive 
without a discussion of his personal and professional exchanges with Wordsworth. Harold 
Bloom’s (1973) assessment that Coleridge refused to assert a strong poetic identity in the 
face of the “grandeur” of Wordsworth’s literary output (p. 38) coincides with Mileur’s 
(1982) account of Coleridge’s exaltation of Wordsworth as a far superior poet (p. 12). 
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According to Bloom and Mileur, Coleridge’s desperate crisis of poetic identity vis-à-vis 
Wordsworth led him either to remove himself (Bloom, 1973, pp. 263-4) or to exorcise 
Wordsworth (Mileur, 1982, p. ix) out of his own poems. In my treatment of Coleridge’s 
revisions from 1814 to 1818, the aspect I find the most fundamental to Coleridge’s 
revisionary activity is the role Wordsworth previously played in constitution of his oeuvre, 
and the way Coleridge dealt with the issue of re-building friendship based on dialogue 
through revisions. Coleridge surely was overwhelmed by the poetic genius of Wordsworth 
at almost every stage of their relationship. However, this does not amount to saying that 
this feeling made him revise his works to keep up with his partner; instead I hold that 
Coleridge’s personal and professional investment in Wordsworth’s reputation was due to 
his psychologically-compelling feeling of subscription to a joint corpus of works. I argue 
that this plan had to be reversed after The Excursion as it marked for Coleridge the 
beginning of a discrete oeuvre, hence revisionary activity from 1814 to 1818.  
Stillinger’s argument that Wordsworth’s The Excursion (1814) and his collected 
poems of 1815, both of which respectively contained a “Preface” outlining the unity of all 
the poet’s works and presenting the rationale behind the classification of his poems, 
constituted an impetus for Coleridge’s considerable revisionary activity around 1815 
coincides with mine (1994, p. 110). However, he adds that Coleridge’s purpose during his 
revisions was “to achieve in his own work the same kind of unity of effect that 
Wordsworth was in the process of accomplishing in his” (p. 110). Here, I swerve away 
from Stillinger when he draws on Coleridge’s contingency, overlooking his struggle to 
give up the habit of speaking through Wordsworth (or his works, for that matter) so that he 
could come up with an idiosyncratic, philosophically-informed authorship independently. 
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Nonetheless, critics writing on the Coleridgean oeuvre and revisions predominantly 
seem to highlight and problematise the hermeneutic gap87 between themselves and 
Coleridge’s historical condition. They hence either attempt to overcome the gap by trying 
to re-evaluate the work in its unique historical circumstances, or try to appreciate 
Coleridge from their own current positions. A noteworthy example is provided by Matthew 
Vanwinkle (2004) when he discusses how Coleridge’s relocation of his “Frost at 
Midnight” in the Sibylline Leaves of 1817 among his meditative poems (even though the 
poem itself responded to “the repressive political climate that emerged in the wake of the 
French Revolution”) was re-considered and re-contextualized in the early 1990s by critics 
as “a text intricately engaged with the broad social and cultural questions of its day” (pp. 
583-584). However, Vanwinkle asserts, such a “revaluation” has led to “some unfortunate 
consequences, not the least of which is the occlusion of Coleridge’s own conversation with 
his earlier self in the process of revising one of his signature texts” (p. 584). Mays (2001) 
also argues that once an editor – or a critic, for that matter – “works to exclude the 
assumptions of a particular time, and to subordinate temperamental preferences to the 
author-artist he is attempting to serve, his efforts show up as limiting and intrusive, and 
thereby increasingly a distraction”, and he also warns against “presenting an author on his 
or her own terms” as “the result will hardly survive a generation” (p. lxxxii). However, this 
approach misses the opportunity to deal with what Coleridge thought he was doing at the 
time he was revising his oeuvre. 
                                                 
87 Characteristically, the term means lack of information. Karl F. Morrison (1988) defines the term as 
summing up “the negative content of an inquiry into understanding” resorted by those who are deprived of 
"information needed to complete the pattern” emerging before them, and end up becoming “a co-creator of 
the text in the process of reading”. They hence “enter into the text, and into the author’s mind, trying 
repeatedly to fill in the gap.” (p. 34) 
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Joseph A. Appleyard (1965) once deplored the lack in Coleridge scholarship of “a 
full-scale study of the development of his philosophy which will consider him on his own 
terms and not as a representative of something else, whether it be German idealism, 
English Platonism, pantheistic mysticism…so as to see what that thought is and not merely 
what it is like or unlike” (p. ix). I think this statement simultaneously pinpoints what also 
made Coleridge grow discontent with others’ philosophical views: He did not want to 
follow any single person; he aspired to be followed by others (especially Wordsworth as 
his showcase) in his eclectic handling of philosophical and literary issues. I also concur 
with Stillinger’s (1994) view that when it comes to Coleridge’s revisionary engagements 
and the “surplus of materials”, it is of utmost importance to consider “what [Coleridge] 
thought he was doing in writing and (continually, obsessively) revising”; otherwise, a 
critical position inevitably raises “serious philosophical questions about the basic nature 
(ontology) of a Coleridge poem and the constitution of the Coleridge canon” (p. 25). In 
other words, the question “what Coleridge thought” becomes fundamentally central to the 
discussion of Coleridge’s textual and contextual modifications.  
Having hence outlined the body of criticism that has profoundly informed my point 
of view and enabled me to formulate my contributory argument on Coleridge’s revisions 
from 1814 to 1818, the following part is aimed to clearly demonstrate my unique 
intervention to the field. 
 
The Main Contribution of This Study  
Coleridge’s revisions cannot be merely confined to misreading of precursors, concealment 
of previous personal or professional entanglements, correction and clarification of original 
meaning, or an interpretation of it – although I agree that his revisionary activity in one 
100 
 
way or another potentially and usefully served these purposes. Although Coleridge himself 
would surely subscribe to the idea that revision is merely a tool for clarifying his original 
intention, and would love people to adopt this opinion, in fact Coleridge the writer and 
Coleridge the inveterate reviser are by no means mutually exclusive; rather, they both act 
concertedly and simultaneously. Hence revision for Coleridge is not only interpretive and 
clarifying but also additive and even generative. This is critically important when we 
handle the Coleridgean oeuvre because in the name of of clarification and explanation, 
Coleridge substantially changed the content of his previous works, or retrospectively 
interpreted them in such a way that the original context of the work was either lost or 
nebulized. I hold that the Coleridgean awareness of split between what he actually 
experienced and what he thought and knew equipped him with a consciousness that 
whereas he actually aimed for building an identity and creation of a public persona, 
Coleridge at the same time wished to reflect his revisionary activity as nothing more than 
clarification and correction of an otherwise misunderstood position. 
I think in Coleridge’s case of revisiting his life, opinions and poems in the 
aftermath of The Excursion, revision turned into a tool of revelation, detachment, 
recognition of his muddles and reconstruction of his own discrete oeuvre. More 
specifically, during his revisions from 1814 to 1818, Coleridge not only had to deal with 
his “precursors” as suggested by Bloom, he also dealt with Wordsworth and their personal 
and professional entanglements. I would therefore contest the idea that at the high 
watermark of their collaboration Coleridge suffered a peculiar version of the anxiety of 
influence, rooted in the fact that it was not always clear how influence would be nurtured 
and measured. As the philosopher and critic in the relationship, Coleridge knew that his 
role was to be the influencer. But he could not wield his influence without deep 
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engagement with his friend’s work and he often doubted his initial misgivings about it. 
After the publication of The Excursion, on the other hand, this anxiety assumed a subtly 
different form. He had to give up the idea that he was the influencer in order to rescue the 
integrity of his own work and that part of Wordsworth’s oeuvre with which he felt most 
identified. This second version could at best be an “anxiety” of disentanglement. In other 
words, contrary to Galperin’s idea of “writing over” one’s previous works, Coleridge was 
aiming to re-record his own works in their individual existence. However, far from 
exorcising Wordsworth from his life or works, he was rather recognising his own path to 
secure proper friendship by abandoning the habit of speaking through his partner. The aim 
of revision was hence to enable dialogue with Wordsworth. 
In addition, I would like to expound on the dates, 1814-1818, which I take to be a 
significant timespan for Coleridge’s separation from Wordsworth and for constitution of 
his own discrete oeuvre. It must be noted that Coleridge revising himself was surely not a 
new phenomenon in the specific dates from 1814 to 1818, as discussed above. There were 
surely a myriad of intellectual and revisionary activities before 1814 and after 1818. In this 
study, however, I aim to demonstrate the faultlines instigating Coleridge’s “reactionary” 
revisions and their long-lasting results because I assert that those revisions largely laid the 
groundwork for the Coleridgean oeuvre as we know it today. Critics including Magnuson 
(1974), Mileur (1982), Stillinger (1994), and Leader (1996) have already noted that 
Coleridge carried out the most famous revisions in and around 1815-1817, taking the 
writing process and publication of the Biographia Literaria and Sibylline Leaves as the 
preambles and terminal dates to revisionary activity. However, these critics and their 
dating miss out on two important milestones in Coleridge’s revisions around these dates: 
The role of Wordsworth’s The Excursion (1814) in initiating Coleridge’s revisions, and the 
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importance of Coleridge’s revisions of the periodical Friend in 1818. My dates are 
therefore intentionally more comprehensive. My emphasis is on Coleridge’s loss of heart 
in the grand project of The Recluse upon the publication of Wordsworth’s The Excursion 
in 1814, and on the publication in 1818 of the revised version of The Friend as the terminal 
dates for Coleridge’s revisionary reaction.  
With this dissertation, I therefore hope to make contribution to our developing 
understanding of Coleridge’s revisions, which have so far been inspiringly examined by 
the leading scholars, as outlined above. However, the works I have so far engaged with and 
those treating Coleridge directly or in passing do not deal in a sustained way with the 
intersections between Coleridge’s discrete revisionary journey in the Biographia Literaria, 
Sibylline Leaves, and The Friend and his idiosyncratic responses to Kant beginning from 
the early 1800s, his joint project – The Recluse – with Wordsworth, and his theory of 
language and imagination. Considering the extent to which Wordsworth’s The Prelude and 
The Excursion accorded with Coleridge’s theory of language and imagination vis-à-vis the 
corresponding concepts in Kant’s critical philosophy discussed in the previous chapter, my 
distinct and main critical intervention in the critical debate about Coleridge’s revisions is 
the assertion that once Coleridge was frustrated by Wordsworth’s The Excursion, he found 
that it was high time he resorted to his own resources, rather than the remains of his 
symbiotic relationship with Wordsworth, to revise his past and rewrite his life, opinions 
and poetical works in order to lay claims on his discrete oeuvre. It was in this way that he 
could not only dig out his own unique voice, but also build a proper dialogue and 
friendship with Wordsworth. 
Taking the overall argument of my thesis into consideration, it must be noted that 
this particular study is especially relevant today because it is important to pinpoint the 
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strongest impetus behind Coleridge’s self-refashioning in the relatively later period of his 
career, and his motivations considering the intersections between Coleridge’s idiosyncratic 
intellectual pursuits, his investment in Wordsworth and his poetic genius, and his later  
personal and professional frustration and his revisionary activity from 1814 to 1818- which  
has not been the subject of close scrutiny in Coleridge studies so far. 
 
Coleridge’s Revisions: 1814-1818 
Coleridge between 1814 and 1818 was committed to redesign his life, opinion and 
affiliations in the Biographia (1817), re-record his poetical works in the Sibylline Leaves 
and enact his fixed principles in The Friend (1818). The first reason for Coleridge’s 
revisionary activity in this timespan was to firmly underscore his philosophical and 
religious faith in linguistic signification. Considering language for Coleridge was capable 
of creating thoughts, hence constituting the layers of human understanding, and bearing the 
essential nature of things in its capacity of expression, we can hold that his revisions were 
surely guided by his faith in communicability of thoughts through language. Language, 
hence, emerges as the immediate embodiment of an inseparable bond with the phenomenal 
objects to which the linguistics signs point. On the other hand, Wordsworth’s views on 
rustic language and half-hearted faith in linguistic signs to convey his thoughts through 
language – which for Coleridge was similar to Kantian neglect towards the power of words 
– constituted one of the most important departures for Coleridge while revising himself. 
I find Coleridge’s description of “desynonymy” useful here as the concept helps us 
gain deeper understanding of Coleridge’s dissociation from Wordsworth in terms of 
language. It is a method he conceptualised in 1803 (CN I, §1336) to differentiate between 
the standard synonyms unanimously adopted and interchangeably used. Likewise, 
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following Galperin (1987), the termination of the joint oeuvre process after 1814 can also 
be named as Coleridge’s “desynonymization” from Wordsworth. In addition, Coleridge’s 
quest for the absolute Oneness but his simultaneous recognition of multiplicities also had 
its bearing on his conception of language.  
Early in his youth Coleridge endorsed the view of “Unity Entire”, which can be 
very broadly described as deduction of the inherent connectedness, wholeness and 
“holiness of earth and sky” alike. In the early years of his career, this view had roots in his 
Unitarianism and pantheistic views, as Coleridge vividly described in a letter of October 
1797 his attraction to unity, “My mind feels as if it ached to behold & know something 
great, something one & indivisible-and it is only in the faith of this that rocks or waterfalls, 
mountains or caverns give me the sense of sublimity or majesty” (CL I, p. 349). 
Strengthened by his early contacts with “the monistic philosophies of Plotinus, Boehme, 
Berkeley and Spinoza”, as Raimonda Modiano explains (1985, p. 20), Coleridge’s 
espousal of the idea reflects his preliminary quest to grasp the existence of “oneness, there 
being infinite Perceptions”, and his resolution that “there must be a oneness, not an intense 
Union but an Absolute Unity” (CN I, §556). According to this early view, then, diversity 
and multiplicity stemming from infinite numbers of perceptions get inextricably 
interwoven in the supposedly harmonious melting pot of the Absolute Unity. Morton D. 
Paley argues that in the years following his return from Malta, it turned out that the 
wholeness of Coleridge’s vision regarding the harmoniously interrelated order of things 
was already lost (1996, p. 37). I contest this view and assert that the vision was not 
completely lost, but rather retained partially and reformulated as “Multeity in Unity” - a 
term was first presented in the Malta notebooks (CN II, p. 2344), and later became 
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Coleridge’s preferred word for the diversity or plurality ever-present in the unified whole: 
“the Revelation of the Finite, of the Multeity in the Unity” (Fragments, II: 1320).  
Upon his return from the Mediterranean in 1806, Coleridge separated from his 
wife, Sara Coleridge, and moved in with Wordsworths at Grasmere. He spent his time both 
lecturing and writing articles for journals, which gave him the opportunity to address a 
bigger audience, enabling him to formulate his ideas on literary criticism as well as the 
notion of Multeity in Unity. During his lectures in early 1810s, he praised Shakespeare and 
Milton, whose “myriad-mindedness” he admired, aspired and in a sense followed since by 
altering words as well as images they brought about unique works that would not only 
“hover between images”, but also “reconcile opposites and qualify contradictions” by 
leaving them “unfixed and wavering” between images, “attaching [themselves] 
permanently to none” (Lectures II, p. 496; Lectures I, p. 311). This is surely what Lucy 
Newlyn means when she identifies this myriad-mindedness with “the interdisciplinary 
nature of Coleridge’s thinking” (2002, p. 2). It was this mindset, I hold, that enabled 
Coleridge to bring together the metaphysical significance of language and the manifold 
relations between words, object and the mind. As Coleridge states in a notebook jotting of 
March-April 1811: 
We must therefore minutely examine, each in all its manifestations, as far as 
we can…for ever be this my Motto/ ‘When I worship, let me unify…To be 
wise I must know all things as One; to be knowing I must perceive the 
absolutely indivisible as infinitely distinguishable. And this holds from the 
Universe to a Grape-cluster / even as the human Intellect in the infinite 
divisibility of matter attributes the same infinity of component parts to a 
Grain of Sand as to a System of Worlds.. (CN III, §4058) 
Differing from the Unity Entire, this new vision denotes an acknowledgment of the 
multiple forms of existence as they are, without necessarily trying to impose an “absolute 
unity” upon divergent components. It was thanks to this understanding of multeity in unity 
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that Coleridge was able to accommodate the incongruous and even contradicting ideas 
both in his mind, in his works and revisions. 
The second reason this thesis will focus on for Coleridge’s revisionary activity 
between 1814 and 1818 is his theory of imagination and Wordsworth’s misunderstanding 
of the concept, even “synonymizing” it with fancy. Coleridge’s frustration with the lack of 
imaginative-“recreative” power in The Excursion (1814) was even more intensified by 
Wordsworth’s description of imagination and fancy in the “Preface” his Poems (1815). 
Coleridge hence was resolved in the Biographia to “add the Trunk, and even the Roots” to 
Wordsworth’s “sketch of the Branches with their poetic Fruitage” (BL I, p. 88). Just as the 
concept of “muddle” helps us recognise the peculiarities of Coleridge’s active-constitutive 
mind imbued with the idea of “Multeity in Unity” and its reflections on language, 
Coleridge needed an understanding of imagination which not only unifies but also 
“dissipates” and “dissociates” at once (BL I, p. 304) so that it recreates the images anew. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter I have outlined Coleridge’s motivations for revisionary activity from 1814 
to 1818, and what makes these refashionings unprecedented in the course of Coleridge’s 
personal and professional history. According to this investigation, Coleridge emerges not 
merely as the composer of a handful of brilliant poems in the annus mirabilis during his 
symbiotic partnership with Wordsworth, but most importantly as an important figure of the 
Romantic movement with his definitive and idiosyncratic philosophical ideas and 
revisionary activity informed by his views on language and imagination, reaching its peak 
after he embarked on his discrete oeuvre, this time in dialogue with Wordsworth, 
especially after The Excursion (1814). According to my approach, Coleridge’s literary 
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criticism, his muddles, and reactionary revisions in the aftermath of The Excursion up until 
The Friend of 1818 have eventually set the terms for, though not fully anticipated, his 
awareness of an oeuvre desynonymised from that of Wordsworth in a distinctive way. 
The following chapters will focus on providing more detailed analyses of 
Coleridge’s revisionary practice between 1814 and 1818. By means of extensive references 
to Coleridge’s marginalia, letters and notebooks made available by the Bollingen edition of 
the Collected Coleridge, the chapters to come account for how Coleridge revised his life 
and opinions in his autobiographical work the Biographia Literaria (1817), his poetical 
works in collected form named Sibylline Leaves (both written in 1815, but not published 
until 1817), and his The Friend (composed and issued weekly in 1809-10, and published as 

















CHAPTER THREE – REVISING LIFE AND OPINIONS: BIOGRAPHIA 
LITERARIA (1817) 
I regard, and ever have regarded the obligations of intellect among the 
most sacred of the claims of gratitude. (BL I, p. 15) 
 
First conceived as a few-page-long autobiographical preface to the Sibylline Leaves but 
later transformed into a separate work in two volumes,88 the Biographia Literaria as an 
eclectic potpourri (not merely as “Biographical Sketches”) became Coleridge’s 
autobiographical attempt to rehearse his theoretical and practical criticism and dig out the 
most presentable version of himself to “turn it to the best purposes” (CL IV, p. 728). More 
specifically, it was an interpretive attempt to present a revision of his life and opinions, in 
addition to offering a revised context with critical tools according to which his poetic 
collection Sibylline Leaves and Wordsworth’s works (including his Prefaces of 1800 and 
1815) would be dealt with.89 This chapter hence aims to investigate the way Coleridge, 
through his novelistic literary criticism combined with self-narration, took the chance to re-
shape his past, opinions and affiliations; how he retrospectively confronted Wordsworth 
and their joint projects of Lyrical Ballads and especially The Recluse. Considering the 
emotional and professional turmoil he went through ever since he left Allan Bank in 1810, 
his disappointment with Wordsworth’s The Excursion (1814) and his increasingly mixed 
                                                 
88 As James Engell (2002) explains it, “Coleridge envisioned a short preface to a projected book of poems, 
Sibylline Leaves. Mary Lamb understood it would be five or six pages. But as early as 1811 Coleridge 
contemplated a ‘Preface of 30 pages, relative to the principles of Poetry, which I have ever held, and in 
reference to myself, Mr Southey, and Mr Wordsworth’. On 30 March 1815, Coleridge wrote to Byron, 
awkwardly asking the younger man to read his poems and, if he judged them worthy, recommend them ‘to 
some respectable Publisher’. Coleridge added, ‘A general Preface will be pre-fixed, on the principles of 
philosophic and genial [having to do with genius] criticism relatively to the Fine Arts in general; but 
especially to Poetry’ (CL iv, 561; see BL i, 264).” (pp. 59-60) 
89 In a letter of July 1816 to John Hookham Frere, he says “...the accompanying Sheets – which consist of a 
1st Volume and a part of a Second of my literary Life...in which my chief purposes were, 1. to defend myself 
(not indeed to my own Conscience; but) as far as others are concerned, from the often and public 
denunciation of having wasted my time in idleness – in short, of having done nothing – 2. not merely to state 
my own principles of Taste, but to settle, if possible, and to put to rest with all men of sense the controversy 
concerning the nature and claims of poetic Diction…” (CL IV, p. 646) 
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and idiosyncratic responses to the Kantian critical philosophy ever since he became 
familiar with it as early as 1790s, I will also analyse how Coleridge’s poetics in the 
Biographia underpinned his linguistic concerns in literary works and his theory of 
imagination, and how the revisionary approach he presented ultimately enabled him to 
speak to Wordsworth.90 
 
A Brief Background to the Biographia Literaria 
The Biographia was conceived almost two decades earlier than it was published in 1817. 
Initially, Coleridge during his German tour of 1798-99 had planned to write a biography of 
Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729 – 1781), a German dramatist and critic.91 The project by 
October, 1800 transformed into another project to be titled an “Essay on the Elements of 
Poetry” (CL I, 632) and, as John Spencer Hill (1983) demonstrates, “the essay - at least in 
its aesthetic aspect - was eventually written, not by Coleridge, but by Wordsworth, who 
published it as the Preface to the second edition (1800) of Lyrical Ballads” (p. 207).92 
However, the Preface of 1800 gave way to “a radical Difference” concerning poetic 
diction between the two poets,93 and in September-October 1803 Coleridge wrote down the 
                                                 
90 The Preface, as it was initially called, was the chance Coleridge took, as Engell states, “to dissociate 
himself from Wordsworth [and] to elucidate his philosophical inquiries into language, the language of poetry, 
and the proper distinction between fancy and imagination” (Engell, 2002, p. 60). 
91 The first time Coleridge mentions the project was in a letter of January 1799 to Poole, in which he 
mentioned his plans to write “a Life of Lessing — & interweaved with it a true state of German Literature, in 
its rise & present state” (CL I, p. 455). Four months later, he wrote in another letter of May 1799 to Josiah 
Wedgwood that such an undertaking would give him “an opportunity of conveying under a better name, than 
my own ever will be, opinions, which I deem of the highest importance.” (CL I, p. 519). 
92 As Coleridge confirms this in a letter of July 1802: “It is most certain, that that Preface arose from the 
heads of our mutual Conversations &c - & the first passages were indeed partly taken from notes of mine / 
for it was at first intended, that the Preface should be written by me.” (CL II, p. 811) 
93 Two years after stating that “The Preface contains our joint opinions on Poetry” (CL I, p. 627), in 1802, 
after Wordsworth’s revision of the Lyrical Ballads, Coleridge revealed in a letter to Southey on 29 July that 
“altho’ Wordsworth’s Preface is half a child of my own Brain . . . yet I am far from going all lengths with 
Wordsworth . . . I rather suspect that some where or other there is a radical Difference in our theoretical 
opinions respecting Poetry.” (CL II, p. 830)  
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following resolution to his notebook: “Seem to have made up my mind to write my 
metaphysical works, as my Life, & in my Life – intermixed with all the other events / or 
history of the mind & fortunes of S. T. Coleridge” (CN I, §1515). Coleridge was obviously 
aiming towards an autobiography, but he was to wait for another twelve years to write 
one.94 
The Biographia for Coleridge was a promise for “a solid foundation” to 
permanently ground his opinions (BL I, p. 22). Having Wordsworth’s Prefaces95 in mind, it 
was only in May 1815 that Coleridge began his own Preface to the collection of poems 
(CL IV, p. 576). Working with John Morgan as his amanuensis, Coleridge around July-
September 1815 extended the Preface into “an Autobiographia literaria, or Sketches of my 
literary Life & opinions, as far as Poetry and poetical Criticism is concerned” (CL IV, pp. 
578-79). Coleridge’s post-Excursion endeavours to revise himself and his oeuvre so that he 
could establish principles in literary criticism and present an integrated narrative of both 
himself and his relationship with Wordsworth ultimately gained momentum with the 
publication of his Biographia in 1817, two years after he had finished writing it.  
 
Previous Scholarship 
The literature on the Biographia Literaria is massive, and rightly so: Even though the 
nineteenth-century commentators generally ignored it, today it is one of the most iconic 
and important prose texts of the Romantic period.96 The work itself has long been 
                                                 
94 In the meantime, The Friend of 1809 can be considered as a preliminary work for Coleridge to pour down 
the history of his mind: “…I have been giving the History of my own mind.” (TF II, p. 277) 
95 That is, Wordsworth’s 1815 “Preface” to Poems with another piece titled “Essay, Supplementary to the 
Preface”, as well as a reprint of the “Preface to Lyrical Ballads” followed by an Appendix on “poetic 
diction”, published in the 1815 poetic collection.  
96 The Biographia languished in relative obscurity until I.A. Richards resurrected it in the 1920s. Its 
posthumous reception has been very bound up with the creation of literary study as a university discipline. 
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characterised as a curious compilation. For example, in an attempt to provide an answer to 
“what kind of work the Biographia is”, H. J. Jackson (1997) called it a “conundrum” (p. 
55), and Gary Dorrien (2012) characterised it as a “a massive, sprawling, profuse two-
volume stemwinder defying categorization” (p. 129). After all, Coleridge himself named it 
“so immethodical a miscellany” and does not seem to have regarded Biographia as his best 
work (BL I, p. 88). However, some critics chose not to take Coleridge entirely at his word, 
but aimed to look for the elaborate unity and extensive structures embedded within 
Coleridge’s thought, and the outcome in the Biographia. Kathleen M. Wheeler’s Sources, 
Processes and Methods in Coleridge's 'Biographia Literaria'  (1980 ), for instance, sought 
to trace the gradual proliferation and maturation of the Biographia in Coleridge’s mind 
over a period of fifteen years by providing historical context (including his Notebooks and 
Letters). Wheeler used the idea of unity to defend Coleridge against the charge of lacking a 
method (p. 11), just as McGann later characterised the “accusations of incoherence and 
disorganization” as misguided (1989, p. 237). Similarly, having previously seen the 
Biographia as one of Coleridge’s “rubble-heap works” (1981, p. 21), Thomas McFarland 
in an article of 1986 suggested that in the Biographia, Coleridge “fructified seeds that had 
been planted as early as 1800” (p. 406).  
Other critics rather focused on Coleridge’s plagiarisms. Subtantially initiated by 
Thomas de Quincey97 after the death of Coleridge, followed by the 1840-article by James 
Ferrier98, the critical debate lingered up to the twentieth century. Coleridge was especially 
attacked by Norman Fruman (1971) and Rene Wellek (1981) who drew on Coleridge’s 
                                                                                                                                                    
The key person in the rehabiliation of Biographia was I.A. Richards, one of the most important figures of 
Cambridge English in the early 20th century. 
97 See: Daniel Sanjiv Roberts. Revisionary Gleam: De Quincey, Coleridge and the High Romantic Argument. 
2000. 
98 “Plagiarisms of S.T. Coleridge”, was published in March 1840 in Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine.  
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lavish “borrowings”. However, as Modiano (2009) states, “it is not just plagiarism, a 
natural subject of controversy, that has polarized critics, but virtually anything having to do 
with the Biographia” (p. 205). Eugene Stelzig in “Coleridge’s Failed Quest” (1980) 
criticised Coleridge’s literary theory in the Biographia by holding that it is not a work to 
be taken “all too seriously” (83), and the parts that modern scholars extravagantly praise 
are nothing other than a “failed epiphany” (93-94). Hamilton, similarly, in Coleridge’s 
Poetics (1983) devoted a chapter to the investigation of the reasons for “Coleridge’s failure 
in the Biographia to achieve what he set out to do” (p.5). The bulky controversy over the 
glorious achievements or disreputable defects of the Biographia have more recently 
transitioned into exploring the foundational aspects of the work: How the work led to 
Coleridge’s productivity afterwards (Engell, 2002)99, how the writing process helped 
Coleridge develop a more philosophical and relatively systematic approach to literary 
criticism (Modiano, 2009)100, how through his autobiographical work Coleridge sought to 
universalize his individual experience (Hamilton, 2007)101 and the way it influenced the 
future generation of writers (Perry, 2009).102 
The view that the Biographia is a product of Coleridge’s revisionary activity has 
been subject to scholarly scrutiny that primarily takes its genre into account. According to 
                                                 
99 As Engell notes, “in many respects, the whole of Biographia Literaria opened gates in Coleridge’s psyche. 
Shortly after he began actively to write and dictate it, a series of remarkable publications in prose and verse 
flowed from him until his death in 1834. If, as with many great works in philosophy, criticism, religion and 
autobiography, Biographia Literaria remains a source of unending discussion and even disagreement, this is 
because it generates endless fascination and insight.” (pp. 73-74) 
100 Modiano (2009) notes that “Coleridge’s conception of the enterprise of literary criticism in the 
Biographia” is related with “what he elusively called ‘genial criticism’ in his 1814 Essays on the Principles 
of Genial Criticism.” (p. 206) 
101 Hamilton (2007) maintains that “Coleridge’s free and easy attitude towards the writing of his 
autobiography evinces both confidence and trepidation. Coleridge’s autobiography is, by turns, droll, 
pompous and strategic. It toys with the varieties of inwardness at its disposal in a knowing, sometimes arch 
manner. It is evidendy acquainted with post-Kantian attempts, following from Kant's third Critique, to 
universalize the individual experience without using scientific concepts.” (p. 79)  
102 “Coleridge’s Literary Influence” (2009) in The Oxford Handbook of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. 
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this, as Paul Hamilton’s (2007) chapter “Coleridge’s Coleridge” extensively discusses, any 
attempt at writing biography or autobiography is invariably bound to consist, among many 
others, of the writer’s distortions, wishful thinking, corrective accounts, and misleading 
judgements in retrospect (pp. 69-88). In this vein, finding out the “real” Coleridge through 
his autobiography is as doomed as finding “the real language of men” – they both infinitely 
exert their sway (p. 71). Monika Class (2012) also argues that whereas Coleridge in the 
Biographia presented his radical politics in the past as motivated by disinterestedness, he 
was in fact revising his current reputation as the fact was that he did pursue an “interested” 
agenda.103 In addition, Class underscores the discrepancy between Coleridge’s deliberate 
and repressive (mis)presentation of Kantian terms and historical facts in the Biographia. 
That is, Coleridge severed the ties between the Kantian philosophy and its political 
implications, consciously revising image of Kant that complied with his political 
expedience (Class, p. 151), and relegating the Kantian principles laden with political 
undertones such as categorical imperative to a purely theoretical realm (p. 118). Coleridge 
                                                 
103 Coleridge’s review of his life and opinions definitely involved retrospective corrections and at times 
concealment through elaborate diction and digressive explanation. The most well-known aspect of his 
revisions in the Biographia is the fact that Coleridge aimed to convert his relatively radical reputation of the 
past into a disinterested zeal adopted at the time to attain higher truths (Tee, 2009, pp. 74-75). Reminiscing of 
the Watchman years of 1795-1796, he wrote “O! never can I remember those days with either shame or 
regret. For I was most sincere, most disinterested! My opinions were indeed in many and most important 
points erroneous; but my heart was single. Wealth, rank, life itself then seemed cheap to me, compared with 
the interests of (what I believed to be) the truth, and the will of my maker. I cannot even accuse myself of 
having been actuated by vanity; for in the expansion of my enthusiasm I did not think of myself at all (BL I, 
pp. 179-80). He surely did, in a cynical way. Class argues that Coleridge was unable to describe 
“disinterestedness” without thinking about the outcomes of it. Class refers to a notebook entry dated to late 
1795 and early 1796, in which Coleridge (informed by Nitsch) expressed his views on the Kantian 
categorical imperative with the following words: “By obliging every one always to do that which to him shall 
seem in the then present time and circumstances conducive to the public good: or by enjoining the 
observation of some determinate Laws, which if universally obeyed would produce universal happiness” (CN 
I, §249). Here, Coleridge cannot but deviate “slightly” from a sheer disinterested approach as the phrases 
such as “public good” and “universal happiness” makes us think of the outcome rather than, as Kant would 
have it, sole motivation (Class 83). Over a decade later, in The Friend of 1809-10 (TF II, p. 128), Coleridge 
presented categorical imperative without its political content and potential activism – which also bears 
testimony to the idea that Coleridge even while talking about disinterestedness ingenuously got rid of the 
content he found unfavourable at the time. 
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also contravened the charges of Jacobinism (Alan D. Vardy, 2010, pp. 10-25) and his 
radical youth104 by means of his revisionary account in his autobiography. In other words, 
according to scholars, Coleridge in the Biographia reshaped his past by drawing attention 
to his disinterested and almost naïve motivations, but he actually procured those proofs 
through half-truths with the aid of his autobiographical “semi-narrative” (BL I, p. 175). 105 
The reputation of Coleridge has almost always been associated with plagiarism, 
and this was the case as well when he was writing the Biographia.106 Coleridge therefore 
presented a defence for his unacknowledged borrowings to euphemistically justify them on 
the grounds of undeliberate coincidence. Christoph Bode (2009) notes that in his attempt to 
change this perception, Coleridge distorted the truth:  
Samuel Taylor Coleridge himself is not a very reliable witness regarding the 
evolution of his own religious, political and philosophical thinking. For 
example, with some impudence he…claimed to have developed the same 
ideas as Friedrich Schelling before Schelling even published them (between 
1797 and 1800), though there is absolutely no evidence for this in 
Coleridge’s writing and, what is more, what Coleridge did write during this 
period (and before) stands in marked opposition to Schelling’s 
Transendental- and Naturphilosophie and to other forms of German 
                                                 
104 In the Biographia he claims, for example, that through his “constitutional indolence” Coleridge was able 
to keep his “enthusiasm in check” even throughout “the very hey-day of hope” (BL I, p. 199)  
105 By publicly confronting his earlier views again years later in the Biographia and demonstrating his 
unselfish and bona-fide objectives at the time, Coleridge in 1815 rather pragmatically trimmed the undesired 
parts of his life and pruned the sharp ideas of his youthful zeal to be able to embrace his earlier self, and 
rewrite his religious and political background at his own will. An example to this is, as Class argues, his 
support for expedience, half-truths and half-contradictions in Biographia: “‘half-contradiction’ consisted in 
Coleridge’s use of the…strategy of divorcing metaphysics and morals from politics in Biographia Literaria. 
It has often been commented that Coleridge’s narrative structure resembles Tristram Shandy….[as] fiction is 
an essential part of Biographia Literaria. What gives us historical insights are the discrepancies between 
Coleridge’s narrative self-construction and historical evidence; his departures and omissions are revealing 
and help us to understand his intellectual development…” (Class, p. 148) 
106 It must be noted here that for Coleridge, the concept of intellectual property did not have the same 
meaning as we understand it today.  Tilar J. Mazzeo in Plagiarism and Literary Property in the Romantic 
Period (2007) explains why we should not take the word in modern sense “without historical interrogation 
into what might have constituted plagiarism in another century” (pp. 46-47). For example, Mazzeo describes 
how Norman Fruman condemned Coleridge “through assiduous research”, judging Coleridge according to 
“standards that his contemporaries never would have thought to apply to his borrowings. In the end, the 
critical tradition surrounding Coleridge tells us more about the ways in which the category of literary 
property has evolved and about our own relations to it than it tells us about the poet or the stakes being 
contested when charges of plagiarism were made in early nineteenth century Britain.” (p. 47)  
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Idealism as well. He also lied about his acquaintance with August Wilhelm 
Schlegel’s Vienna Lectures and about the extent of his familiarity with 
Schelling’s post-1800 writings, from which he helped himself copiously, 
either totally without or with misleading acknowledgments. (p. 591) 
Similar to his practice of marginalia, it seems that Coleridge found it more secure and 
preferable to develop his own idiosyncratic system by means of adapting the philosophy of 
others, and synthesising and disciplining his own views and comments out of their 
wisdom. Therefore, after translating extensively from Schelling in the Biographia, 
Coleridge claimed that “I might have transcribed the substance from memoranda of my 
own, which were written many years before his pamphlet was given to the world”, and 
added that he preferred “another’s words to my own, partly as a tribute due to priority of 
publication; but still more from the pleasure of sympathy in a case where coincidence only 
was possible” (BL I, p. 147). After all, he regarded “truth as a divine ventriloquist”: He did 
not care “from whose mouth the sounds are supposed to proceed” as long as “the words are 
audible and intelligible” (BL I, p. 164). This was his strategy for arguing against the 
accusations of intellectual theft and countering his current and prospective notoriety as a 
perpetrator of plagiarism through modifications of the past in an autobiographical 
narrative. 
 
Gap in Scholarship 
Scholarship on the Biographia falls short of offering an exhaustive investigation of 
Coleridge’s revisionary approach to his life and opinions vis-à-vis his response to Kantian 
critical philosophy and his earlier conception of joint oeuvre with Wordsworth. To address 
this gap, I would like to consider the wider implications of the self-willed alterations of 
Coleridge while writing the Biographia. I hold that Coleridge in 1815 thought he was on 
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the verge of building dialogue with Wordsworth by rediscovering the value of his discrete 
oeuvre, reshaping his poetic identity, and laying weight on his poetics and practical 
criticism. As he announced in the Biographia, due to the “frequent conjunction” of his 
name with Wordsworth’s, he declared it “expedient to declare once for all” in what points 
he coincided with Wordsworth’s opinions and in what points he altogether differed (BL II, 
p. 8).With this in mind, I aim to discuss how Coleridge’s muddled approach helped him 
change his past and design future reception through the Biographia by specifically 
elaborating on the second volume in which he described an unprecedented method of 
practical criticism merged with his poetics. I also aim to delineate the philosophical and 
religious aspects of his opposition to Wordsworth’s notion that his poems exemplified the 
language of men speaking to men, to put Coleridge into dialogue with Wordsworth in his 
revisionary account of their joint projects, to discuss Coleridge’s Aristotelianism in 
criticism, and to examine his resistance to Kantian transcendental deduction as well as 
distinction between the mind and the outside world vis-à-vis his theory of imagination. 
With this proposition, I contravene Hamilton’s (1983) argument that Coleridge failed to 
“achieve the transcendental deduction” in the Biographia (p. 5), and argue instead that 
Coleridge’s engagement with transcendence in philosophical investigation would never 
yield such results at all.  
By means of the extended quasi-fictional prospective autobiography promised, 
Coleridge in the Biographia aimed to draw attention to his inner thoughts, not precisely as 
he experienced but as he wanted to present them. Here, his faith in the constitutive aspect 
of the mind played an important role. For instance, although it was Coleridge who 
designed the main content of the “Preface” to the Lyrical Ballads (1800), he later became 
discontented with it and in the Biographia, he criticised the Preface as if he was not 
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involved in its constitution process. This is because in order to dissociate himself from 
Wordsworth, his account had to recreate the past in line with his current needs and 
purposes. In this respect, although I agree with Joseph Appleyard (1965) when he states 
that the Biographia is “primarily a record, not of Coleridge’s youthful search for a literary 
theory, but of the state of mind in the summer of 1815” (p. 170), I would like to accentuate 
the integral role of The Excursion and the overall collapse of his joint project of The 
Recluse with Wordsworth on his revisionary activity.  
Although I am well aware of the fact that Coleridge in retrospect did not seem to be 
overly proud of his autobiographical work, I do not see the Biographia as either trivial or a 
failure. Neither do I consider it as an embodiment of a larger developmental process, nor a 
work that has intrinsic unity as it was a product of a perfect plan. Rather than solely 
reaping the fruits of hard labour, Coleridge was revising his debt to Kant, his affiliation 
with Wordsworth, and distangling himself from the remnants of their symbiosis, struggling 
to exist on his own and speak for himself, not through others. With people such as Hazlitt 
publicly reproaching his “hypocrisy” at every turn, and seeing that a real historical account 
of his mind would fall short of an enabling a change of public opinion, Coleridge surely 
had an interest in (as he saw it) setting the record straight in the Biographia through 
recirculation of the past thoughts to yield the “intellectual offspring” of today.    
Until the Biographia, Coleridge had published very little literary criticism: There 
was a book review in the 1790s107, he had delivered two or three series of lectures on 
Shakespeare and Milton but he had never, for example, published his detailed views of 
Wordsworth as such. The Biographia has already been commonly and rightly described as 
                                                 




a response to Wordsworth’s two Prefaces - 1800 and 1815 (Milnes, 1999, p. 127; Engell, 
2002, p. 61).108 However, laying too much emphasis on the Prefaces crucially misses what 
I hold to be the most definitive aspect of the composition process of the Biographia – 
Coleridge’s frustration with what would, if accomplished, be the first philosophical poem 
by Wordsworth.        
For Coleridge the Biographia was a strategic work so that he could present his 
praise as well as distaste for not only Wordsworth’s works and Prefaces, but also his 
commentary on The Excursion. A letter of May 30, 1815 to Wordsworth demonstrates the 
importance Coleridge attributes to his own “Preface” where he was to outline the reasons 
for his disappointment. He wrote:    
I have only to finish a preface, which I shall have done in two, or, at 
farthest, three days; and I will then, dismissing all comparison either with 
the poem on the growth of your own support, or with the imagined plan of 
“The Recluse,” state fairly my main objections to “The Excursion” as it is. 
But it would have been alike unjust both to you and to myself, if I had led 
you to suppose that any disappointment I may have felt arose wholly or 
chiefly from the passages I do not like, or from the poem considered 
irrelatively. (CL IV, 576)  
That he does not elaborate on his views in the letter but postpones them until the 
Biographia has been written shows that he was intent on disentangling his reputation from 
that of Wordsworth’s and only after that could he present a more thorough analysis of The 
Excursion. More precisely, the Biographia was a notable step towards speaking to 
Wordsworth, so he could establish friendship as well as dialogue with his former symbiotic 
partner. After all, Coleridge ruefully stated that from 1794 when he “published a small 
volume of juvenile poems” to the publication date of the Biographia Literaria he had 
                                                 
108 Tim Milnes argues that the Biographia first emerged as “a reply to and a rebuttal of Wordsworth’s 
empirical and associative definition of imagination as set out in the Preface to his Poems (1815)” (1999, p. 
127). Engell similarly argues that the “Biographia Literaria creates an extended dialogue with – and answers 
–Wordsworth’s two Prefaces (1800 and 1815); it then criticises Wordsworth’s poetry.” (2002, p. 61) 
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published nothing with his own name (BL I, pp. 5, 7).109 His relationship with Wordsworth 
and their joint venture of writing a philosophical poem, he thought, had almost removed 
him from view as an author in his own right, largely undermining his own capability as 
well as name in front of the public, and we can see his frustration when Coleridge referred 
to the Lyrical Ballads as “Mr. WORDSWORTH’s” (BL I, p. 69). The Biographia, along 
with the accompanying poetic collection, gave Coleridge the chance to reclaim his own 
works and name. Therefore, he had taken time until his own perception of his oeuvre as a 
thing in its own right grew into relative maturity, enabling him to present his revisionary 
reaction to Wordsworth.   
 
Coleridge’s Revisions in the Biographia Literaria 
Coleridge’s devotion to present in the Biographia “a total and undivided philosophy” 
which would be intertwined with religion so that, reversibly, “religion [could] become 
inclusive of philosophy” resulted in the extended line of argument laying the grounds for 
Coleridge’s conception of language (BL II, p. 282).110 That he agreed to prepare a 
dictionary of English language, Encyclopedia Metropolitana, the following year 
demonstrates his preoccupation not only with language but also with its origins.111 The 
                                                 
109 With “nothing, with my name” Coleridge exaggerates the situation because the fact is that he had a 
translation of Schiller’s Wallenstein (1800), The Friend (1809-10), and Remorse (1813) and some other 
poems written in this period and published with his own name. 
110 Charging the dictionary of Samuel Johnson with being inccurate and incomplete (BL I, 237 n.), Coleridge 
advanced on his own proposal as follows: “Were I asked, what I deemed the greatest and most unmixt 
benefit, which a wealthy individual, or an association of wealthy individuals could bestow on their country 
and on mankind, I should not hesitate to answer, ‘a philosophical English dictionary; with the Greek, Latin, 
German, French, Spanish and Italian synonimes, and with correspondent indexes’.” (BL I, 239 n.) 
111 “In the following year, Coleridge entered into a contractual agreement with the publishers of the 
Encyclopedia Metropolitana to prepare an etymological dictionary of the English language. Coleridge 
described the plan for this new ‘Philosophical and Etymological LEXICON of the English Language’ in 
terms that strikingly foreshadow the plan that was later devised for the Oxford English Dictionary (OED): 
each word would be accompanied by illustrative citations in chronological order, with ‘every attention to the 
independent beauty or value of the sentences chosen … consistent with the higher ends of a clear insight into 
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Biographia is therefore a project of Coleridge’s ambitions to elaborate on his theory of 
language and his practical criticism in line with his theologically-informed philosophical 
arguments. 
 
Revisions and the Controversy over Language 
Coleridge in 1815 was aware that Wordsworth might not have become the poet he was had 
he not collaborated with him; Wordsworth’s greatness was in this sense part of Coleridge’s 
achievement (Perry, 2003, p. 161). However, back in December 1800, Coleridge wrote to 
Francis Wrangham noting that Wordsworth was a true poet while he was only a kind of 
metaphysician.112 I interpret this statement as a “division of labour” planned by Coleridge 
early in their collaboration in order not only to draw attention to his extra-curricular 
engagements, but also to paradoxically accentuate his own poetic productions. Morton D. 
Paley in Coleridge’s Later Poetry (1996) presents a similar strategy Coleridge adopted: 
Lamenting his failing creative powers and classifying his later productions as something 
other than poetry (pp. 2-3). A striking example to this is the letter of March 1801 addressed 
to William Godwin, in which Coleridge beautifully and most poetically explains that “The 
Poet is dead in me - my imagination...lies, like a Cold Snuff on the circular Rim of a Brass 
Candle-stick, without even a stink of Tallow to remind you that it was once cloathed & 
mitred with Flame” (CL II, p. 714). The imagery he used to endorse his assertion that he 
can no longer compose poetry is indeed solidly and ironically poetic, and as a simultaneous 
refutation of his own argument, Coleridge here is writing his “most celebrated valedictory” 
                                                                                                                                                    
the original and acquired meaning of every word’ (‘Treatise on Method’, Shorter Works and Fragments, 
687).” (McKusick, 2009, p. 583) 
112 In a letter to Francis Wrangham on December 19, 1800 he said, “Wordsworth & I have never resided 
together…As to our literary occupations they are still more distant than our residences – He is a great, true 
poet – I am only a kind of Metaphysician.” (CL I, p. 658) 
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by using “poetically charged imagery to deny his own poetic impulse” (Paley, 1996, pp. 3, 
4). Coleridge apparently could not let go of the poet inside, neither did he give up his 
ambitions of endowing his creative powers with metaphysics and philosophy. 
Nevertheless, because in the 1800s Wordsworth and Coleridge were still collaborating on 
their grand project of The Recluse, Coleridge put the poet inside into the relative 
background because he felt overshadowed by Wordsworth in this domain. Despite their 
differences respecting poetry, which for him emerged after Wordsworth’s “Preface” to 
Lyrical Ballads in 1800, I hold that Coleridge still cherished hopes for completion of a 
great philosophical poem, which – if completed – would be the ultimate epitome of his 
philosophical pursuits and Wordsworth’s poetic competence.  
An autobiography penned by Coleridge would therefore be impossible without the 
inclusion of Wordsworth and their collaborative work, the Lyrical Ballads (1798), since he 
had for a long time been the other half of Coleridge ever since their literary collaboration 
in annus mirabilis, and continued to arouse deep respect despite the ruptures, resentments 
and misunderstandings afterwards. As Coleridge explicitly stated at the beginning of the 
Biographia, he aimed for “a settlement of the long continued controversy concerning the 
true nature of poetic diction; and at the same time to define with the utmost impartiality the 
real poetic character of the poet, by whose writings this controversy was first kindled, and 
has been since fuelled and fanned” (BL I, p. 5). However, Coleridge up until 1815 does not 
seem to have properly and publicly defended his position in constitution of this joint 
project. In the Biographia, he took opportunity to change the perception of irrelevancy of 
his poems in the Lyrical Ballads and explicate his philosophical, poetic and linguistic 
views distinct from those of Wordsworth’s at the time. This entailed a simultaneous 
reassessment of Wordsworth’s poems and his literary theory, reconsideration of their 
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literary partnership, and dissociation from him. The Biographia in this respect enabled 
Coleridge to clarify his initial mindset while planning the work and outline the reasons for 
his distaste afterwards. 
When the plan for the Lyrical Ballads was materialised, Coleridge narrated, “it was 
agreed” that a reconciliation of the ordinary and supernatural would have been presented 
throughout the work. Hence, what would make the Lyrical Ballads unprecedented and 
truly a ground-breaking experiment was the initial and essential agreement of both 
Wordsworth and Coleridge to present the ordinary in order “to give the charm of novelty to 
things of every day” and supernatural so as “to transfer from our inward nature a human 
interest and a semblance of truth sufficient to procure for these shadows of imagination 
that willing suspension of disbelief for the moment, which constitutes poetic faith” (BL II, 
pp. 7, 6). Wordsworth would therefore direct his creative skills towards accomplishing the 
former “to excite a feeling analogous to the supernatural, by awakening the mind’s 
attention from the lethargy of custom, and directing it to the loveliness and the wonders of 
the world before us…” (BL II, p. 7), whereas Coleridge’s “endeavours should be directed 
to persons and characters supernatural, or at least romantic” (BL II, p. 6). It was with this 
agenda in mind that Coleridge wrote such poems as “The Ancient Mariner” and 
“Christabel”. However, Wordsworth’s “industry had proved so much more successful, and 
the number of his poems so much greater,” that Coleridge’s final compositions, “instead of 
forming a balance, appeared rather an interpolation of heterogeneous matter” (BL II, p. 8). 
And the Lyrical Ballads was published in this form and presented by Wordsworth as an 
“experiment” (LB, p. 47). 
Publication of the 1800 edition of the Lyrical Ballads with a “Preface” by 
Wordsworth had further considerable impact on Coleridge’s consideration of their literary 
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partnership. Although Coleridge in a letter of September 1800 had claimed that “The 
Preface contains our joint opinions on Poetry” (CL I, p. 627), Wordsworth’s theory of 
poetic diction seemed to Coleridge more concerned with a defence of his own theoretical 
views on poetry, almost discarding the poetry Coleridge wrote for the collection (and 
overlooking their initial plan, for that matter). Indeed, Coleridge’s contribution both in 
terms of poetic style (supernatural) and actual poems themselves (“Christabel”  113) was 
banished from the second edition of Lyrical Ballads, culminating in “Wordsworth asking 
the printer to omit the poem and to cancel a crucial passage of the Preface that spoke of the 
essential agreement of the two men and turn it into a mere list of the poems included from 
Coleridge” (Engell, 1983, p. xlvii). When Wordsworth with his 1815 Poems reprinted the 
1800 “Preface” to the Lyrical Ballads this, as Engell (2002) puts it, “revived ghosts” for 
Coleridge (p. 59). He remonstrated in the Biographia with his friend, who 
“notwithstanding some passages of apparently a contrary import”, paradoxically aimed for 
the extension of his own argument “to poetry of all kinds” by rejecting “as vicious and 
indefensible all phrases and forms of speech that were not included in what he 
(unfortunately, I think, adopting an equivocal expression) called the language of real life” 
(BL II, p. 8).114  
In addition to the exclusion of his poem “Christabel” from the collection and 
relegation of “The Ancient Mariner” from its initial position in the collection to the end of 
                                                 
113 “Christabel” was initially intended to be placed at the end of Volume 2, but Wordsworth suddenly came to 
the resolution to omit the poem, as he wrote to Longman on 18 December 1800, “I found that the Style of 
this Poem was so discordant from my own that it could not be printed along with my poems with any 
propriety” (WL I, p. 309). It was subsequently replaced by Wordsworth’s Michael.  
114 Coleridge regarded this an unfortunate step and objected to it firstly on the grounds that “in any sense this 
rule is applicable only to certain classes of poetry; secondly, that even to these classes it is not applicable, 
except in such a sense, as hath never by any one (as far as I know or have read,) been denied or doubted; and 
lastly, that as far as, and in that degree in which it is practicable, it is yet as a rule useless, if not injurious, 
and therefore either need not, or ought not to be practised.” (BL II, p. 42) 
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Volume 1, Wordsworth outlined the “great defects” of the latter at the end of Volume 1 of 
the 1800 edition,115 and the second edition appeared with only Wordsworth’s name as the 
author. Most importantly, with its emphasis on the ordinary, “real language of men” (LB, 
p. 171), the “Preface” simultaneusly made the poems of Coleridge in the collection seem 
even more eccentric at best and defective at worst, if not thoroughly irrelevant. Coleridge 
in the Biographia detailed his criticism of Wordsworth’s controversial “Preface” (1800) to 
the second edition and did not fail to present his own counter argument on Wordsworth’s 
theory of the “real language of men”116 – which Coleridge thought was rooted in 
misunderstandings of the ideas he first expressed to Wordsworth in the 1790s.  
In the second volume of the Biographia, Coleridge presented not only corrective 
accounts of his collaboration with Wordsworth, but also a critical reading of Wordsworth’s 
poetic compositions by taking his theory of ordinary language into consideration. Against 
Wordsworth’s assertion that in his imitation of the very language of common man he 
deliberately avoided poetic diction117 as much as possible for “the human mind is capable 
of excitement without the application of gross and violent stimulants” (LB, p. 176), 
Coleridge replied that “Now it is clear to me, that in the most interesting of the poems, in 
which the author is more or less dramatic…the persons introduced are by no means taken 
                                                 
115 “The Poem of my Friend has indeed great defects…” (p. 289). Lyrical Ballads 1798 and 1800: William 
Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Ed. Michael Gamer and Dahlia Porter. Peterborough: Broadview, 
2008.  
116 “I object, in the very first instance, to an equivocation in the use of the word “real.” Every man’s language 
varies, according to the extent of his knowledge, the activity of his faculties, and the depth or quickness of 
his feelings. Every man's language has, first, its individualities; secondly, the common properties of the class 
to which he belongs; and thirdly, words and phrases of universal use.” (BL II, p. 55) 
117 “There will also be found in these volumes little of what is usually called poetic diction; I have taken as 
much pains to avoid it as others ordinarily take to produce it; this I have done for the reason already alleged, 
to bring my language near to the language of men, and further, because the pleasure which I have proposed to 
myself to impart is of a kind very different from that which is supposed by many persons to be the proper 
object of poetry.” (LB, p. 178 ) 
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from low or rustic life in the common acceptation of those words…” (BL II, p. 43).118 
Wordsworth, Coleridge suggested, in fact had many common threads with those who took 
much pains to produce stylistic features in their poetry, and his “Preface” was a failed 
attempt at rhetorical manoeuvring to justify a position he did not adhere to in the first 
place. 
After all, Coleridge added, the concept of “ordinary language” spoken by “common 
man” is an idealized denomination.119 McKusick rightly explains the reason for 
Coleridge’s unfavourable reaction to “ordinary language” as follows,  
Throughout his career as a poet and philosopher, Coleridge’s quest for 
linguistic naturalness is fundamentally motivated by a pervasive nostalgia 
for the alleged transparency of primitive language, the immediacy of 
relation between the linguistic sign and its referent. Coleridge’s distaste for 
ordinary language is motivated by a corresponding reaction against the 
defacement of words in the tawdry transactions of everyday life. (2009, p. 
579) 
Therefore for Coleridge, as Engell and Bate state, “the essential flaw in Wordsworth’s 
theory” was the misconception that poetic language was a mere copy, “and a reproduction 
of ordinary speech” (1983 , pp. cv-cvi), whereas in fact it was a form of imitation in 
Aristotelian sense, according to which clear wording “consists of prevalent words, but it is 
flat” whereas “the use of unfamiliar words lends dignity and departs from the local idiom” 
(Poetics, p. 54). According to Coleridge, his partner’s theory potentially gave rise to a 
                                                 
118 Wordsworth also argued that “...a language arising out of repeated experience and regular feelings is a 
more permanent and a far more philosophical language than that which is frequently substituted for it by 
Poets, who think that they are conferring honour upon themselves and their art in proportion as they separate 
themselves from the sympathies of men, and indulge in arbitrary and capricious habits of expression in order 
to furnish food for fickle tastes and fickle appetites of their own creation” (LB, p. 174-75). The poet here 
aims to theoretically establish the merits of the actual, the ordinary, the familiar, mainly proposing to 
“imitate, and, as far as possible, to adopt the very language of men” (p. 177). 
119 As Coleridge explains, “the language so highly extolled by Mr. Wordsworth varies in every county, nay in 
every village, according to the accidental character of the clergyman, the existence or non-existence of 
schools; or even, perhaps, as the exciteman, publican, and barber happen to be, or not to be, zealous 
politicians, and readers of the weekly newspaper pro bono publico” (BL II, p. 56). 
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rupture between words and thought, due to its emphasis on the rural, ordinary language 
consisting of arbitrary signs of language. 
Against Wordsworth’s contention that ordinary men “hourly communicate with the 
best objects from which the best part of language is originally derived” and that “being less 
under the action of social vanity, they convey their feelings and notions in simple and 
unelaborated expressions” (LB, p. 174), Coleridge’s reply therefore shows how distinct 
their views were, when he says:  
… a rustic’s language, purified from all provincialism and grossness, and so 
far reconstructed as to be made consistent with the rules of grammar—
(which are in essence no other than the laws of universal logic, applied to 
psychological materials)—will not differ from the language of any other 
man of common sense, however learned or refined he may be, except as far 
as the notions, which the rustic has to convey, are fewer and more 
indiscriminate. (BL II, p. 52) 
Coleridge clearly outlined the demarcation lines between his “poetic creed” and “the 
doctrines promulgated in this preface” by pointing out his adoption “with full faith” of the 
principle of Aristotle, “that poetry, as poetry, is essentially ideal, that it avoids and 
excludes all accident; that its apparent individualities of rank, character, or occupation 
must be representative of a class; and that the persons of poetry must be clothed with 
generic attributes…” (BL II, p. 45). Against Wordsworth’s proposition that sporadic 
language of the common man is more preferable (and should be regarded as “more 
permanent and a far more philosophical”) vis-à-vis the systematic design of literary texts 
and poetic diction, Coleridge firmly argued as follows: “The best part of human language, 
properly so called, is derived from reflection on the acts of the mind itself. It is formed by 
a voluntary appropriation of fixed symbols to internal acts, to processes and results of 
imagination, the greater part of which have no place in the consciousness of uneducated 
man...” (BL II, p. 54). In order for language to create thoughts worthy of poetic output, the 
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man articulating the symbols must have reflected on the machinations of the mind. In this 
case, whereas Coleridge’s conception of language was largely inspired by its “divine” 
thought-making potential, the uneducated man speaking ordinary language cannot go 
beyond expressing the mundane states of everyday existence. 
In the Biographia Coleridge strongly contested Wordsworth’s theory because it 
was vital to clearly delineate the peculiar characteristics of language in any literary work, 
not just the poems of Wordsworth. “Be it observed,” exclaimed Coleridge, “that I include 
in the meaning of a word not only its correspondent object, but likewise all the associations 
which it recalls. For language is framed to convey not the object alone but likewise the 
character, mood and intentions of the person who is representing it” (BL II, p. 104). This is 
the reason why Coleridge in the Biographia accentuated - in a moment of exaltation of 
Wordsworth’s poetry - his friend’s capacity “to combine the child’s sense of wonder and 
novelty with the appearances, which every day for perhaps forty years had rendered 
familiar” (BL I, p. 81). Stylistic devices hence are not simply meant to convey meaning as 
in simple everyday communication, but they in fact work towards disrupting the mundane 
nature of the actual, hence making the outright perception difficult to prolong the aesthetic 
experience. Deautomatization of perception and defamiliarization are the tools that 
distinguish between artistic language and everyday communication, and the poetry of 
Wordsworth, for Coleridge, in this respect contradicted greatly even with his own theory, 
and rightfully so because, supposing that Wordsworth had happened to fully apply his 
theory on his compositions, considered from Coleridge’s critical position, his work would 
not have attained the level of literary production at all. 
Wordsworth in the Biographia was portrayed as the poet with an indisputable 
poetic genius whose “fame belongs to another age, and can neither be accelerated nor 
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retarded”; and albeit the small proportion of “the defects” vis-à-vis “the beauties” of his 
poems, Coleridge “repeatedly declared” that none of them “originates in deficiency of 
poetic genius” (BL II, p. 158). However, he thought, Wordsworth was not at all meant to 
be a man seeking or establishing “fixed principles”; he was a man of unbounded genius. 
The experiment, Coleridge supposed, had failed because “Mr. Wordsworth have set forth 
principles of poetry which his arguments are insufficient to support”, and it was 
Coleridge’s target in the Biographia to set “him and those who have adopted his 
sentiments” right through “the confutation of those arguments, and by the substitution of 
more philosophical principles” (BL II, p. 119). It is therefore noteworthy that “Coleridge’s 
systematic self-construction as a philosopher of genius” (Class, 2012, p. 151) in the 
Biographia is most visibly foregrounded in the second volume, where he dealt with the 
poetic genius of Wordsworth and the wasted possibility of fully collaborating on an 
experiment that could have enabled a balanced multiplicity of poetic styles in the Lyrical 
Ballads. 
The mid-1815 publication of Wordsworth’s two-volume collected Poems, 
including Lyrical Ballads and the Miscellaneous Pieces of the Author with a new 
“Preface” and a supplementary essay also put pressure on Coleridge during the 
composition of the Biographia in the same year. This is because Wordsworth had 
“transferred” the “Preface” to the end of the second volume, “to be attended to, or not, at 
the pleasure of the Reader” (The Major Works, p. 626). After all, Wordsworth in 1815 had 
a new “Preface” as well as a supplementary essay to his larger collection of poems, in 
which he was concerned with the task of “creating the taste by which he is to be  enjoyed” 
rather than drawing on propositions of fifteen years earlier (p. 657). However, Coleridge 
begged to differ with Wordsworth on this. 
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In the process of revising his collaboration with Wordsworth and bringing out his 
own distinct oeuvre, Coleridge in 1815 must have been alarmed by the realisation that the 
latter had already “degraded” the “prefatory disquisition” of the Lyrical Ballads (1800) “to 
the end of his second volume, to be read or not at the reader’s choice” (BL II, p. 10) for 
two significant reasons: First, it was Coleridge’s aim in 1815 to retrospectively criticise 
Wordsworth’s prescriptions on language in the Preface of 1800, but when it is banished as 
such, his criticism would seem outdated and irrelevant. There would be no room for his 
response to Wordsworth’s views of poetic diction. Secondly, Wordsworth was on the 
verge of forming his own taste-forming argument with the new Preface in 1815. To 
address these concerns, Coleridge had to prove the relevance of Wordsworth’s views in the 
Preface of 1800 to his current collection. This is why, for instance, Coleridge presented his 
criticism and objection in the Biographia to Wordsworth’s famous “Preface” of 1800 by 
drawing on the poems from the latest collection. This is why, for another example, against 
Wordsworth’s assertion in his new “Preface” of 1815 that the collection recorded how his 
thoughts and poetic attitude had changed over time, Coleridge aimed to foreground that  
With many parts of this preface…I never concurred; but on the contrary 
objected to them as erroneous in principle, and as contradictory (in 
appearance at least) both to other parts of the same preface, and to the 
author’s own practice in the greater number of the poems themselves. Mr. 
Wordsworth in his recent collection…has not, as far as I can discover, 
announced any change in his poetic creed. (BL II, p. 10)  
After all, this conviction had already been confirmed one year earlier, when Wordsworth 
published The Excursion: Coleridge was immensely frustrated by the language and 
dramatic technique Wordsworth used in the narrative as his friend seemed to have lost his 
individual and unique vocabulary that had so exquisitely adorned his poetry while writing 
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The Prelude. One year forward, as Coleridge saw it, Wordsworth’s collection and 
“Preface” were not making any substantial progress, either.   
Throughout the revisionary activity of Coleridge from 1814 to 1818, I maintain, 
“desynonymy” as a Coleridgean term came to denote two interrelated but distinct 
activities: First, the act of advancing knowledge through language; and two, the act of 
ensuring dissociation of self through revisions. In the former, desynonymization is in the 
service of the transcendent linguistic conception of Coleridge; in the latter, it refers to 
Coleridge’s design of his own corpus of works.120       
In the opening sentences of Chapter 13 of the Biographia, Coleridge deals with the 
philosophical positions of “Des Cartes, speaking as a naturalist” and Kant, speaking as “the 
transcendental philosopher”: Whereas the former “said, give me matter and motion and I 
will construct you the universe” (meaning “I will render the construction of the universe 
intelligible”), the latter said “grant me a nature having two contrary forces, the one of 
which tends to expand infinitely, while the other strives to apprehend or find itself in this 
infinity, and I will cause the world of intelligences with the whole system of their 
representations to rise up before you” (BL I, p. 297). Both positions and the linguistic 
implications of these arguments posed fundamental problems for Coleridge. Against the 
“naturalistic” matter-based conception of the cosmos and yet against the “transcendental” 
system presenting representations of the natural objects, Coleridge deductively prioritized 
his theological concerns. He therefore maintained in the Biographia that “TRUTH, 
NATURE, LOGIC, and the LAWS OF UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR” are “actuated too by 
my former passion for metaphysical investigations; I laboured at a solid foundation, on 
                                                 
120 See: Galperin (1987), “‘Desynonymizing’ the Self in Wordsworth and Coleridge”, Studies in 
Romanticism. pp. 513-526  
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which permanently to ground my opinions, in the component faculties of the human mind 
itself, and their comparative dignity and importance” (BL I, p. 22). Coleridge’s quest for 
the transcendent origin of language required that language does not consist of non-
teleological elements, instead, his faith in language stemmed from the conviction for a 
consistent coaction of the mind, linguistic sign and the objects of the consciousness.  
On the other hand, when Coleridge first became “acquainted with Mr. 
Wordsworth’s first publication entitled Descriptive Sketches” in 1794 (BL I, p. 77), prior 
to any personal contact with Wordsworth, the language he found in this piece was 
fundamentally different from the normative language prescribed in the Preface:  
In the form, style, and manner of the whole poem, and in the structure of the 
particular lines and periods, there is a harshness and acerbity connected and 
combined with words and images all a-glow, which might recall those 
products of the vegetable world, where gorgeous blossoms rise out of a hard 
and thorny rind and shell, within which the rich fruit is elaborating. The 
language is not only peculiar and strong, but at times knotty and contorted, 
as by its own impatient strength; while the novelty and struggling crowd of 
images, acting in conjunction with the difficulties of the style, demands 
always a greater closeness of attention, than poetry,--at all events, than 
descriptive poetry--has a right to claim. (p. 77) 
The descriptive vocabulary Coleridge uses to delineate Wordsworth’s early language is 
poles apart from Wordsworth’s language of the rustic, ordinary man. It is “knotty and 
contorted” with “crowd of images” presented through “the difficulties of the style” – not 
plain and simple at all. Later in The Prelude of 1807, as elaborated in the first chapter of 
this study, Wordsworth offered two alternating positions vis-à-vis language: At times he 
focused on language as the impotent medium to express his thoughts,121 and later language 
                                                 
121 Consider the following lines and Wordsworth’s only flickering faith in linguistic capacity of man:  
Oh mystery of man, from what a depth 
Proceed thy honours! I am lost, but see 
In simple childhood something of the base 




emerged as the productive source of all thinking.122 I interpret this as the lingering 
influence of his symbiosis with Coleridge: Just as The Prelude as part of the larger joint 
oeuvre was to be informed by the philosophical insights of Coleridge, it can be expected 
that the poem would by extension reflect the Coleridgean devotion to language. However, 
after The Excursion (1814) and publication of the 1815 Preface with poems, Coleridge’s 
criticism in the Biographia became less appreciative, conducted with “parental partiality” 
and he now sought fixed principles in criticism and poetry, hence he had to resort to 
dialogue vis-à-vis Wordsworth. Coleridge therefore expressed his long-sought wish as 
such: 
Long have I wished to see a fair and philosophical inquisition into the 
character of Wordsworth, as a poet, on the evidence of his published works; 
and a positive, not a comparative, appreciation of their characteristic 
excellencies, deficiencies, and defects. I know no claim that the mere 
opinion of any individual can have to weigh down the opinion of the author 
himself; against the probability of whose parental partiality we ought to set 
that of his having thought longer and more deeply on the subject. But I 
should call that investigation fair and philosophical in which the critic 
announces and endeavours to establish the principles, which he holds for 
the foundation of poetry in general, with the specification of these in their 
application to the different classes of poetry. (BL II, p. 107) 
Just as Coleridge, rather than responding Wordsworth’s letter in private, preferred to 
expound on his dissatisfaction with The Excursion in the Biographia, he again reserved his 
                                                                                                                                                    
I see by glimpses now, when age comes on 
May scarcely see at all; and I would give  
While yet we may, as far as words can give, 
A substance and a life to what I feel (Book XI: 330-344) 
122 Elsewhere in The Prelude, Wordsworth shows faithful adherence to language in general and poetry in 
particular as the intermediary channel to make him gain recognition of the language in the phenomenal 
reality “abroad”:  
…through this verse my mind hath looked 
Upon the speaking face of earth and heaven 
As her prime teacher, intercourse with man 
Established by the Sovereign Intellect, 
Who through that bodily image hath diffused  
A soul divine which we participate, 
A deathless spirit. (Book V: 11-17) 
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criticism on Wordsworth’s poetical works to the same work. In this respect, the Biographia 
is not only a showcase for his critical approach applied on the poetry of Wordsworth, it is 
also a medium to ensure dialogue through desynonymizing his own opinions from 
Wordsworth. Desynonymy as a critical method of differentiation hence played a 
significant role in his disentanglement from Wordsworth in the Biographia. 
Coleridge’s views on language and generation of new concepts to distinguish his 
arguments from others in the Biographia benefited considerably from an idiosyncratic 
linguistic technique, called “desynonymization”. Giving the credit to himself that he was 
“the first of [his] countrymen” to point out “the diverse meaning of which the two terms 
were capable” and to analyse “the faculties to which they should be appropriated” (BL I, 
pp. 85-86), Coleridge argued that the act of desynonymizing played a substantial role in 
the historical progress of all languages, because “in all societies there exists an instinct of 
growth, a certain collective, unconscious good sense working progressively to 
desynonymize those words originally of the same meaning” (BL I, p. 82). McKusick 
follows a similar line of thought when he argues that  
In the Biographia…He suggests that this gradual process of differentiation 
can account for the entire formation of a lexicon, from a few simple sounds 
to an immense nomenclature. Coleridge’s critical and philosophical 
vocabulary derives largely from his own frequent habit of desynonymizing. 
Several of his most crucial distinctions—between fancy and imagination, 
genius and talent, symbol and allegory, copy and imitation—result from this 
technique of linguistic analysis. Coleridge’s practice of desynonymization 
can be observed throughout the Biographia, the Notebooks, and The Friend. 
The distinctions created by means of desynonymization play a major role in 
the formation of Coleridge’s critical and philosophical discourse. (2009, p. 
580) 
This technique hence enabled Coleridge to generate a refreshed discourse on concepts and 
philosophical terms and bring them into circulation by disrupting the automatized and 
ordinary perception attributed to them: “The first and most important point to be proved”, 
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as suggested in the Biographia, is “that two conceptions perfectly distinct are confused 
under one and the same word…to appropriate that word exclusively to the one meaning, 
and the synonyme (should there be one) to the other” (p. 82). It is therefore not befitting 
the poet to merely copy “the sort and order of words which he hears in the market, wake, 
high-road, or plough-field” (BL II, p. 81); he must instead resort to his creativity to invent 
new vocabulary or concepts so that he can circumvent the habitual misuse of the words or 
their ancient usages.   
Desynonymy simultaneously supplied Coleridge with a pragmatic ground to make 
use of when he differed from the general use of ideas and concepts, even from those 
originally devised or endorsed by himself. Coleridge employed desynonymization to claim, 
for example, that Wordsworth’s argument on imagination and fancy rested on a 
misunderstanding of their shared thinking on poetry and philosophy, and that he had 
missed an essential distinguishing feature in his definition in the 1815 Preface.123 
Since the Biographia was largely a revisionary and dialogic reaction to 
Wordsworth’s poems and prefaces (1800 and 1815), Coleridge had to “desynonymize” his 
own poetry, poetics and philosophy from those of Wordsworth- for quite a number of 
which he also claimed “semi-paternity” (Perry, 1999, p. 247). Initially, the symbiotic 
relationship between Coleridge and Wordsworth was integral to the former’s conception of 
self and formulation of his role with respect to the latter. Even on first meeting 
Wordsworth in September 1795, Coleridge knew found a partner who possessed what he 
then thought he was missing. As he expressed it in the Biographia: 
                                                 
123 Wordsworth once mentioned that Coleridge “never did converse in the common sense of the word; he 
would lay hold of another person's suggestion, & then refine upon it, divide & subtilize it till he had made it 
entirely his own.” (TT I, p. 546) 
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I was in my twenty-fourth year, when I had the happiness of knowing Mr. 
Wordsworth personally, and while memory lasts, I shall hardly forget the 
sudden effect produced on my mind, by his recitation of a manuscript poem, 
which still remains unpublished, but of which the stanza, and tone of style, 
were the same as those of the “Female Vagrant” as originally printed in the 
first volume of the “Lyrical Ballads.” There was here, no mark of strained 
thought, or forced diction, no crowd or turbulence of imagery... (BL I, pp. 
78-79) 
Unlike his own juvenile poems, having “an EXCESS OF ORNAMENT, in addition to 
STRAINED AND ELABORATE DICTION” (BL I, p. 8), Wordsworth’s poems largely 
seemed to possess a natural flow and eloquence, hence for Coleridge potentially indicating 
his natural and unmediated genius. Coleridge’s initial attraction towards Wordsworth was 
therefore on grounds of a “lacking” that he thought could only be filled and compensated 
by the genius of Wordsworth.124  
Considering Coleridge’s self-confessed constitutional dependence on others,125 
there is no wonder that he has been considered to be the submissive and “masochistic” side 
of the relationship. However, although he is said to have “an almost chameleonlike ability 
to alter his own tone to conform to that of his friend”, in fact Coleridge’s need to speak 
through Wordsworth until the end of their symbiotic relationship can be characterised as an 
attempt to “project his psyche into” Wordsworth “to an almost unique extent” (McFarland, 
1981, p. 59). This gave Coleridge the prospect that he could speak through Wordsworth by 
merging his own philosophical speculations with the natural poetic genius of Wordsworth 
in the joint project of The Recluse. Both in terms of content and in terms of the role 
Coleridge would play in composition of it, The Recluse was an excessively ambitious 
project. For Wordsworth it turned out to be a project of lifelong strife and disapprobation 
                                                 
124 McFarland (1981) links this aspect of Coleridge’s mind to Freud’s theory of the castration anxiety. (p. 
114)  
125 As Coleridge makes it clear in a notebook entry of late 1803: “My nature requires another Nature for its 
support, & reposes only in another from the necessary Indigence of its Being.” (CN I, §1679) 
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as he was too overwhelmed by Coleridge’s expectations and design to meet them. Indeed, 
it is surely admissible that The Recluse was too much of a burden that Wordsworth’s 
unphilosophical mind could not handle the task in its full. As he wrote on June 3, 1805,  
I was dejected on many accounts; when I looked back upon the 
performance it seemed to have a dead weight about it, the reality so far 
short of the expectation ... the doubt whether I should ever live to write the 
Recluse and the sense which I had of this Poem being so far below what I 
seem’d capable of executing, depressed me much. (WL I, p. 594)  
He was right, because Coleridge’s preliminary expectations as he referred to them later in 
1815 suffice to show how overwhelmed Wordsworth must have been: “Whatever in 
Lucretius is Poetry is not philosophical, whatever is philosophical is not Poetry: and in the 
very Pride of confident Hope I looked forward to the Recluse, as the first and only true 
Phil[osophical] Poem in existence” (CL IV, p. 574). In a sense, therefore, the Biographia is 
a prosaic illustration of what Coleridge had expected from Wordsworth in The Recluse.  
For Coleridge, Wordsworth’s distinctively authentic voice in such poems as The 
Prelude owed much to his detour vis-a-vis the theory of simple language proposed in the 
Preface of 1800. Just as “A person of any taste, who had but studied three or four of 
Shakespeare’s principal plays, would without the name affixed scarcely fail to recognise as 
Shakespeare’s a quotation from any other play”, Wordsworth’s language, “though in a less 
degree” can be accorded with such peculiarity, so long as “he speaks in his own person” 
(BL II, p. 100). This characteristic of Wordsworth’s poetic style distinguished him in a way 
that he was unexcelled by his contemporaries, because from none of them “could so many 
lines be quoted, without reference to the poem in which they are found, for their own 
independent weight or beauty” (BL II, p. 106). Even while “under a feigned name” of “the 
different dramatis personae” of The Excursion (1814), Wordsworth’s voice is clear and 
distinguished. However, what raised some serious issues with the language in The 
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Excursion for Coleridge was just a different aspect to it from Wordsworth’s prominent 
style. This must be why in the Biographia, Coleridge’s argument on the defects of 
Wordsworth’s poetry in Chapter 22 includes frequent references to The Excursion.  
After all, because Coleridge thought Wordsworth’s “principles of poetry” in the 
“mistaken theory” were not grounded by philosophical precepts, “the effects” were full of 
flaws, and Coleridge aimed to confute “those arguments” and set them right (BL II, p. 
119). The “defects” Coleridge presented stem largely from Wordsworth’s theory of 
language: That his style was inconstant; that the “matter-of-factness” Wordsworth aimed at 
ruled the imagination out; that “the choice of his characters” and minute details about them 
thwarted his poetic genius in building up refined and authentic characters; that the “undue 
predilection for the dramatic form” at times undermined his authentic voice; that the 
dramatic voice caused “occasional prolixity, repetition, and an eddying, in lieu of 
progression, of thought”; and that the subject chosen hence does not accord with  “thoughts 
and images”, causing “disproportion of thoughts to the circumstance and occasion” (BL II, 
p. 135). 
On the other hand, after elaborating the defects, Coleridge expressed “with the 
liveliest convictions” that Wordsworth still is “capable of producing… the FIRST 
GENUINE PHILOSOPHIC POEM” (BL II, p. 156). Considering the larger argument of 
this thesis, it can be held that Coleridge’s reaffirmation in the Biographia of his hope for 
completion of The Recluse must be read reversely: After The Excursion his hopeful 
expectations were replaced by frustration and his wish to achieve the project, to a large 
extent, himself through the Sibylline Leaves and the Biographia together. In this respect I 
concur with Sally Bushell, who states that “To the rest of the world this may sound l ike a 
praise, appearing to be a grand statement of belief in Wordsworth, but...it stands as a denial 
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of The Excursion which has failed to be that philosophic poem” and Bushell describes the 
statement as a “very hollow praise indeed”, obvious to Coleridge and Wordsworth at the 
time it was written (2002, p. 68).  
Coleridge’s extended argument in his comprehensive intellectual autobiography 
was largely motivated by the termination of his symbiotic relationship with Wordsworth. I 
agree with Modiano when she says, 
Every move Wordsworth makes in the 1815 Preface is counteracted by 
Coleridge with a strategic countermove. While Wordsworth retired the 1800 
Preface to the end of the second volume, Coleridge makes it the very 
centerpiece of his critique in the Biographia, using it to undo Wordsworth’s 
self-flattering presentation in the 1815 Preface as a dedicated philosopher, 
all clad in Kantian garb with a coherent system of classification. To 
Wordsworth’s ‘slim’ performance in his 1815 Preface, Coleridge 
counterposes his own, conspicuously lengthy intellectual biography, which 
occupies the bulk of volume one of the Biographia and features Coleridge’s 
arduous journey through the entire history of philosophy, from classical to 
contemporary; from empiricist, to rationalist, to transcendentalist; from 
British to continental. To Wordsworth’s meandering theory of the 
imagination and his emphasis on imagination’s capacity of ‘consolidating 
numbers into unity, and dissolving and separating unity into number’, 
Coleridge responds by outlining a much more complex dual structure at the 
heart of the imagination, as represented by the primary and secondary 
imagination, focusing on the connection of the former with the I AM, in a 
concise formula whose triumph is achieved in no mean measure through the 
simplicity and conciseness with which it distills dense philosophic material 
from numerous sources. (2009, p. 214) 
Contrary to the view that the Biographia is a response to Wordsworth’s The Prelude,126 I 
hold that he had already responded to the latter with his poem “To William Wordsworth” 
(1807), and the Biographia is rather a response to The Excursion (1814), as well as to the 
1815 “Preface” of Wordsworth. Whereas “To William Wordsworth” can be characterized 
by Coleridge’s extravagant praise for Wordsworth and his almost masochistic demise of 
                                                 
126 William Christie (2006), Samuel Taylor Coleridge: A Literary Life, p. 10. Raimonda Modiano (2009), 
“Coleridge as Literary Critic” (pp. 204-234) 
139 
 
himself (Paley, 1996),127 the Biographia is a work through which Coleridge elaborated his 
“comparative censure” of The Excursion and his frustration with the poem as well as their 
grand project of The Recluse as a means, I hold, to dissociate himself from Wordsworth as 
his once symbiotic partner failed to live up to his expectations. 
Coleridge’s revision of his past in the Biographia is, then, fundamentally 
dialogical. First of all, it is a conversation with his past and current self simultaneously, 
where Coleridge brings out multiple voices at once. Coleridge claimed in Chapter 13 that 
while his autobiography was being “transcribed for the press”, he received a “letter from a 
friend…whose practical judgment I have had ample reason to estimate and revere, and 
whose taste and sensibility preclude all the excuses which my self-love might possibly 
have prompted me to set up in plea against the decision of advisers of equal good sense, 
but with less tact and feeling” (BL I, 300). The friend writing the letter was none other than 
Coleridge himself128, and this demonstrates Coleridge’s dialogue with himself even within 
the Biographia. Secondly, the dialogue in the process of composing the Biographia also 
involved the poetical works of Wordsworth. In the Biographia, Coleridge hence aimed to 
revise his works, life and opinions to separate himself from Wordsworth as much as he 
could in order to come up with a separate oeuvre of his own. He simultaneously aimed at 
revising his past collaboration with Wordsworth and producing counter-arguments to 
Wordsworth’s two prefaces, 1800 and 1815, in order to distinguish his intellectual 
                                                 
127 According to this view, Coleridge undermined his own poetic persona by writing this poem, as Adam 
Sisman puts it: “Coleridge retired to his room and stayed up most of the night composing lines in which he 
attempted to express his response — seemingly the only poem he would write that troubled year, and 
arguably his last poem of any substance.” (Sisman, 2006, p. 388) 
128 In a letter to Thomas Curtis on 29 April 1817, Coleridge wrote that the “letter addressed to myself as from 
a friend, at the close of the first volume of the Literary Life…was written without taking my pen off the 
paper except to dip it in the inkstand.” (CL IV, p. 728) 
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offspring that once helped cultivate Wordsworth’s philosophical understanding, and 
foreground his own idiosyncratic critical and poetic genius at the time. 
 
Revisions and the Misunderstanding over Imagination 
Investigating Coleridge’s criticism of Wordsworth in the Biographia, Nigel Leask (1993) 
maintains that Coleridge’s critique of Wordsworth was “not motivated simply by aesthetic 
preferences” (p. 54), and I would like to elaborate on my own insights into Coleridge’s 
main motivations. Wordsworth’s 1815 Preface, probably slightly more than the 1800 
Preface,129 caused an important concern for Coleridge, bringing about the “intemperate” 
and “vituperative attack” on Wordsworth, as Modiano (2009) observes, because of 
“Wordsworth’s self-representation in the 1815 Preface not only as a literary giant in the 
distinguished lineage of Shakespeare and Milton, but, more ominously for Coleridge at 
that time, as an able philosopher, engaging fundamental concepts from Coleridge’s own 
arsenal, such as the prized distinction between fancy and imagination…without 
acknowledgement” (pp. 212-213). Moreover, rather than simply appropriating the terms 
belonging to Coleridge in the first place, Wordsworth ended up distorting them. Having 
seen in The Excursion that Wordsworth failed to bring the philosophical agenda into 
execution in his poem, Coleridge in 1815 must have come to another realization that the 
joint oeuvre he had willingly subscribed to in the past now ran the danger of undermining 
his new idiosyncratic philosophical arguments, and it was time to desynonymize his works 
from those of Wordsworth because if he did not, Coleridge must have thought, 
                                                 
129 Modiano maintains that “The main provocation for Coleridge was by no means the audacity…of 
Wordsworth's argument in the 1800 Preface that there was no ‘essential’ difference between the language of 
poetry and prose” which was, after all, “an idea which at the time could have been prompted by Coleridge 
himself” (2009, p. 212) 
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Wordsworth would supplant his once symbiotic partner and claim the ownership of 
Coleridge’s own views by overshadowing his contribution completely, as he did in the 
1800 “Preface” to Lyrical Ballads.  
The only reference Wordsworth gives to Coleridge was in a corrective statement 
concerning Coleridge’s definition of fancy and imagination. As Wordsworth put it,  
To the mode in which Fancy has already been characterized as the Power of 
evoking and combining, or, as my friend Mr. Coleridge has styled it, ‘the 
aggregative and associative Power,’ my objection is only that the definition 
is too general. To aggregate and to associate, to evoke and to combine, 
belong as well to the Imagination as to the Fancy; but either the materials 
evoked and combined are different; or they are brought together under a 
different law, and for a different purpose. (The Major Works, p. 613) 
Wordsworth in the introductory essay bluntly blurred the distinction between fancy and 
imagination, as the phrase goes, by “trespassing into Coleridgean territory” (Modiano, 
2009, p. 214). Fancy and imagination, for Wordsworth, do not seem fundamentally 
different in terms of their basic functions. The main difference between the two agents for 
Wordsworth, on the other hand, is related to the materials they deal with and their 
respective purposes: 
Fancy does not require that the materials which she makes use of should be 
susceptible of change in their constitution, from her touch; and, where they 
admit of modification, it is enough for her purpose if it be slight, limited, 
and evanescent. Directly the reverse of these, are the desires and demands 
of the Imagination. She recoils from every thing but the plastic, the pliant, 
and the indefinite. (The Major Works, p. 613) 
Wordsworth’s distinction here focuses on the extent of either concept’s capacity to modify 
the material at hand: Whereas fancy has a relatively passive role, imagination emerges as 
an active process able to alter the existing sensory data so that it can produce new ones. In 
this respect, as Schlutz (2015) states, “Imagination, as Wordsworth conceives the term in 
the 1815 Preface, is not a mental faculty producing images or copies of previously 
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received sensory data” (p.505). But still, Wordsworth seems to endorse the view that the 
ability to change in this sense is also able to carry one from the earthly to the permanent: 
“Fancy is given to quicken and to beguile the temporal part of our Nature, Imagination to 
incite and to support the eternal” (The Major Works, p. 614). Taking this into 
consideration, Schlutz argues that Wordsworth’s conception of imagination, by 
“appropriating the intellectual capital of his ‘philosophical friend’ Coleridge”,  
provides the mind with a form of religious inspiration. In this conception, 
which has its roots in Platonic and Neoplatonic views of the faculty, as well 
as in their post-Kantian transformations in the discourse of German 
Idealism, imagination gives the mind access to a super-sensible realm not 
usually available to conscious experience. Such moments of inspiration may 
be brief, but their effect is lasting, Wordsworth asserts, and they serve as a 
reminder that our existence is not merely temporal. The poet thus 
appropriates the qualities of the prophet and the religious visionary, while 
reference to ‘imagination’ can underwrite the myth of the poet’s election. 
(2015, pp.505-506) 
Wordsworth here seems to be inciting in Coleridge a spark for further distinction or 
specification, and his distinction serves to highlight some basic divergences between the 
two terms, but it is not as penetrating as Coleridge’s own conception since Wordsworth 
misses out imagination’s holistically regenerative potentiality vis-à-vis fancy’s associative 
function.  
As Coleridge clearly puts it in the Biographia “…it was Mr. Wordsworth’s purpose 
to consider the influences of fancy and imagination as they are manifested in poetry, and 
from the different effects to conclude their diversity in kind; while it is my object to 
investigate the seminal principle, and then from the kind to deduce the degree. My friend 
has drawn a masterly sketch of the branches with their poetic fruitage. I wish to add the 
trunk, and even the roots...” (BL II, p. 88). Coleridge sought to establish the distinction of 
his own theory from not only associationism but also transcendentalism in the Biographia. 
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He aimed to counter Wordsworth’s “Theory, in which my name has been so constantly 
included”, adding that in the Preface he elaborated on “the powers of association …and on 
the generic difference between the faculties of Fancy and Imagination…as laying the 
foundation Stones of the Constructive or Dynamic Philosophy in opposition to the merely 
mechanic” (CL IV, pp. 578–9). Coleridge’s subtle distinction surely took its source from 
his philosophical investments, and Wordsworth’s objection in the “Preface” to his own 
theory of fancy and imagination which, for Coleridge, “distorted a vital particularity and 
caused a fundamental confusion” (Engell, 2002, pp. 59-60). It was therefore of utmost 
importance that a response was given and a base was provided for Coleridge’s own theory 
of imagination and fancy in the Biographia.  
“I shall now proceed to the nature and genesis of the Imagination”, Coleridge 
announced in Chapter 12, and added, “but I must first take leave to notice, that after a more 
accurate perusal of Mr. Wordsworth’s remarks on the Imagination, in his preface to the 
new edition of his poems, I find that my conclusions are not so consentient with his as, I 
confess, I had taken for granted” (BL I, p. 294). As a response to Wordsworth’s objection 
and explanation in his Preface of 1815 concerning fancy and imagination, Coleridge wrote 
in the Biographia that their arguments are at odds “chiefly, perhaps as our objects are 
different” (BL II, p. 87). Coleridge elaborates as follows:   
if, by the power of evoking and combining, Mr. Wordsworth means the 
same as, and no more than, I meant by the aggregative and associative, I 
continue to deny, that it belongs at all to the Imagination; and I am disposed 
to conjecture, that he has mistaken the copresence of Fancy with 
Imagination for the operation of the latter singly…deeming it necessary to 
go back much further than Mr. Wordsworth’s subject required or permitted, 
I have attached a meaning to both Fancy and Imagination, which he had not 
in view, at least while he was writing that preface. (BL I, p. 294)  
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Here Coleridge is aiming towards realization of the “Dynamic Philosophy” by renouncing 
what he took to be Wordsworth’s faulty judgments that could subversively lead to 
“despotism of the eye” (BL I, p. 107) and levelling up of fancy and imagination. 
Coleridge had to provide his own definitions of fancy and imagination so he could 
distinguish his own line of thought and use of concepts from others. Early in the 
Biographia, in Chapter 4, Coleridge announced that thanks to “Repeated meditations” he 
came to the “full conviction” that “fancy and imagination were two distinct and widely 
different faculties, instead of being, according to the general belief, either two names with 
one meaning, or at furthest, the lower and higher degree of one and the same power”  (BL I, 
p. 82). In Chapter 10, he revisited his argument by presenting a word he himself coined 
from Greek roots – “ESEMPLASTIC”, which means “to shape into one; because, having 
to convey a new sense, I thought that a new term would both aid the recollection of my 
meaning, and prevent its being confounded with the usual import of the word, 
imagination” (BL I, p. 170). Coleridge was constantly seeking to desynonymize the 
concept from the ordinary use. Hence, after the long chapter of philosophical tour de force 
full of “requests and premonitions”, preparing the reader for elucidation of the famous 
distinction between the two imaginations and fancy, Coleridge in Chapter 13 theorised 
about their complex and interwoven definitions by getting rid of some long established 
misconceptions about the terms. He hence provided his most well-known, though for some 
notoriously brief, distinction as follows: 
The IMAGINATION, then, I consider either as primary, or secondary. The 
primary IMAGINATION I hold to be the living Power and prime Agent of 
all human Perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act 
of creation in the infinite I AM. The secondary I consider as an echo of the 
former, co-existing with the conscious will, yet still as identical with the 
primary in the kind of its agency, and differing only in degree, and in the 
mode of its operation. It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-create; 
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or where this process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it 
struggles to idealize and to unify. It is essentially vital, even as all objects 
(as objects) are essentially fixed and dead. (BL I, p. 304) 
He makes further distinction of fancy from imagination, either primary or secondary, with 
the following words:  
FANCY, on the contrary, has no other counters to play with, but fixities and 
definites. The fancy is, indeed, no other than a mode of Memory 
emancipated from the order of time and space, and blended with, and 
modified by, that empirical phenomenon of the will which we express by 
the word CHOICE. But, equally with the ordinary memory, it must receive 
all its materials ready made from the law of association. (BL I, p. 305) 
Coleridge’s definition of two imaginations and their distinction from fancy is closely 
related to his conception of mind and the senses. In the Biographia, we can see the 
illustrations of the aforementioned correspondence between Coleridge’s own deployment 
of Kantian tripartite division of Reason, Understanding, Senses and his trilateral 
conception of secondary imagination, primary imagination and fancy. For Coleridge, the 
mind is activated not necessarily through the objects of the senses but “by thoughts”, and it 
“only then feels the requisite interest even for the most important events and accidents, 
when by means of meditation they have passed into thoughts” (BL I, p. 31). He later 
emphasized his point by suggesting observation of “a small water-insect on the surface of 
rivulets” and   
how the little animal wins its way up against the stream, by alternate pulses 
of active and passive motion, now resisting the current, and now yielding to 
it in order to gather strength and a momentary fulcrum for a further 
propulsion. This is no unapt emblem of the mind’s self-experience in the act 
of thinking. There are evidently two powers at work, which relatively to 
each other are active and passive; and this is not possible without an 
intermediate faculty, which is at once both active and passive. In 
philosophical language, we must denominate this intermediate faculty in all 
its degrees and determinations, the IMAGINATION. (BL I, p. 124-25) 
Watching the background states of mind unfolds the way it gathers strength in the face of 
the passivity of the senses, and enables the mind to keep itself active. Coleridge’s 
146 
 
conception of imagination at this point diverges from Kant and Wordsworth130 since he 
spares imagination from being connected to the senses in their rawest form.     
The momentous definition of imagination Coleridge provided in the Biographia, as 
Alexander Schlutz (2015) puts it, “gathers its resonances from the textual echo-chamber of 
philosophy” (p. 508). Navigating through the multifarious philosophical thoughts, 
Coleridge eventually came up with the idiosyncratic “muddle” and his theory of 
imagination in the Biographia is the product of such a synthesis. He was especially 
concerned with the Kantian perspective on imagination, and its function on the empirical 
and transcendental level, and how far it accorded with his own muddle. As Schlutz 
explains:  
For Kant, the synthesis of imagination, the way it combines various sense 
impressions into a unity that can then be taken up by the faculty of 
understanding in the processes of rational thought, is only in its empirical 
incarnation bound by the laws of association and the principles of 
resemblance, contiguity and cause and effect central to the empiricist 
philosophical approaches of John Locke, David Hume, David Hartley, and 
others. On the transcendental level, however, on which the a priori 
conditions of experience as such are at stake, the imagination’s synthesis 
provides the conditions of possibility for the laws of association and 
grounds the unity of all our judgements in consciousness. It is this 
fundamental moment of freedom in the act of cognition itself, not bound by 
the empirical laws of cause and effect, in which the mind actively shapes 
the empirical data it receives, that opened the door to the idealist systems of 
                                                 
130 It must be noted at this point that other than Kant (and Wordsworth), Coleridge’s systematic exegesis of 
the philosophical movement pioneered by Kant and later represented notably by Fichte and Schelling aided 
him to formulate the idiosyncratic deduction of two imaginations and the “infinite I AM” in the Biographia. 
Within the scope of this study, only Kantian critical philosophy is the subject of my consideration since Kant 
devised the system of the pure (original) apperception of the “I think” (CPR, B 132) as “the transcendental 
unity of self-consciousness” (B 133) and the grounding principle of German transcendentalist philosophy. 
Although the commonly accepted sources of influence for Coleridge’s “infinite I AM” such as Schelling or 
Fichte are not hereby the subject of my consideration, they can be found in scholarly works treating the 
Biographia. See: “Editor’s Introduction” to Biographia Literaria in The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge, Volume 7 (Part I) (1983), eds. J. Engell, &W. J. Bate, pp. cxiv- cxxvii; Coleridge's Poetry and 
Prose (2004) eds. Halmi, Magnuson and Modiano, p. 488, fn. 7, and p.  475, fn. 4-6. Also see: Seamus 




Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, and that so profoundly affected Coleridge. 
(2015, p. 502) 
For Coleridge, Kant’s argument on imagination was rather cursory and the latter’s 
conception at best attributed the “productive” imagination a role similar to 
“understanding”, through its “reproductive” counterpart, due to its connection with the 
laws of association and passive reception of the material at hand, which is accorded with 
the senses. In this respect, I assert, Coleridge’s theory of imagination in 1817 corresponds 
to that of Kant at a preliminary level: Kant’s productive imagination is an approximate 
equivalent to Coleridgean “primary imagination”, but what Kant names “reproductive 
imagination” is, through desynonymy, to be called “fancy” by Coleridge in the Biographia. 
Considering the elevation of the “understanding” after The Friend (1809-10) in 
Coleridge’s philosophy, we can hold that primary imagination as the “prime Agent of all 
human Perception” and as the repetition of “the eternal act of creation” in our finite minds 
is a majestic act in itself.  
So far, Coleridge and Kant’s definitions of imagination seem to overlap to a certain 
extent. Nonetheless, a careful consideration of the Coleridgean preoccupation with the 
divinely-inspired creative powers of mind, i.e. secondary imagination, is required to fully 
understand the transcendent landscape Coleridge aimed to picture vis-à-vis Kant’s 
transcendental deduction. Coleridge’s secondary imagination is fundamentally distinct 
from Kant’s references to imagination due to the incongruous roles they each ascribed to 
Reason and, specifically, as a result of their contesting conceptions of the noumena. Perry 
(1999) observes that 
Kant regards the objective reality of trees and stones themselves as 
unknowable....so his system secures the unity of the self and its experience 
at a cost: moving beyond nature...is one thing, but never having had real 
knowledge of it in the first place is quite another…But Coleridge could 
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‘never believe’…that all the shaping was done by the mind on incoherent 
sense-stuff, and none on the mind by the influence of things themselves... 
(p. 133) 
Coleridge’s transcendent conception of the constitutive Reason is inextricably 
interconnected with the noumena, and it is also actively in exchange with the external 
things as well as the inner workings of the mind. Yet the way Kant conceptualizes Reason, 
whether practical or speculative, precludes the possibility of attaining the knowledge of 
things in themselves, hence for Coleridge missing the imaginative power that is able to 
“diffuse” or “dissipate” in order to “re-create”. 
The point Coleridge diverges from Wordsworth’s conception of imagination is 
similar: What Wordsworth calls “imagination” in the 1815 Preface to Poems seems to 
corresponds to Coleridge’s primary imagination, hence imagination in Wordsworth’s 
theory lacks that “vital” secondary function and instrinsic connection with the constitutive 
Reason, hence being closer to Kant’s reproductive imagination. Coleridge’s description of 
the poet who “brings the whole soul of man into activity, with the subordination of its 
faculties to each other according to their relative worth and dignity”, who “diffuses a tone 
and spirit of unity, that blends, and (as it were) fuses, each into each, by that synthetic and 
magical power, to which I would exclusively appropriate the name of Imagination” (BL II, 
pp. 15-16) does not therefore wholly apply to Wordsworth.   
For Coleridge, creation of a poem requires the poet to be actively involved in the 
process of poetic production, which distinguishes imitation from “a mere copy” (BL II, p. 
43). According to Coleridge’s theory of literary criticism, then, rather than being a passive 
imitation of the raw reality (i.e. mimesis), hence being twice removed from the Truth (The 
Republic, p. 317), literary or art work adds upon the actual by interpreting and recreating 
the ordinary in a peculiar way that has its own reality and beauty. This is what makes a 
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piece of art or literature actively and distinctively appealing to the feelings of its perceiver 
– just as Aristotle considered two poems with “the same iambic line”, and he held that 
whereas the one with unfamiliar wording “appears beautiful”, the other is merely “of a 
dime-a-dozen sort” (Poetics, p. 56). Hence the poet, for Coleridge, while mimetically131 
reproducing the elements in the world (“the composition of a poem is among the imitative 
arts” (BL II, p. 217)), recreates them through imagination and puts them down with the 
help of stylistic features and variations, i.e. “foregrounding”.132 It is mainly this aspect that 
makes literary works quintessentially different from everyday language spoken by 
“ordinary man”.  
Howard H. Creed in “Coleridge’s Metacriticism” (1954) also agrees that Coleridge 
adopts the Aristotelian approach to imitation, and “a great part of the metaphysics 
introduced in the Biographia as an explanation of the faculty of imagination can be read as 
an attempt to develop a psychology for the special kind of imitation that is poetry” (p. 
1164). Coleridge’s definition of imagination is therefore inextricably related with pleasure 
and feeling, “a pleasure from internal relationships within a poem, and a more permanent 
pleasure that results from transferring the nature of poetry to the reader himself” (p. 1169). 
The stylistic features of a literary text thus evoke feelings of the reader, as Miall and 
Kuiken (1994) also discuss,  
in a way that makes it not merely incidental but actually a constructive part 
of the reading process. When perception has been deautomatized, a reader 
employs the feelings that have been evoked to find or to create a context in 
                                                 
131  For a recent study on this topic, see: Frederick Burwick, Mimesis and Its Romantic Reflections (2001). 
132 As David S. Miall and Don Kuiken discuss, “foregrounding enables literature to present meanings with an 
intricacy and complexity that ordinary language does not normally allow.” (1994, p. 390). Referring to the 
theories of the Russian Formalist critic Viktor Shklovsky and Czech theorist Jan Mukařovský, Miall and 
Kuiken (1994) emphasize that although “foregrounding may occur in normal, everyday language” the 
occurrence is sporadic and “without systematic design”; on the other hand, foregrounding in literary texts is 
“structured: it tends to be both systematic and hierarchical”, hence deautomatizing perception, rendering 
ordinary objects unfamiliar, and creating a special effect. (pp. 390-391) 
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which the defamiliarized aspects of the story can be located. This is a 
central part of the constructive work required of the reader of a literary text. 
(p. 392)  
This is an approach that not only distinguishes a literary work from ordinary conversation, 
but also addresses the reader’s feelings. And for Coleridge this is thanks to one of the 
distinctive features of poetry: creating an impact of novelty in the ordinary through 
imaginative power, i.e. defamiliarization, to use the Russian Formalist term.133 
Rather than presenting a mere replica of the phenomenal world, literature is hence a 
recreation of the reality and the familiar, through which “the reader’s mind is thrown by 
the pleasurable confusion of thought from an unaccustomed train of words and images” 
(BL II, p. 40). The “two cardinal points of poetry” Coleridge said, are “the power of 
exciting the sympathy of the reader by a faithful adherence to the truth of nature, and the 
power of giving the interest of novelty by the modifying colours of the imagination” (BL 
II, p. 5).The notion of “defamiliarization” can therefore help us understand Coleridge’s 
initial approach to a joint poetic collection, the Lyrical Ballads, and can also shed light 
onto his revisionary activity and disentanglement with Wordsworth in the Biographia. 
Looking at the world through the spectacles of a poet, critic and a philosopher, Coleridge 
fully beheld the “inexhaustible treasure” for which, he also lamented, “we have eyes, yet 
see not, ears that hear not, and hearts that neither feel nor understand” due to “the film of 
familiarity” (BL II, p. 7). Defamiliarization hence gives the literary work its distinguishing 
feature, since “imitation, as opposed to copying, consists either in the interfusion of the 
SAME throughout the radically DIFFERENT, or of the different throughout a base 
radically the same” (BL II, p. 217). Defamiliarization as a literary tool hence renders the 
                                                 
133 i.e. making strange; transforming the ordinary into the unfamiliar through art and poetry. See: Shklovsky, 
Viktor. “Art as Technique.” Literary Theory: An Anthology. Eds. Rivkin, Julie and Ryan, Michael. New 
York: Blackwell Publishing, 2004. pp. 15-21.Although Coleridge does not use the term itself, but I aim to 
demonstrate here that his definition of poetry encapsulates the concept as used by the Russian Formalists.  
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ordinary and familiar objects strange and unfamiliar, making a literary piece different from 
everyday language, evoking feeling134 and enhancing readers’ perception of the ordinary. 
According to Coleridge, what gives a literary work its idiosyncratic feature is that it 
deautomatizes perception through foregrounding135 (though Coleridge never used these 
terms per se), hence both producing “the strongest impressions of novelty”, and rescuing 
“the most admitted truths from the impotence caused by the very circumstances of their 
universal admission” (BL I, p. 82). With these words, Coleridge stresses the unique nature 
of poetic diction previously described by Aristotle as “the adornment of the spectacle” 
through “unfamiliar words” (Poetics, pp. 27, 54).  
In addition, Coleridge in the Biographia emphasized the crucial role “multeity in 
unity” played in imagination when he wrote “We begin with the I KNOW MYSELF, in 
order to end with the absolute I AM. We proceed from the SELF, in order to lose and find 
all self in GOD” (BL I, p. 283). Here, the emphasis on the significance of beginning with 
individual consciousness in all its multiplicity and diversity in order to attain a unified 
awareness of the self and the noumena points to tensions between (and co-existence of) 
unity and multeity. The conglomeration of seemingly irreconcilable concepts is further 
enabled through Coleridge’s definition of primary and secondary imagination in the 
Biographia. Although Owen Barfield (1971) asserts that both imaginative faculties 
                                                 
134 As Miall and Kuiken indicate, “There seems little doubt that foregrounding, by creating complexity of 
various kinds, requires cognitive work on the part of the reader; but it is our suggestion that this work is 
initiated and in part directed by feeling” (1994, p. 392). They also point to “a relationship between the 
defamiliarizing effects of foregrounding and the emergence of feeling. If response to foregrounding is 
conceptualized as the reaction to an unexpected textual feature, evidence from studies of event-related 
potentials indicates that reading foregrounded text accentuates activity in cortical areas specialized for 
affect.” (p. 393) 
135 As Czech theorist Jan Mukařovský pointed out, “Foregrounding is the opposite of automatization, that is, 
the deautomatization of an act; the more an act is automatized, the less it is consciously executed; the more it 
is foregrounded, the more completely conscious does it become. Objectively speaking: automatization 
schematizes an event; foregrounding means the violation of the scheme.” (Mukařovský, 1964, p. 19) 
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inseparably point to a “unity in multeity” (p. 35), I would like to point to a distinction 
(though not a division) that actually enables the two imaginative departments to co-exist. 
Accordingly, whereas I hold the primary imagination implies “unity entire”, its secondary 
counterpart points to an “essentially vital” secondary effect that “dissolves diffuses 
dissipates, in order to recreate” – reproducing and celebrating Multeity in Unity. This is 
totally different from a reduction of particulars into one unity, which would be –following 
Perry – “the work of Fancy” (1999, p. 33). In other words, reflecting the “hallmark 
Coleridgean quality of trying to have things both ways”, the theory of imagination helped 
him revise a perception of linear development (or apostasy) in his career, showing rather 
an “erratic progress” (Perry, p. 34) of accommodating multiplicity at once. This is a 
significant step for Coleridge towards the refinement to his opinions in the past and 
establishment of the validity of his current position because, for example, while the 
annoying pantheistic undertone of the definition for Coleridge is obvious, the conceptual 
adoption of Multeity in Unity could serve to balance and revise an otherwise precarious 
ramification.136 In addition and most importantly, he differenciates between himself and 
Wordsworth here: Whereas Wordsworth’s definition of “imagination”, Coleridge seems to 
suggest, in the 1815 Preface originates from his faith in the Unity Entire, what 
desynonymized Coleridge from his partner was the proposition that secondary imagination 
                                                 
136 Nevertheless, it is still disputable whether Coleridge managed to realise his aims here because he was not 
happy with Biographia later in his life due to the implicit pantheism in it. Perry (1999) also thinks one of the 
reasons Coleridge was never that keen on the Biographia was that it is a work haunted by the possibility of 
unity entire. His immediate annoyance is obvious as Coleridge crossed out the phrase “and as a repetition in 
the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM” in his own copy of the first edition of the 
Biographia: As Sara Coleridge appended the following note after these lines: “This last clause…I find 
stroked out in a copy of the B.L. containing a few MS. marginal notes of the author, which are printed in this 
edition. I think it best to preserve the sentence, while I mention the author's judgment upon it, especially as it 
has been quoted. S. C.” (qtd.in  Fruman, Norman. “Review Essay: Aids to Reflection on the New 
‘Biographia’”. p. 146. Reviewed Work(s): Biographia Literaria by James Engell and W. Jackson Bate. 




accommodated plurality, fragments, instability and it was through this secondary quality of 
imagination that he hoped to be able to gain cognition of the noumenal world without 




























CHAPTER FOUR – REVISING POETICAL WORKS: SIBYLLINE LEAVES (1817) 
Only trust not thy verses to leaves, lest they fly in disorder, the sport of 
rushing winds; chant them thyself, I pray. 
Aeneas’s plea to the Sibyl of Cumae, Aeneid, vi, 74-76, trans. Fairclough. 
1974. 
 
Sibylline Leaves brought together almost the entire poetic oeuvre of Coleridge, from 1793 
up to the date it was published in 1817.137 It was over 300 pages long, preceded by a short 
“Preface”.138 Although the collection excluded such famous works by Coleridge as 
“Christabel”, “Kubla Khan”, and “The Pains of Sleep”, it still consisted of Coleridge’s 
major poems, which were more or less in the same form as we are familiar with today.139 
In a letter of July 1816 to John Hookham Frere, Coleridge mentioned his collection of 
poems as one he dared “consent to be known as of my own Will as well as Authorship” 
(CL IV, p. 646). Fearing that he would be accused of “a kind of barrenness on [his] 
faculties” (CL IV, p. 679), Coleridge therefore regarded, as Mileur (1982) suggests, both 
the Biographia and Sibylline Leaves as “summary statement on his twenty years as a poet 
and philosopher” (p. 2). Although the revisionary challenges of Sibylline Leaves are very 
different from those of Biographia Literaria, I contend that they were guided by a common 
underlying principle. In both cases, Coleridge needed to transform Wordsworth’s status 
from his symbiotic other to that of a “friend” and a proper dialogue partner.  
                                                 
137 As Coleridge noted in his “Preface” to Sibylline Leaves, “It contains the whole of the author’s poetical 
compositions, from 1793 to the present date, with the exception of a few works not yet finished, and those 
published in the first edition of his juvenile poems, over which he has no controul.” (PW I. II, p. 1249) 
138 The previously unplanned list of errata revisions, including not only the addition of “One Life” line to 
“The Eolian Harp” but also the exclusion of an entire stanza from “The Rime of The Ancient Mariner”, was 
inserted at the beginning of the collection afterwards. 
139 J.C.C. Mays (2001, PW I.II) states that “With a few obvious exceptions...and apart from a few other 
poems C continued to work on (e.g. The Rime of the Ancient Mariner), SL provides authoritative versions of 
texts which the late collections only contaminate.” (pp. 1247-48) 
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Sibylline Leaves differs from the previous collections by Coleridge published under 
his name in the years 1796, 1797 and 1803.140 It was, first and foremost, an invitation to 
the general literary reader to recognise his ‘friendship’ with Wordsworth, by drawing 
attention to their collaboration without allowing it to overshadow his own contribution. 
The matter was complicated considerably by the fact that in order to give himself his due 
as he saw it, Coleridge was obliged to acknowledge that he was source of certain 
tendencies in Wordsworth’s verse that he now found dubious and even heretical.  
 
A Brief Background to Sibylline Leaves 
Coleridge’s resolution to end the scattered state of his poems and collect them in a volume 
can be traced back to 1 May 1807,141 when it was announced in Longman’s journal The 
Athenaeum: A Magazine of Literary and Miscellaneous Information that Coleridge had 
sent two volumes of his poems to the press and they would be published soon. This, Mays 
(2001) states, indicates that Coleridge at this time “began to entertain hopes for a 
collection” that resembled Wordsworth’s 1807 volumes (PW I.II, p. 1244). We see his 
ongoing enthusiasm in his letters of April 1809, just before publishing the periodical 
version of The Friend: “I am about to negotiate with Longman & Rees for 2 Volumes of 
Poems,” he wrote, “which I shall prepare for the Press, the moment ‘the friend’ is fairly 
under way” (CL III, p. 191). He started issuing The Friend in periodical form in 1809-10, 
and in the second number dated 8 June 1809, Coleridge announced the collection in such a 
way that accentuated the fragmented state his poems had remained: “I take the opportunity 
                                                 
140 J.C.C. Mays (2001, PW I.II,), pp. 1226-1240. 
141 Mays states that although “SL descends directly from C’s earlier collections, despite the long interval and 
changed and changing circumstances, and its material beginnings may be traced to events which happened at 
least ten years before it appeared.” (PW I.II, p. 1244) 
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of informing my known and unknown patrons, that I am about to put to the Press a 
collection of the Poems written by me since the year 1795, several of which, of those at 
least of smaller size, have appeared in different Newspapers &c. in an incorrect state…” 
(The Friend II, p. 36). However, I propose that he did not then intend a revisionary 
separation from his partner yet because this alluring plan to save his poems from the 
“incorrect state” could only turn into a workable reality once he had thoroughly resolved to 
invest in his discrete oeuvre.  
The Friend project in periodical form was terminated in March 1810, and Coleridge 
soon found himself at odds with the Wordsworth household (Valerie Purton, 1993, p. 88). 
His disillusionment was intensified by a mutual friend’s report of disparaging remarks by 
Wordsworth about him in October 1810, upon which Coleridge went to London, 
intermittently residing with the Morgans. The next year, he lectured from November 1811 
until January 1812. Despite the withdrawal of half the Wedgwood annuity in November 
1812142 and in spite of his personal crises, Coleridge continued to produce quality work 
befitting the breadth of his actual intellectual reservoir: he wrote articles for newspapers, 
continued lecturing, and revised his dramatical work, Osorio, and successfully put it into 
production at Drury Lane in January 1813 under the new title, Remorse. 
In August 1813, John Morgan who had always supported Coleridge was declared 
bankrupt and that, more than anything else, seems to have spurred him back to life (Purton, 
1993, p. 99). Although Coleridge could not rouse himself for his own sake, he could for 
Morgan’s. I think this is further evidence of the phenomenon McFarland (1981) relates to 
Coleridge’s castration complex (p. 114) – he was never happier than when speaking or 
                                                 
142 As early as January 1798, Wedgwoods had offered Coleridge “£150 a year for life to devote himself to 
poetry and philosophy.” (Purton, 1993, p. 32) 
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acting through another, and Coleridge was at his best when helping out to the Morgan 
family during those hard times. However, prior to pulling himself together to set out on a 
journey to realize his ambition to collect his poems, Coleridge had suffered from severe 
collapse and depression in the first half of 1814 (Purton, 1993, p. 101). As a matter of fact, 
he had gradually sunk towards this crisis since he left Grasmere in the autumn of 1810 but 
it had never been as severe as now because, postponed by the success of his lectures and 
play in Drury Lane, Coleridge was now obliged to confront the still largely unresolved 
contradictions in his life: his professional failures, opium addiction, Sara Hutchinson, his 
marriage, and abandoned children were gradually preying on his mind, seriously disrupting 
not only himself but also his capacity for work (Holmes, 1998, pp. 350-351). Moreover, he 
soon found in the summer of 1814 that, Southey’s Roderick, The Last of the Goths and 
Wordsworth’s The Excursion were both about to be published, and Coleridge’s fame was 
obviously running the risk of publicly being shadowed by his former companions’ 
productivity. 
Money was a crucial factor leading up to Coleridge’s eventual collapse in this 
period. Mays observes, for example, that Coleridge’s enthusiasm as early as 1807 to 
collect his poems, taking Wordsworth’s example, did not “last beyond the excitement of 
watching [Wordsworth]’s volumes appear and was soon overtaken by other, moneymaking 
commitments” (PW I.II, p. 1244). This must be the reason for a strange feeling of 
uselessness that haunted Coleridge at the time he embarked on writing the “Preface” to 
Sibylline Leaves in March 1815 (Purton, 1993, p. 103), as he then poured out his grief in a 
letter and complained:   
…but O me! what can I do, when I am so poor that in having to turn off 
every week from these to some mean Subject for the Newspapers I distress 
myself, & at last neglect the greater wholly to do little of the Less…I have 
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remained poor by always having been poor, and incapable of pursuing any 
one great work for want of a competence before hand. (CL IV, pp. 546-547) 
He was thoroughly in need of money. As he wrote in a letter to John M. Gutch in early 
January 1817, prior to the publication of Biographia Literaria and Sibylline Leaves: “...the 
new Friend, in three volumes...I have been working like a Slave at these two Books (for 
such they are) called Lay-sermons – but I have not received a penny for them, or made any 
Bargain – & for the Biog. & Poems I do not expect to receive a farthing – well! if it do not 
leave me in debt” (CL IV, pp. 701-702). 
It was not until the publication of Wordsworth’s The Excursion in July, 1814 in 
quarto form – with a “Preface” outlining the poet’s plan for the bigger project of Recluse 
and explaining his poetic practice – that there was resurgence not only in Coleridge’s 
spirits but also in his literary pursuits.143 By the beginning of 1815, Coleridge was living 
with the Morgans at Calne in Wiltshire, and enjoying the company of influential friends, 
who joined together “to lend STC £45 to help him publish two volumes of his poetry” - 
Sibylline Leaves (Purton, 1993, pp. 103-104). Here Coleridge began to reconsider 
publishing his collected poems. In the Easter Week of 1815, Coleridge wrote a petitionary 
letter to Byron in which he gave the full account of his planned poetic collection:  
…my circumstances now compel me to publish in two Volumes all the 
poems composed by me from the year 1795 to the present Date, that are 
sanctioned by my mature judgement, all that I would consent to have called 
mine…The whole have been corrected throughout, with very considerable 
alterations and additions, some indeed almost re-written. (CL IV, p. 560)  
By 1817, Coleridge was also a widely known and highly controversial figure who, now 
residing at the Highgate house of James Gillman, “only the year before had published a 
volume containing ‘Christabel’, ‘Kubla Khan’, and ‘The Pains of Sleep’” (Stillinger, 1994, 
p. 70). And ten years after the conception of a poetic collection and two years after it was 
                                                 
143 On June 29, 1814 Coleridge reported to Morgan that he was greatly improved. (Purton, 1993, p. 102)  
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sent to the press, due to delays over printing and publishers, Sibylline Leaves was finally 
published in July 1817. It was yet another accomplishment on Coleridge’s side that the 
1817 version of “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner”, along with other anonymous poems, 
eventually emerged with Coleridge on the scene as the manifest author.144 This was due to 
the fact that with the collection, Coleridge was about to emerge as the sole owner of his 
own poetic oeuvre. 
  
Previous Scholarship  
The Coleridge scholarship is usually and rightfully inclined to deal with Sibylline Leaves 
(1817) as an illustration of the poetics delivered in the widely-acclaimed Biographia. 
Mileur (1982), for instance, argues that the poetic collection of Coleridge, who aimed to 
integrate poetry with philosophy, can be read as the “prophetic fragments of the realized 
poet-philosopher of Biographia”, and the context provided by the Biographia enabled “an 
interpretation of Coleridge and his concerns” through which his poems could be “read 
anew” and through which Coleridge could go beyond “the bounds of the conventionally 
poetic” (p. 2). According to this view, to which I also subscribe, what Coleridge designed 
was a constitutionally-integrated project (albeit a rather sprawling one): the poetical 
collection with a “Preface” (Biographia) that holistically laid out his philosophical and 
theological views, as well as practical criticism. On the other hand, there are views that 
suggest slightly otherwise: Ewan James Jones (2014) has recently argued that it was thanks 
to his verse that Coleridge’s engagement with philosophy yielded a notable outcome, as he 
lacked the systematic speculation required for proper philosophical inquiry. Jones 
                                                 
144 For more information on the complicated publication history of the Biographia Literaria and Sibylline 
Leaves, refer to Collected Letters, III, pp. xlvii–lii and Biographia Literaria, I, pp. xlv–lxv. Also see: 
Stillinger, 1994, Coleridge and Textual Instability pp. 19-20 for further details. 
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discusses that “‘formal’ features such as metre, rhyme and stress” facilitated Coleridge’s 
idiosyncratic thinking in a way systematic philosophy did not (p. 62). For Jones, then, 
Coleridge’s philosophy could not be expressed but for his poetical output. However, I 
suggest, this is one-sided, for Jones is overlooking the holistic nature of Coleridge’s 
collection and “Preface”. As a matter of fact, when Sibylline Leaves was published, 
Coleridge’s poetical and the ensuing revisionary activities were in a mutually binding 
interaction with his many-sided, muddled and theologically-attuned philosophical thinking. 
Scholarship concerning Sibylline Leaves also draws on the idea that it was not a 
complete collection, but a selective specimen of Coleridge’s canon. On the one hand 
Coleridge claimed that the collection would include all of his poetical compositions that 
were “worthy of publication since his first collection would be brought in, and that 
manuscript poems would make up a third of the whole” (Mays, 2001, PW I. II, p. 1245).145 
On the other hand, he failed to live up to this promise:  As Mays (2001) states, “Besides 
including nine of the eleven poems added in 1797, it takes in The Eolian Harp from 1796; 
and besides thirty-eight poems from previously published sources, it takes in only ten 
hitherto unpublished ones” (PW I.II, p. 1245). As Mays elsewhere elaborates,  
He excluded several he wrote after his return from Malta from Sibylline 
Leaves…‘Time Real and Imaginary’, also dating from after the return from 
Malta, was included in Sibylline Leaves but only at the very last moment. 
Other poems remained uncollected – ‘Farewell to Love’ was published only 
in newspapers – and those which would have embarrassed family and 
friends were naturally withheld altogether. (2002, p. 97) 
Ve-Yin Tee (2009) also emphasizes that Coleridge intentionally left the radical poems out: 
“In a collection that purports in the ‘Preface’ to contain ‘the whole of the author’s poetical 
compositions’, including the ‘Poems published . . . in various obscure or perishable 
                                                 
145 Also see: Coleridge’s letters to John May on 27 September 1815 (CL IV, pp. 588-9) and Daniel Stuart on 
17 September 1815. (CL IV, p. 591)  
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journals’,” he questions, “where is the celebrated political satire that he contributed to the 
Morning Post in 1799: ‘The Devil’s Walk’? Similarly, where are his celebratory sonnets 
on the heroes of revolution – Erskine, La Fayette, Koskiusko, Godwin and Stanhope – that 
he published in the Morning Chronicle in 1794 and 1795” (p. 75)? Indeed, when it came to 
providing retrospective explanation to some of his politically-laden pieces, Coleridge was 
rather embracing them through half-truths, selective accounts and expediency – a practice 
that goes back to the time he published the periodical version of The Friend in 1809-
1810.146 That is, just as he knew how to strip the Kantian categorical imperative of its 
political connotations while adopting his philosophical views, Coleridge aimed to acquit 
himself of the possible charges following the revelation of his authorship in 1817 (See: 
“Fire, Famine and Slaughter” case study below).  
 
Gap in Scholarship 
In this chapter, I hope to make a contribution to our evolving understanding of Coleridge’s 
poetic collection, Sibylline Leaves, by considering it within the framework of his 
revisionary activity from 1814 to 1818 and his adherence to language and imagination. In 
the post-Excursion phase of Coleridge’s revisions, it was primarily the fact that 
Wordsworth had abandoned The Recluse that made it imperative for Coleridge to salvage 
                                                 
146 Class (2012) points out this aspect of Coleridge’s rhetoric and selective accounts of his own canon as 
follows: “The Friend introduced the categorical imperative in such a way that it deprived it of any political 
potential: ‘So act that thou mayest be able without involving any contradiction to will that the Maxim of thy 
Conduct should be the Law of all intelligent Beings’ (Friend II, p. 128). Not only did Coleridge omit the 
Jacobin name Kant, he also made sure to tame the categorical imperative and to disconnect it explicitly from 
any form of political activism: the categorical imperative is ‘the one universal and sufficient Principle and 
Guide of Morality. Any why? Because the object of Morality is not the outward act, but the internal Maxims 
of our Actions’ (Friend II, p. 128). The stipulation of disinterestedness can be found in the Groundwork; 
however, the strict separation of morality from outward action in such vehement terms as  ‘And [only] so far 
it is infallible’ (Friend II, p. 128) is Coleridge’s addition. In comparison to Coleridge’s first sketch of the 
categorical imperative in his notebook between late 1795 and early 1796, this version seems completely 
impotent.” (p. 146) 
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what he could out of the joint oeuvre with his former companion, and to re-define his own 
oeuvre. The collection therefore would necessarily emerge as a vital demonstration of his 
self-reassurance.147 I am hence a little bit uncomfortable with the idea, held by Raimonda 
Modiano (2009), that “without the appearance of Wordsworth’s 1815 volume, Coleridge’s 
own projected Preface may never have grown into ‘an Autobiographia literaria’…but 
would have remained yet another item on a long list of unrealized works” (p. 212). I 
suggest that although Modiano’s statement seems to be compatible with my contention, it 
nonetheless presents both Sibylline Leaves and the Biographia predominantly as exclusive 
reactions to Wordsworth’s collection of 1815. However, as I will demonstrate in the 
following parts of this thesis, the story began a year earlier when The Excursion of 1814 
propelled Coleridge’s radical shift in his perception of an independent oeuvre and the 
importance of relying on his own intellectual reservoir.  
In the following, I aim to support my assertion that the meticulous care Coleridge 
took with his collection of poems in 1815 largely stemmed from his disappointment with 
The Recluse project in general and The Excursion in particular. Coleridge hence named the 
collection after Virgil’s Cumaean Sibyl in Aeneid,148, the allusion to which points, as 
Coleridge mentions in the “Preface” to his poems, broadly to their “fragmentary and 
widely scattered state” (PW I.II, p. 1249). Whereas Chris Murray (2013) asserts that the 
                                                 
147 When it “eventually appeared” in 1817, as J.C.C. Mays (2001) informs, the poems in Sibylline Leaves (as 
well as the Biographia) “was attracting a good deal of notice [and he] was willy-nilly more aware of the 
poems as a statement of his achievement than he was in 1809, 1811, or originally in 1815, and he became 
more deeply involved in the book’s fortunes after publication than with any of his earlier collections. He 
annotated copies over a number of years to an extent without precedent or parallel.” (PW I.II, p. 1247)  
148 “...thou shalt look on an inspired prophetess, who deep in a rocky cave sings the Fates and entrusts to 
leaves signs and symbols. Whatever verses the maid has traced on leaves she arranges in order and stores 
away in the cave. These remain unmoved in their places and quit not their rank; but when at the turn of the 
hinge a light breeze has stirred them, and the open door scattered the tender foliage, never does she thereafter 
care to catch them, as they flutter in the rocky cave, nor to recover their places, nor to unite the verses; 
uncounselled, men depart, and loathe the Sibyl's seat.” (Aeneid, Book III, pp. 377-379) 
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title “transforms the disorganized state of Coleridge’s texts into a sort of success” (p. 80), 
Mays (2001) suggests that it refers to Wordsworth’s subtitle “Miscellaneous Pieces”, most 
probably with the intention of “raising to prominence” what Wordsworth in 1815 had 
relegated (PW I.II, p. 1248). In any case, it is significant to note that rather than trusting 
others to take care of his poems, Coleridge in Sibylline Leaves sought to “chant them” 
himself149, so to say, in order to revise himself and re-define his symbiotic history with 
Wordsworth.  
 
Revisionary Activity in Sibylline Leaves 
In the aftermath of giving up on the joint oeuvre with Wordsworth,150 Coleridge sought to 
ensure that his distinct authorship was recognized and appreciated in 1815. This was a 
strategic moment in Coleridge’s career because his poems were recently omitted by 
Wordsworth from the reprint of the Lyrical Ballads in 1815, finally reverting to the author. 
Coleridge therefore had to take prompt action regarding his anonymous and scattered 
works, as well as those published under his name in newspapers and private letters, and the 
poems he had to omit from his previous publications.151 In addition, after Wordsworth’s 
publication of his own collected poems in 1815, Coleridge felt he was now being 
completely airbrushed out of the picture. This, however, was not a total surprise for 
                                                 
149 From Aeneas’s plea to the Sibyl of Cumae, Aeneid, vi, 74-76, trans. Fairclough. 1974. 
150 In a letter of September 1814 to Daniel Stuart, Coleridge both laments and affirms that he was “abused, & 
insolently reproved, as a man, with reference to my supposed private Habits, for not publishing …but I could 
rebut the charge, & not merely say but prove – that there is not a man in England, whose Thoughts, Images, 
Words, & Erudition have been published in larger quantities than mine – tho’, I must admit, not by or for 
myself”  (CL III, p. 532). This quotatiton is highly significant because it bears witness to Coleridge’s 
investment in the reputation of others, or his practice of speaking through Wordsworth through his friend’s 
publications as well as their plan to write a philosophical poem, The Recluse.  
151 For example, “The Foster Mother’s Tale” (which was also included in the Lyrical Ballads in 1798) 
published in the Sibylline Leaves in 1817 was recycled from Osorio of 1797 because in the revised version 
Remorse this part had to be omitted and he could not let go of the poem. The poem with its radical content 
was no longer appropriate for the new version of the play in 1813. 
164 
 
Coleridge since the process has already started back in 1798: although initially an 
anonymous publication was decided before printing the first edition of the Lyrical Ballads 
(“Wordsworth’s name is nothing,” Coleridge wrote to Cottle, and added “to a large number 
of persons mine stinks” (CL I, p. 412)), only Wordsworth’s name was printed on the title 
page of the second edition of the Lyrical Ballads in 1800. Therefore, Coleridge in 1817 
was not in any straightforward sense making his “Collected Poems” public. He was in fact 
issuing a disguised poetic history of his collaboration with Wordsworth. The symbiotic 
nature of their relationship had long consigned Coleridge to the background (at least as a 
poet, and surely at Coleridge’s own will)152 in the eye of public, and this collection 
therefore was a belated attempt to lay claims on his own poetry and start dialogue with 
Wordsworth after years of collaboration with him. When we consider the sequencing of 
the volume and analyse what exactly Coleridge includes and what he excludes, we can see, 
for example, that he began the collection with the revised“The Rime of the Ancient 
Mariner”, thereby almost replicating the ordering of the original Lyrical Ballads. I 
therefore suggest that the reason for this was part of Coleridge’s anxiety to reclaim his own 
oeuvre and authorship in the face of his disappointment with Wordsworth after The 
Excursion. Here, the discrepancy between Coleridge’s and Wordsworth’s conceptions of 
language and imagination had incontrovertible effects on the former’s revisionary activity 
in compilation of Sibylline Leaves.  
 
                                                 
152 Paley (1996) agrees, borrowing from McFarland (1981), that this is also part of Coleridge’s “masochistic” 
submission to Wordsworth. (p. 69) 
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Revisions and Language 
Writing on Coleridge and his language theory, McKusick (2009) emphasizes that 
Coleridge’s “distinctively Romantic conception of language” provided a “constantly 
evolving” axis to his discourse on “poetry, criticism, and philosophy” (p. 573). Indeed, 
Coleridge’s adherence to the idea that language is the emblem of unification of the mind 
and God (Fulford, 1991, p. xvii), not merely consisting of arbitrary signs (CL I, pp. 625-
26) but instead constituting the objects of thought surely emerged in Sibylline Leaves. 
Within the scope of this thesis, an analysis of the revisionary activity carried out in 1817 
on two distinctive poems by Coleridge, “The Eolian Harp” and “Fire, Famine and 
Slaughter”, will provide curious but concurring results. 
According to Coleridge, language was able to communicate Truth because the 
linguistic signs had their origins in the divinity that necessarily ensured a constitutional 
correspondence between the mind, the word and the external objects.153 Having founded 
this interplay on a transcendental ground and having conceived of linguistic signs as 
“living powers, not merely articulated air” (Essays II, p. 249), Coleridge took for granted 
that once the linguistic signs signify a thing, they necessarily point to its existence because 
language was bound to be the outlet through which our pre-existing knowledge was 
expressed by means of words, ultimately finding a correspondent idea or object. 
A careful consideration of Coleridge’s insistence on the transcendent power of 
language to ensure a coherent exchange between words and things and their coherent 
                                                 
153 Consider, for instance, Coleridge’s note of April, 1805: “ln looking at objects of Nature while I am 
thinking, as at yonder moon dim-glimmering thro’ the dewy window-pane, I seem rather to be seeking, as it 
were asking, a symbolical language for something within me that already and forever exists , than observing 
any thing new. Even when that latter is the case, yet still I have always an obscure feeling as if that new 
phenomenon were the dim Awaking of a forgotten or hidden Truth of my inner Nature/ It is still interesting 
as a Word, a Symbol! It is…the Creator! [and the Evolver!]”  (CN II, §2546)  
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relation to the human mind sheds light on the meaning and implications of “the one Life” 
passage in Sibylline Leaves: 
O! the one Life, within us and abroad,   
Which meets all Motion, and becomes its soul,   
A Light in Sound, a sound-like power in Light,  
Rhythm in all Thought, and Joyance every where — (PW I.I, p. 116) 
The way Coleridge perceived how the elements of the interior world have instrinsic bonds 
with the external things, how they automatically combine with the one and the many (in 
line with the principle of Multeity in Unity) is a useful pointer to gauge the integral role of 
“the one Life, within us and abroad” in Coleridgean universe. In Coleridge’s accounts 
especially in the Biographia, the idea of “one Life” often features, as Perry (1999) puts it, 
“as part of the parochial lumber that he shook off once he encountered Kant” (p. 68). The 
fact that the lines themselves stand physically apart from the rest of the poem in the 
erratum slips might as well indicate Coleridge’s obvious ambivalence about the concept in 
1817. However, I agree with Perry’s argument that “for much of his intellectual life, the 
doctrine and its cognates are…centrally important, and even a key to the Coleridgean 
predicament, because so powerful an expression of his abiding muddle between unity and 
diversity” (pp. 68-69). Coleridgean conception of “the one Life” is indeed rather fluid and 
muddled: it welcomes “all Motion”, evolves with the dynamic and manifold nature of 
external stimula but at once retains its fundamental core, resulting in “Rhythm in all 
Thought”, hence sparking a ubiquitous bliss in those imbued with its awareness. I will read 
this aspect of the revised version of “The Eolian Harp” as an indicator of the persistence of 
Coleridge’s language theory, his post-Excursion revisionary reaction to Wordsworth, and 




The pantheistic overtone in “the one Life” lines is evident, but to me the crucial 
issue is not whether Coleridge was consolidating his pantheistic views; rather it must be 
noted that technically, Coleridge in these lines was quoting Wordsworth. Magnuson (1985) 
informs that “It was Wordsworth, after all, who first used the phrase the ‘one life’ in the 
Pedlar material of 1798” (p. 3),154 referring to the Pedlar passages in the two-part Prelude 
of 1798-1799155 (a revised and extended version of the poem was later re-published in part 
in Book I of The Excursion).156 Consider the following lines from “Two-Part Prelude”: 
…in all things 
I saw one life, and felt that it was joy. 
One song they sang, and it was audible, 
Most audible then when the fleshly ear, 
O’ercome by grosser prelude of that strain, 
Forgot its functions, and slept undisturbed.  
(Wordsworth, 2010, p. 186-87. Part II, Lines 459-464) 
The way Wordsworth described “one life” is indeed quite similar to Coleridge’s “one Life 
within us and abroad”. Nonetheless, the matter is in fact even more complicated than 
Magnuson suggests because of Coleridge’s role in the design of The Recluse since he may 
also have been quoting himself. The expression of “one Life” in the Pedlar material was 
more of the product of the two poet’s symbiosis (and Coleridge’s habit of speaking 
through Wordsworth) rather than Wordsworth’s influence on Coleridge. However, 
Coleridge later realised, both in the 1800 “Preface” to Lyrical Ballads and in the 1814 
Excursion, that Wordsworth was overtly preoccupied with “ordinary language” and was 
                                                 
154 “…if ‘The Eolian Harp’ is a seminal poem,” Magnuson adds, “its influence must come from the earlier 
texts, not the later ones, and in its later versions the added lines might well be a result of Wordsworth’s 
influence” (p. 3). Also see: James Butler (ed.) The Ruined Cottage and The Pedlar (1979) and Jonathan 
Wordsworth, The Music of Humanity (1969). 
155 In The Prelude, “passages on the Pedlar’s education as a favoured child of Nature” were used togive an 
“account of [Wordsworth]’s own childhood…” (Stephen Gill (ed.) Wordsworth, 2010, p. 740). Also see: 
Jonathan Wordsworth and Stephen Gill (October 1973). “The Two-Part ‘Prelude’ of 1798-99”. The Journal 
of English and Germanic Philology. Vol. 72, No. 4, pp. 503-525. Published by: University of Illinois Press. 
156 “With The Ruined Cottage the cadence of Wordsworth’s most impressive medium from ‘Tintern Abbey’ 
to The Prelude and The Excursion emerged.” (Stephen Gill (ed.) Wordsworth, 2010, p. 718) 
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ambivalent about whether language would be able to convey what Coleridge once 
characterised as “that prophetic Lay” (PW I.II, p. 816) at all.  
It remains true that Coleridge’s adherence to the concept of “one Life” persisted in 
the aftermath of his separation from Wordsworth, whereas in the latter’s case, the 
“intellectual development center[ed] on his acceptance, revision, and eventual 
abandonment of Coleridge’s notion” (William A. Ulmer, 1996, p. 304). I agree with Ulmer 
with the proposition that the inclusion of the concept in Wordsworth’s poems did not 
necessarily entail his complete subscription to pantheism either during or after writing The 
Ruined Cottage and the Two-Part Prelude157 because, Ulmer explains, “Wordsworth’s few 
indisputable affirmations of the One Life…remain specific not to a developmental phase, 
in short, but to a particular poetic project” (p. 305). I would like to further this point 
through the assertion that his symbiotic relationship with Coleridge and the latter’s fervour 
to speak through his friend’s poetic genius resulted in Wordsworth’s adoption of concepts 
and composition of lines owing to the influence Coleridge exerted upon his poetic career 
even at such an early stage. As a corollary of this, I suggest, Coleridge during his post-
Excursion revisionary activity for Sibylline Leaves and with his insertion of the “one Life” 
passage did not only quote himself, he also aimed to merge his philosophical views on 
language with his poetical output. 
Coleridge’s solid investment in the power of language to convey meaning, to 
reflect what is in mind, and to constitute thoughts resulted in curious revisionary activity in 
                                                 
157 “Nowhere does Wordsworth’s poetry display his sympathy with pantheism evolving into his own certain 
conviction of the truth of the One Life. In fact, Wordsworth's struggles with the ending of The Ruined 
Cottage indicate his humanistic awareness, even in 1798, that oneness with nature was no unequivocal 
good.” (Ulmer, 1996, p. 331) 
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Sibylline Leaves during which he dealt with a poem of 1798158 titled “Fire, Famine and 
Slaughter” in such a way that seemingly fell at odds with his faith in language. In the 1817 
version of the poem, revisions and alterations enabled Coleridge to paradoxically defend 
his original position. While doing this, Coleridge’s use of linguistic possibilities in the 
service of highlighting incongruity respecting what he wrote and what he had in mind is 
noteworthy.  
“Fire, Famine and Slaughter” first appeared in 1798 in The Morning Post with a 
pseudonym, and re-emerged in Sibylline Leaves at the end of the section titled “Poems 
Occasioned by Political Events or Feelings Connected with them”.  It presents a 
hypothetical conversation among three entities, “Fire, Famine and Slaughter”, in which 
they blame a person - whose name is formed by “Letters four” (PW I.I, p. 441), assumedly 
pointing to the coded name of the Prime Minister at the time, William Pitt - for the 
destruction brought by the war in France. The general tone of the poem is furious, even 
violent. At the end, the language goes so far as to imagine Pitt’s own demise by hoping 
that “the multitude […] shall seize him and his brood –” (PW I.I, p. 443). It was not until 
Coleridge published Sibylline Leaves in 1817 that the poem was publicly acknowledged, 
with an attachment of a twenty-two page long apologetic prologue to the six-page long 
poem, which primarily concerns us here in terms of contributing to Coleridge’s revisionary 
agenda at the time. More specifically, the apologetic “Preface” to the poem demonstrates 
the way Coleridge aimed both to reclaim authorship for his poem and, simultaneously, to 
reverse the political implications in the poem to his advantage.  
                                                 
158 “The poem was probably written in Dec 1797, even though C himself dated it 1796 in all his collections”, 
but it was “published in M[orning] Post (8 Jan 1798) over a pseudonym” (Mays, 2001, PW I.I, p. 428) 
170 
 
In the “Preface”, Coleridge recalls a conversation at a dinner table, during which 
this anonymous poem was mentioned. Unaware of the presence of its writer, people at the 
table said the style was admirable and eloquent, but the poem itself pointed to the writer’s 
“malignity of heart.” The “Preface” was hence reported to be written to defend the poem as 
well as the poet against this charge by suggesting that though it might seem vengeful and 
harsh, the poem actually reflected “mere bubbles, flashes and electrical apparitions from 
the magic cauldron of a fervid and ebullient fancy, constantly fuelled by an unexampled 
opulence of language...” (PW I.I, p. 433). It aimed to convey “deep feelings of revenge 
commonly expressed in a few words, ironically tame and mild” (p. 431). To prepare the 
way for this argument, the prologue opened with a quotation from the book of 
Ecclesiasticus: “THERE IS ONE THAT SLIPPETH IN HIS SPEECH, BUT NOT FROM 
HIS HEART; AND WHO IS HE THAT HATH NOT OFFENDED WITH HIS 
TONGUE?” (PW I.I, p. 429).  
The Coleridge who wrote the first version of the poem wrote as a kind of prophet, 
whereas the author of Sibylline Leaves was more concerned with the meaning of the past 
and the way we interpret it. In contrast to the Kantian philosophical strain that presupposes 
the “regulative” function of the mind, the mature Coleridge seems to imply that reality can 
only be known (or constituted) retrospectively. In “Fire, Famine and Slaughter”, Coleridge 
apparently felt compelled to use the poem to instantiate the distinction between the past as 
experienced (i.e. the past as he inwardly knew it) and the past as he now saw it. The poem 
was “sibylline” in its first version, but not in ways the young prophet could have discerned 
at the time. Coleridge’s moment of confession at the dinner table to have authored the 
poem bears testimony to this: 
171 
 
I must now confess, Sir! that I am the author of that Poem. It was written 
some years ago. I do not attempt to justify my past self, young as I then 
was; but as little as I would now write a similar poem, so far was I even 
then from imagining, that the lines would be taken as more or less than a 
sport of fancy. At all events, if I know my own heart, there was never a 
moment in my existence in which I should have been more ready, had Mr. 
Pitt's person been in hazard, to interpose my own body, and defend his life 
at the risque of my own. (PW I.I, p. 434) 
Coleridge actually does not seem to be deflecting or diluting his radicalism into something 
he was ashamed of twenty years later, as we still can see him in 1818 proud of the work he 
had written: “I do not fear telling you,” he wrote to Derwent Coleridge in November 1818, 
“the Apologetic Preface to the Fire, Famine, and Slaughter in Sibylline Leaves is my 
happiest performance in respect of Style…” (CL IV, pp. 885).159  
The prologue to “Fire, Famine and Slaughter” was intended by Coleridge to create 
what Clifford Siskin (1988) terms as an “extratextual” revision on the poem:160 through the 
apologetic “Preface” he underscored the discrepancy between what was written through 
words (i.e. in the poem) and what was actually intended, in order to discharge himself 
against accusations of apostasy and, ironically and simultaneously, continue to defend his 
previous line of thought by altering the way the poem itself is read. Therefore, against the 
critics holding that with the “Preface” Coleridge “had just excused the radicalism” of the 
poem161, I would like to highlight the striking fact that the prologue opens with a quotation 
from the apology to Hadrianus by Claudian, who had imagined the prefect in an earlier 
                                                 
159 Mays (2001) also states that “C was particularly pleased with the style of the Preface, despite the fact that, 
even because, its magisterial and even tone is oblique to the poem.” (PW I.I, p. 428) 
160 Clifford Siskin (1988) observes that the Romantics performed two forms of revision: “intratextual” and 
“extratextual.” “Intratextual revision” is the “interpretive principle” that is at work even during the 
composition of a text, therefore whether revised or unrevised, all texts “exhibit revisionary behavior” (p. 
109). According to Siskin, on the other hand, “extratextual revision” makes use of “prefaces and 
classificatory schemes” that do not modify the text itself but alters the way it is read. 
161 See, for example, Barrell, J. (2000). “Fire, Famine, and Slaughter.” Huntington Library Quarterly, 63(3), 
277-298. p. 287. 
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poem in a perpetual coma, “if not dead exactly”.162 This is a tricky allusion, which Ve-Yin 
Tee (2009) finds truly problematic referring to the interpretation of Edward Gibbon (1776-
1788) in The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, because “the Classical 
poet was understood to be insincere” (p. 79). Gibbon explains this with the following 
words: “He deplores, in mournful strains, the fatal indiscretion into which he had been 
hurried by passion and folly…Yet, in some places, an air of irony and indignation betrays 
his secret reluctance” (p. 188 and footnote). Here, the role Coleridge assigned to language 
(which not only forms knowledge but also potentially contorts the sense of reality) enabled 
him to manoeuvre the probable connotations of his verse. This is what Tim Fulford (1991) 
explains with the “figurative” power of linguistic signs:163 He holds that Coleridge  
remained a difficult but intriguing thinker, a challenge to critics precisely 
because his ideas remain powerful even though their expression is 
fragmentary and often convoluted. I attempt here to meet that challenge by 
revealing the exemplary nature of his understanding of figurative language, 
whilst showing that it arose from his participation as a speaker and author in 
discourses which, hard though he tried to reconcile them, conflicted with 
each other and with his own sense of identity. (p. xv) 
This makes one think that the “Preface” in fact had an underlying irony and twist designed 
both to look like an apology and to add an ironic undertone to it simultaneously. This can 
be considered as the Coleridgean craft of prevaricating possible reactions against himself 
by relying on language and its power of constituting thoughts while reclaiming the 
authorship to the poem. Consequently, in the context of “Fire, Famine and Slaughter”, 
Coleridge seems to be depoliticizing highly-political and even radical content.  
                                                 
162 The epigraph from Claudian is taken from the “Apology to Hadrian”. Claudian, ed. and trans. Marice 
Platnauer, 2 vols. London and Cambridge, Mass., 1963. 2, pp. 196-99. 
163 “By figurative language” Fulford clarifies, “I refer to a discourse which embraced conceits, allusions, 
puns and even verbal slips, as well as metaphor and symbol. These figures reshaped Coleridge's 
understanding of language's role in knowledge…” (1991, p. xv) 
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Nonetheless, I assert that the discrepancy between what he knew he had thought at 
the time of writing the poem and what he had to present in the face of historical 
circumstances in 1817 was deliberately to exist. Coleridge’s witty eloquence and “strange 
power of speech” (PW I.I. p. 416) combined with his use of (and faith in) language 
empowered him to revise and occlude portions of his past views so he could mitigate the 
reactions to his poetical works and persona in 1817, but still be non-compromising 
regarding his work and the younger intentions while writing the poem. Instead of 
considering this as a transition in years from a radical position to a more orthodox one, I 
believe it is necessary to bring to mind the Coleridgean muddle and his pursuit of an 
oeuvre divorced from his symbiosis with Wordsworth.  
It would be too far-fetched, on the other hand, to suggest here that Coleridge’s 
agenda was to separate himself as the author from his works, since he was after all in the 
process of reclaiming his works in Sibylline Leaves. As he himself clarified in the 
“Preface”: “if it be asked why I re-published it at all? I answer, that the Poem had been 
attributed at different times to different other persons” (PW I.I, p. 434). Coleridge hence 
stressed the significance he attributed to owning the authorship of even his controversial 
works in the “Preface” to the poem due to the vitality at the time of proving, vis-à-vis 
Wordsworth, that he had accomplished notable oeuvre not only in prose but also in verse. 
What Coleridge wished to highlight in the prologue of 1817 was a subtly-Aristotelian 
distinction between a “poem” and “poet”:164 we are told that the poem itself belonged to 
the realm of fantasy and allegory, distinguishing the poem from the poet’s real-life 
                                                 
164 According to the Aristotelian argument of the poet’s relation to poem, the poet merely imitates the ideal, 
hence not merely copies the phenomenal world as it is: “the work of the poet is to speak not of things that 
have happened but of the sort of things that might happen and possibilities that come from what is likely or 
necessary.” (Poetics, p. 32) 
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experiences. Coleridge illustrated his point through a reference to Milton who, Coleridge 
suggested, neither stated his “ideal of virtue, or of depravity, as an individual or individuals 
actually existing”, nor named or referred in his poem “to any persons, living or dead”, 
though his “calumniators” dared to interpret his words as alluding to real persons (PW I.I, 
p. 436).165 Against his own calumniators, Coleridge in this way aimed to demonstrate how 
the experience of reading the poem should not automatically lead the reader to infer that 
they stemmed specifically from Coleridge’s own knowledge, or his personal opinions. 
Coleridge hence also defended himself against the charges that he was imagining the 
destruction of Pitt with the poem by illustrating his point via a question concerning Dante: 
“should we hold it either fair or charitable to believe it to have been Dante's serious wish, 
that all the persons mentioned by him, (many recently departed, and some even alive at the 
time,) should actually suffer the fantastic and horrible punishments, to which he has 
sentenced them in his Hell and Purgatory” (PW I.I, p. 432)? It was through this line of 
argument that he sought absolution for writing the dialogues between fire, famine and 
slaughter: When asked about the person who bade them do their respective works, each 
answer by saying “Letters four do form his name. / He let me loose, and cried Halloo! / To 
him alone the praise is due” (PW I.I, pp. 442-443). At one point towards the end of the 
poem, Famine, who is proud of “gnaw[ing] the multitude”, states that once “the cup of 
rage” is “o’erbrim”, the multitude “shall seize him and his brood”, and this projection is 
carried even further by Slaughter’s statement that “They shall tear him limb from limb” 
(PW I.I, p. 443)! Dramatic voices of the fictional characters, Coleridge argued in the 
                                                 
165 “Had Milton stated either his ideal of virtue, or of depravity, as an individual or individuals actually 
existing? Certainly not! …His wish is expressly confined to a speedy stop being put by Providence to their 
power of inflicting misery on others! But did he name or refer to any persons, living or dead? No! But the 
calumniators of Milton daresay (for what will calumny not dare say?) that he had LAUD and STAFFORD in 
his mind, while writing of remorseless persecution, and the enslavement of a free country, from motives of 
selfish ambition.” (PW I.I, p. 436) 
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“Preface”, were created through his own “seething imagination”, and as a poet he tried to 
paint “the circumstances that accompany war in so many vivid and yet fantastic forms, as 
proved that neither the images nor the feelings were the result of observation, or in any 
way derived from realities” (PW I.I, p. 433).  
 
Revisions and Imagination 
In Sibylline Leaves Coleridge sought to constitute a poetic collection neatly divorced from 
his previous affiliation with Wordsworth, and even when he included poems that were the 
products of their collaboration, or inspired by it, Coleridge made (or had to make, as in the 
case of “To William Wordsworth”) necessary alterations in order to reclaim his distinct 
author identity. In addition to linguistic concerns, what spurred Coleridge’s revisionary 
activity in 1815 (when he was collecting his poems and writing the Biographia) was his 
former partner’s misunderstanding – or incomplete understanding – of one of the most 
crucial concept of Coleridge’s poetical, theological and philosophical queries: Imagination. 
The point of divergence, as expounded in the third chapter of this study, was that whereas 
for Coleridge it was one of the fundamental functions of imagination to ensure generation 
of meaning in a wholly productive fashion, Wordsworth seemed to align it with fancy, 
which for Coleridge was merely an associative tool that was sharply distinct from both the 
creative potential of primary imagination and the divine power of secondary imagination. 
A striking example to Coleridge’s revisions based on his views on imagination is “To a 
Gentleman”, the 1817 version of “To William Wordsworth”166, a poem originally 
composed as a response to Wordsworth’s recitation on January 7, 1807 of the 1805 version 
                                                 
166 There are basically two different versions of the poem: “To William Wordsworth” (1807) and “To a 
Gentleman” (1817).  
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of The Prelude (most of which had been written during Coleridge’s Malta years) over the 
course of several days.167  
Ever since they designed The Recluse in 1797-98 and, especially after the Lyrical 
Ballads in 1798 and the “Preface” to the second edition in 1800, Coleridge was not 
unwillingly committed to the division of labours with Wordsworth: he had even 
pronounced himself in 1800 as a mere “Metaphysician” compared to the greatness of 
Wordsworth as a poet (CL I, p. 658). In another letter to Richard Sharp on 15 January 
1804, he confessed that although “Wordsworth is a Poet” he felt himself “a better Poet, in 
knowing how to honour him, than in all my own poetic Compositions,” because he still 
cherished the hope of “immortality to his Recluse, as the first & finest philosophical Poem, 
if only it be (as it undoubtedly will be) a Faithful Transcript of his own most august & 
innocent Life, of his own habitual Feelings & Modes of seeing and hearing” (CL II, p. 
1034). Despite the divergences in their poetical methods that at times offended both parties 
in the course of their symbiosis, Coleridge was in 1805 still committed to maintaining their 
mutually-fruitful partnership so that he continued to inspire the first philosophical poem to 
be written by Wordsworth; so that his own poetic “identity” could “flow into” 
Wordsworth’s and “live and act in” him (CN II, §2712). Being the embodiment of 
Coleridge’s conception of a joint oeuvre, The Recluse project still underpinned Coleridge’s 
strong wish to speak through Wordsworth in 1807, after hearing The Prelude and being 
assured that his expectations for a joint project was yielding the products he was looking 
for. After all, it was this “Orphic Tale”, “A Tale divine of high and passionate thoughts” 
(PW II.II, p. 1031) that spurred Coleridge to compose one of the most major poems of his 
                                                 
167 As elaborated in the first chapter of this study, Coleridge wrote “To William Wordsworth” in 1807 days 
after hearing Wordsworth’s Prelude to their joint project, The Recluse. 
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career, “To William Wordsworth”. I therefore maintain that Coleridge for this reason was 
still not close to a discrete path in 1807. On the other hand, Paley (1996) asserts that 
Coleridge’s “To William Wordsworth” (1807) inaugurated a post-Wordsworthian phase in 
his career as the poem marked a transformation in “Coleridge’s own history as a poet” 
because “By representing himself as dead and in his coffin, Coleridge seems to represent 
the end of his poetic career while actually…leaving open the possibility of its rebirth in 
another form” (p. 12). “To William Wordsworth”, Paley adds, is “thus a door that closes in 
one direction to open in another”. The poem indeed figures Coleridge as Milton’s drowned 
Lycidas (See: Paley, p. 21), or as the murdered John the Baptist in the following lines:    
A bodily Tumult! and thy faithful Hopes, 
Thy Hopes of me, dear Friend! by me unfelt 
Were troublous to me, almost as a Voice, 
Familiar once and more than Musical; 
To one cast forth, whose hope had seem’d to die, 
A Wanderer with a worn-out heart, 
Mid Strangers pining with untended Wounds! 
O Friend! too well thou know’st, of what sad years 
The long Suppression had benumm’d my soul,  
That even as Life returns upon the Drown’d. (PW II.II, p. 1032) 
My line of thought, however, differs markedly from Paley’s suggestive theory. In my 
alternative reading of “To William Wordsworth” Coleridge took the chance to highlight 
The Prelude’s joint authorship; that is, the view that it was largely his own ingenuity to 
intentionally retreat so that he could turn attention to Wordsworth’s poetic genius, 
cultivating it as much as he could. If there was “a door that closes in one direction to open 
in another” at all, it led Coleridge to instil more of his “bold Optimism” (PW I.I, p. 280) 
into Wordsworth when he composed the poem because, as we will see in the following 
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analysis of the poem’s 1807 version, the symbiotic partnership as well as the pride168 of 
“speaking through” the composer of those lines was still there. Although I hold the same 
opinion with Paley (1996) when he argues that Coleridge’s exaltation of The Prelude in 
fact underscored his “own failed ambitions”, I think it would be misleading to relate this 
situation with Coleridge’s “self- abnegatory position” at the time it was originally 
composed (p. 15). Years later, nonetheless, the poem with statements of Coleridge’s 
admiration for Wordsworth’s The Prelude in its 1807 version was revised so that it could 
epitomize his dissociation from a symbiotic partner a decade later in Sibylline Leaves. 
 “To a Gentleman” (1817) differs markedly from the original version, regarding its 
context and the transforming events in the timespan between the two versions. Coleridge’s 
agenda had changed immensely since he wrote the poem in 1807: he had lost his optimism 
and hope in the project after The Excursion169 and now, he was seeking to stop speaking 
through Wordsworth. To both John Morgan and Charles Lamb, Coleridge wrote in 1814 
that he could say “with little appearance of profaneness” that he had been “crucified, dead, 
and buried, descended into Hell” but now, he was “rising again, tho’ slowly and gradually” 
(CL III, p. 489). These words could be compared with his 1807 poem “To William 
Wordsworth” in which Coleridge compared himself with John the Baptist, heralding 
Wordsworth as Christ (Paley, 1996, p. 23).170 It was in 1814, around the time he read The 
                                                 
168 Coleridge wrote “To William Wordsworth” as a response to Prelude in 1807 because, I argue, he found 
Wordsworth’s poem largely promising in terms of reflecting his own metaphysical and philosophical views 
vis-à-vis language and imagination. 
169 It must be noted that the correspondence made to discuss the publication of “To William Wordsworth” 
ended up with another discussion of Coleridge’s “comparative censure” (WL III, p. 238) of The Excursion 
(compared here with The Prelude of 1807). 
170 That way no more ! and ill beseems it me,  
Who came a welcomer in herald's guise,  
Singing of Glory, and Futurity,  
To wander back on such unhealthful road,  
Plucking the poisons of self-harm! and ill  
Such intertwine beseems triumphal wreaths  
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Excursion, that Coleridge was at least acknowledging in the letter above that it was himself 
that assumed the role of Christ all along. In the post-Excursion revisionary activity from 
1814, as a result, a collection of his poetical works would provide him with a secure 
refuge, a familiar old friend for Coleridge as poetry was his oldest passion that would 
potentially guide him throughout his attempt to redefine and have a much better control 
over his oeuvre. The preliminary step to be taken was to bring the intrinsic elements of it 
together and, in an attempt to achieve this, he asked Lady Beaumont in April 1815 for a 
copy of one of his poems which was very crucial for constitution of his oeuvre.171 Lady 
Beaumont, rather than sending the copy to Coleridge, showed the letter to Wordsworth and 
upon this, the latter wrote to Coleridge on 22 May, 1815 to dissuade him from publishing 
the poem addressed to himself: “Let me beg out of kindness to me” he wrote, “that you 
would relinquish the intention of publishing the Poem addressed to me after hearing mine 
to you. The commendation would be injurious to us both, and my work, when it appears, 
would labour under a great disadvantage in consequence of such a precursorship of Praise” 
(WL III, p. 238). Wordsworth’s concern was that because The Prelude was yet to be 
published, the publication of Coleridge’s response to it would be prejudial to their  joint 
project. It would be an announcement of the existence of a “Poem to Coleridge”.172 On the 
other hand, against his former partner’s objection to his plans to publish the poem, 
Coleridge’s reply on May 30th, 1815 utterly bears the traces of his long-term plans to be 
achieved through corrections: “…since I lit on the first rude draught, and corrected it as 
                                                                                                                                                    
Strew'd before thy Advancing! (PW II.II, pp. 1032-1033) 
171 “Should your Ladyship still have among your Papers those Lines of mine to Mr Wordsworth after his 
Recitation of the poem on the Growth of his own spirit [To William Wordsworth], of which you honoured by 
wishing to take a Copy, you would oblige me by inclosing them for me...” (CL IV, p. 564) 
172 In a letter of April 29, 1804, he wrote that “It seems a frightful deal to say about oneself, and of course 
will never be published (during my lifetime I mean) till another work [The Recluse] has been written and 
published, of sufficient importance to justify me in giving my own history to the world.” (WL I, p. 470) 
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well as I could, I wanted no additional reason for it’s not being published in my Life Time, 
than it’s personality respecting myself...” (CL IV, p. 572). Coleridge was long resolved to 
publish the poem, and this correspondence is a firm statement that he was to hold on to his 
own works and nobody, not even Wordsworth, would have a say in this matter. An 
important sign for Coleridge’s detachment in order to build a more healthy dialogue with 
his friend starts here: Despite Wordsworth’s solid objections, Coleridge resolved to publish 
it, though under a different and more generic title, “To a Gentleman: Composed on the 
night after his recitation of a Poem on the Growth of an Individual Mind”. I hold that in the 
revised version, Coleridge emerges as the autonomous version of himself, now in a 
dialogue with Wordsworth, speaking to him as a fellow poet. 
This is largely due to the well-known removal of personal and intimate passages 
from the 1817 version of the poem. To begin with, the change of title from “To William 
Wordsworth” to “To a Gentleman” fairly neutralized the addressee of the poem from the 
beginning: whereas the original poem opened with the line “O Friend! O Teacher! God’s 
great Gift to me!”, it was replaced by a more formal addressing in 1817: “FRIEND of the 
Wise! and Teacher of the Good” (PW II.II, p. 1029)!173 Here, the impassioned tone in the 
poem transitioned into a more emotionally-settled voice. Likewise, in the 1807 version 
“Hope” is summoned “homeward to thy Heart”, whereas in 1817 the “Hope” springs forth 
“from the general Heart of Human kind” (PW II.II, p. 1031). “Hope” is a crucial word in 
this period of Coleridge’s life due to his loss of hope with regards to The Recluse project, 
and in addition to non-personalizing the expression, I think that Coleridge deliberately 
distanced the concept from the poem which was the product of his joint authorship with 
                                                 
173 To present a comparative revisionary activity from the 1807 to 1817 version, I will refer to The Collected 
Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Volume 16: Poetical Works II. Poems (Variorum Text) Part 2 (2001). 
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Wordsworth. It should be noted that as the revisionary activity was carried out, the 
eventual product turned out to be more than Wordsworth could have asked from Coleridge. 
The following passage expressing Coleridge’s profound feelings for Wordsworth and 
mentioning Wordsworth’s “hopes” for Coleridge in the original poem was also completely 
eliminated in the 1817 version: 
Dear shall it be to every human heart 
To me how more than dearest! me, on whom 
Comfort from thee, and utterance of thy love, 
Came with such heights and depths of harmony, 
Such sense of wings uplifting, that the storm 
Scatter’d and whirl’d me, till my thoughts became 
A bodily tumult; and thy faithful hopes, 
Thy hopes of me, dear Friend! by me unfelt! 
Were troublous to me, almost as a voice, 
Familiar once, and more than musical; 
To one cast forth, whose hope had seem'd to die 
A wanderer with a worn-out heart 
Mid strangers pining with untended wounds. 
O Friend, too well thou know’st, of what sad years 
The long suppression had benumb’d my soul, 
That even as life returns upon the drown’d, 
The unusual joy awoke… (PW II.II, p. 1032) 
Considering the overall argument in this study, I interpret this erasure of intimacy and 
poetic proofs of personal “fecundations”174 in the poem as the symbolic watermark of an 
irretrievability of their symbiosis in the aftermath of The Excursion. It is for this reason 
that Coleridge deleted the complete passage where he was talking about his pathological 
dependence on Wordsworth’s approval, so that he could in 1817 demonstrate his 
independent authorship and discrete oeuvre, without needing the endorsement of a 
symbiotic partner.  
Another addition of 1817 is significant for my discussion here since I take this 
change as nostalgic reference to Coleridge’s initial enthusiasm about imaginative power 
                                                 
174 For the term, see: McFarland, 1981, p. 56. 
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and, by extension, investment in language in The Prelude. That is, whereas in the 1807 
version the praise is directed towards Wordsworth’s “building up” of “thy own Spirit” in 
order to express what “thou hast loved to tell” so that something “within the mind” may 
“rise enkindled”, the insertions as well as changes in 1817 tone down the addressee’s 
powerful position. In the revised version, “To a Gentleman”, Coleridge talks about 
building up of “the Human Spirit” because the poet “hast dared to tell” such “Thoughts” in 
the mind that are quickened by “vital Breathings, like the secret soul / Of vernal growth” 
(PW II.II, pp. 1029-30). Here, the addressee of Coleridge’s poem activates the divine 
“Breathings” in his verses, that is, the imagination, so that the thoughts that may seem 
inexpressible through linguistic signs do get verbalised thanks to the courageous persona 
of the poet. Considering the fact that these changes were carried out after Coleridge read 
The Excursion, we can hold that they refer to Wordsworth’s loss of faith in the linguistic 
mediums to express the thoughts “within the mind”. Therefore, I assert, Coleridge’s 
subsequent two-line addition aimed to draw Wordsworth’s attention to vital function of the 
re-creative, secondary imagination: because Coleridge firmly believed that the generative 
power of imagination in human beings has its origins in the divine imagination in its 
fullness, in “To a Gentleman” he reminded his partner of the “Power” which is reflected 
“Now in thy inner life and now abroad, / When [it] streamed from thee, and thy soul 
received / The light reflected as a light bestowed” (PW II.II, p. 1030). However, prior to 
his revisionary activity in Sibylline Leaves, Coleridge had come to the realisation that 
Wordsworth’s line of thinking about poetry and poetic language had undergone an 
immense change, and the former’s expectations of a joint project had gone 
unconsummated, hence he almost admonishingly brought up “The Guides and the 
Companions of thy way” (PW II.II, p. 1030 – emphasis added)! I take this as a reference to 
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the similarities between Wordsworth’s more materialistic and less spiritual handling of the 
“imagination” material and the Kantian reluctance to attribute transcendent characteristics 
to it. 
Considering the revisionary activity in Sibylline Leaves, it becomes obvious that 
the most well-known and distinctive change was carried out on “The Rime of the Ancient 
Mariner”. Originally drafted between November 1797 and March 1798175, the poem has 
massively drawn the attention of critics ever since it was first published. As one of its early 
critics once noted, the poem was “a rhapsody of unintelligible wildness and incoherence… 
[with] poetical touches of an exquisite kind” (The Monthly Review 29, June 1799, p. 
204)176, and Coleridge’s poetic career owed immensely to it. “Coleridge’s claim to be a 
great poet”, Mays (2002) confirms, “lies in the continued pursuit of the consequences of 
‘The Ancient Mariner’, ‘Christabel’ and ‘Kubla Khan’ on several levels” (p. 91). In this 
part of this study, therefore, the revisions on the poem’s original 1798 (as first published in 
the Lyrical Ballads) and the Sibylline Leaves (1817) versions will be examined to provide 
a comparison between the preliminary versions as products of Coleridge “speaking 
through” Wordsworth and Sibylline Leaves version as the part of Coleridge’s reconstitution 
of discrete oeuvre. More specifically, through this case study of “The Rime” I aim to 
demonstrate how, contrary to the 1798 version which was the product of his symbiosis 
                                                 
175 Tee (2009) states that “According to Coleridge’s footnote to ‘The Rime of the Ancient Mariner’, it ‘was 
on a delightful walk from Nether Stowey to Dulverton’ with William and Dorothy Wordsworth ‘in the 
Autumn of 1797, that this Poem was planned, and in part composed’. It is, however, a context that is 
provided two decades later – the first appearance of the footnote being in the 1817 version. Though it is not 
until his letter to Joseph Cottle of 28 May 1798 that an explicit reference to ‘the ancient Mariner’ is made 
(CL, I, p. 412), as early as 20 November 1797, Dorothy had recorded ‘William and Coleridge employing 
themselves in laying the plan of a ballad; to be published with some pieces of Williams’ (WL, I, p. 194). 
While he did announce the completion of ‘a ballad’ shortly after Dorothy’s correspondence, at ‘about 300 
lines’ (CL, I, p. 357) the work is clearly different from the 658-line version that was first published in 1798.” 
(Coleridge, Revision and Romanticism, p. 42)  
176 Attrib. Charles Burney, Monthly Review, XXIX (1799) pp. 202-10.  
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with Wordsworth and division of labours between the two, the 1817 version became an 
emblem of Coleridge’s solo ordeal with imagination, his philosophical oscillations 
between Reason, Understanding and Sense, and the way the revised text of 1817 embodied 
Coleridge’s desynonymization from Wordsworth in the aftermath of The Excursion. More 
specifically, I suggest, just as in the Biographia, the revisionary activity in Sibylline Leaves 
was partially carried out as a reaction to Wordsworth’s The Excursion, and in some poems 
such as “The Rime” this need to respond to his former partner can be fully traced.      
When the first edition of the Lyrical Ballads appeared in 1798, “The Rime of the 
Ancyent Marinere” (as it was originally titled) took up one-fourth of the volume as the 
opening piece, and it received mixed but mostly negative reactions from readers due to its 
obscurity and style (Stillinger, pp. 61-62). Surely, the “Advertisement” to the Lyrical 
Ballads written by Wordsworth must have contributed to this unfavourable reception of 
“The Rime”, since the poems in the collection were presented as “experiments…written 
chiefly with a view to ascertain how far the language of conversation in the middle and 
lower classes of society is adapted to the purposes of poetic pleasure” (LB, p. 47). On the 
other hand, as Coleridge made clear in the Biographia, Wordsworth and himself had 
initially committed to a division of labours in the 1798 collection: Wordsworth was meant 
to “give the charm of novelty” to everyday objects whereas Coleridge was to engage his 
poems with “persons and characters supernatural” (BL II, pp. 6-7). In this respect, the 
whole collection – as Coleridge retrospectively claims in the Biographia – was to reflect 
their collaboration to arouse the power of imagination in the reader by dealing with 
different material but serving a common end.177 However, “The Rime of the Ancyent 
                                                 
177 Retrospectively in a Table Talk of May 1830, Coleridge described “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner” as 
a poem of “pure imagination”. (TT I, p. 149) 
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Marinere”, with its peculiar, archaic diction and animal-magnetic narrator was received as 
an eccentric piece in the whole collection. In a letter to Cottle on the 24th June 1799, 
Wordsworth hence wrote that the poem became “an injury to the volume” due to “the old 
words and the strangeness of it”, which eventually “deterred readers from going on”, and 
Wordsworth was even then planning to replace the poem with “some little things which 
would be more likely to suit the common taste” if the collection “should come to a second 
edition” (WL II, pp. 226–227). Obviously, whereas Coleridge said little about the poem 
and did little to resist the view that it did not make much sense, Wordsworth was anxious 
about the troubled reception of it.  
As clarified in the Biographia, “The Rime” initially was a product of an agreement 
between Coleridge and Wordsworth: whereas the former was to transfer “from our inward 
nature a human interest and a semblance of truth sufficient to procure for these shadows of 
imagination that willing suspension of disbelief for the moment, which constitutes poetic 
faith”, the latter’s poems would “give the charm of novelty to things of every day, and to 
excite a feeling analogous to the supernatural, by awakening the mind’s attention to the 
lethargy of custom, and directing it to the loveliness and the wonders of the world before 
us” (BL II, p. 6). “The Rime” of 1798 hence was an optimistic attempt on Coleridge’s part 
to bring about a collection, which was meant to emerge as the body consisting of 
seemingly incongruous components by two poets inversely complementing one another. 
At this point, I would like to join the scholarly conversation about the impact of the 
eighteenth-century Biblical criticism on Coleridge’s understanding of poetry and the way 
we interpret poems, as well as the initial writing process of “The Rime”. This line of 
Biblical criticism was based on historical and rational understanding of the Bible to prove 
that the Scriptures were originally constituted by drawing on ancient texts. As Elizabeth A. 
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Rubasky (2001) demonstrates, “One of their methods was tracing the sources of the 
Scriptures, from most primitive to more contemporary…determining the ‘origin, character, 
and relative age’ of the Scriptures, and the higher critics specifically used historical 
methods of textual comparison and philological inquiry to discover these origins” (p. 20). 
Anthony Harding (1985) also explains that “Romantic so-called primitivism… led many 
poets to imitate the spareness and emotional intensity they found in Biblical poetry. For 
such poets, the fact that the Bible was traditionally treated as a canon was arguably less 
important than the discovery that it was nevertheless open not only to imitation but 
reinterpretation… (p. 6). Coleridge was immensely informed by these ideas while 
formulating his own views about the nature of poetry in the 1798 version of “The 
Rime”,178 therefore, the primitive atmosphere and archaic language in the poem is 
interpreted as a demonstration of Coleridge’s investment in the eighteenth-century 
criticism.179  
According to Jerome McGann (1985), therefore, Coleridge’s affirmation “that the 
Bible is indeed the Word of God, but that its Word is uttered by God’s mortal creatures”  
led him to arrive at the conviction that “God’s eternal Word is expressed and later re-
expressed through commentary, gloss, and interpretation by particular people at different 
times according to their differing lights” (p. 145). As a corollary of this, Coleridge could as 
well compose poetry resembling the primitive but evocative narrative of Scriptures, 
recounted simply through the visual perception and eye-witnessing of the Mariner 
                                                 
178 See: Rubasky (2004), pp. 19-20. 
179 As Rubasky (2004) puts it, “In the 1798 version of the ‘Rime,’ Coleridge’s ideas about the primitive 
mind, as reflected in the Mariner’s simple descriptions of his journey, are clearly informed by his 
understanding of Biblical critics such as Lowth and Wakefield, who, in the tradition of early eighteenth-
century criticism, emphasized the spare and pure character of primitive language.” Therefore, “It is not 
surprising that Coleridge, like many other late eighteenth-century writers, became interested in the idea of the 
simple and expressive poet of Scripture…” (pp. 20-21, 22) 
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(Rubasky, 2004, p. 22). Considering these perspectives, I hereby aim to present an 
ampliative argument by approaching the simple and primitive content of “The Rime” of 
1798 in terms of imagination, and later comparing the earlier poem with its 1817 version 
with its historically-informed marginal gloss. 
Prior to responding to Kant’s transcendental “productive” imagination that was 
subject to the check-and-balance system of constitutive Understanding and regulative 
Reason (that is, by the time he wrote The Friend of 1809), Coleridge’s conception of 
imagination was not as transcendent and elaborate as he described in the Biographia. 
When we consider his references to imagination in the earlier years of his career,180 it is 
obvious that he had its basic and more straightforward functions in mind; namely, fancy 
and primary imagination which, as has been demonstrated in the first chapter of this thesis, 
correspond to sense and understanding respectively. By extension, while writing the 
primitive, Lyrical Ballads version of “The Rime”, Coleridge’s theory of imagination was 
relatively pristine as well. In this respect, Rubasky (2004) and McGann’s (1985) 
                                                 
180 For instance, in a letter of 25 March 1801, we can see that Coleridge’s imagination was closely associated 
with fancy: “The Poet is dead in me - my imagination…lies, like a Cold Snuff on the circular Rim of a Brass 
Candle-stick…I was once a Volume of Gold Leaf, rising & riding on every breath of Fancy …” (CL II, pp. 
713-14). In another letter of July 1802, he valued the kind of imagination that enables us “to send ourselves 
out of ourselves, to think ourselves in to the Thoughts and Feelings of Beings in circumstances wholly & 
strangely different from our own/ hoc labor, hoc opus/” (CL II, p. 809), a description which can be closely 
associated with his later formulation of Primary Imagination. He surely held metaphysics an inalienable part 
of poetry, as he wrote in a letter to William Sotheby in July 1802: “Metaphisics (sic) is a word, that you, my 
dear Sir! are no great Friend to/ but yet you will agree, that a great Poet must be…a profound Metaphysician” 
(CL II, pp. 809-10). Nonetheless, a proper theory of imagination that equipped one with divine power to not 
only think ourselves outside the phenomena but also to “diffuse” or “dissipate” in order to “re -create” (BL I, 
p. 304) was yet to systematised. During his Mediterranean years (1804-1806) that he began to formulate 
imagination as “the modifying Power in that highest sense of the word” distinct from fancy (CL II, p. 1034), 
and a year later, in September 1807, he wrote in a notebook entry the following “Imagination the Laboratory, 
in which Thought elaborates Essence into Existence.  A Psilosopher, i.e . a nominal Ph[ilosopher] without 
Imagination, is a Coiner-Vanity, the Froth of the molten Mass, is his Stuff and Verbiage the Stamp & 
Impression. This is but a deaf Metaphor-better say , that he is guilty of Forgery-he presents the same [sort of] 
Paper as the honest Barterer, but when you carry it to the Bank, it is found to be drawn on-Outis, Esq. His 
words had deposited no Forms there, payable at Sight-or even at any imaginable Time from the Date of the 
Draft” (CN II, §315). In these letters and notes, we can see imagination as a concept evolving across the 
years, from the one similar to the associative fancy to a divine, transcendent power in a poet and philosopher.  
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arguments of primitive, bodily and untrained narrative in the 1798 version should be 
complemented with careful consideration of Coleridge’s almost-embryonic adoption of 
imagination as well.      
In the second edition of the Lyrical Ballads (1800), “The Rime” was altered in a 
way that addressed Wordsworth’s concerns about the poem, including its archaic style. It 
was hence considerably curtailed in the 1800 edition of the Lyrical Ballads,181 published 
with a new title (“The Ancient Mariner: A Poet’s Reverie”) as a response to unfavourable 
critical reviews182 directed towards the author of the opening piece and of the Lyrical 
Ballads. Nevertheless, in addition to the modernized archaic vocabulary and change of 
title, the poem’s position in the volume was changed, and the second edition of the Lyrical 
Ballads was published with a “Preface” and Wordsworth’s name as the author.183 Although 
in the “Preface” Wordsworth gave a vague credit to Coleridge for writing some of the 
poems in the volume,184 for any reader skipping this part, Wordsworth became the sole 
                                                 
181 This revision dismayed readers such as Charles Lamb, who thought that the changes worked to tame the 
pristine sublimity of the poem. Lamb wrote: “I am sorry that Coleridge has christened his Ancient Marinere, 
a Poet’s Reverie; it is as bad as Bottom the Weaver’s declaration that he is not a lion, but only the scenical 
representation of a lion. What new idea is 
gained by this title but one subversive of all credit— which the tale should force upon us—of its truth.” The 
Letters of Charles Lamb, ed. E. V. Lucas, London, 1935,i.240. 
182 For instance, see: The Analytical Review xxviii (December 1798);The Monthly Review. Also see: The 
British Critic (October 1799) (1793). [London]: [Printed for F. and C. Rivington]. p. 365. 
183 “When the poem was first published, as the opening piece in the anonymous Lyrical Ballads of 1798, 
there was no identifiable author in sight. Or rather, the author of The Ancient Mariner was the author of all 
the poems in the volume—not only The Ancient Mariner but Goody Blake and Harry Gill, Simon Lee, We 
Are Seven, The Thorn, and eighteen other pieces, including some eloquent blank-verse lines about revisiting, 
or at least getting within a few miles of, Tintern Abbey—and he (if one assumed, from the name "William" 
in Expostulation and Reply, that the author was male) was a person on a mission to reform the language of 
poetry: "the following poems," he announces in the prefatory Advertisement, "are to be considered as 
experiments . . . to ascertain how far the language of conversation in the middle and lower classes of society 
is adapted to the purposes of poetic pleasure.”(Stillinger, 1994, p. 61, 68) 
184 “For the sake of variety and from a consciousness of my own weakness I was induced to request the 
assistance of a Friend, who furnished me with the Poems of the ANCIENT MARINER, the FOSTER-
MOTHER’S TALE, the NIGHTINGALE, the DUNGEON, and the Poem entitled LOVE. I should not, 
however, have requested this assistance, had I not believed that the poems of my Friend would in a great 
measure have the same tendency as my own, and that, though there would be found a difference, there would 
be found no discordance in the colours of our style; as our opinions on the subject of poetry do almost 
entirely coincide.” (2010, p. 57) 
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author of the book. Compared to the first version of the poem, the revised and modernised 
text, “The Ancient Mariner”, itself partially lost its pristine quality,185 and transitioned into 
a relatively more settled narrative and became more of a lyrical ballad.186 Therefore, we 
can hold that the 1800 version, with its overtly moralising narrative,187 failed to yield 
further interpretive and imaginative possibilities due to, as we will see shortly, the lack of a 
tension between the matter-of-factness of the 1798 version and the rationalisation of the 
marginal notes in 1817. 
Whereas “The Rime” was originally a profoundly symbiotic poem, for Coleridge in 
1817, acknowledgement of his exchanges with Wordsworth was also part of his transition 
from “speaking through” his partner to “speaking to” a friend. Therefore, his 1817 footnote 
to line 227 (Part Four) of the poem must be noted in this regard. After the lines,   
I fear thee, ancient Mariner! 
I fear thy skinny hand! 
And thou art long, and lank, and brown, 
As is the ribbed sea-sand. (224-27) 
when, as Stillinger says, “the disbelief-suspending reader as well as the Wedding-Guest 
might well worry about the Mariner’s substantiality”, Coleridge’s insertion of this “chatty 
                                                 
185 Stillinger (1994) states that the 1798 version of the poem was “a relatively simple tale of crime and 
punishment” in which “the Mariner wantonly kills an albatross and suffers terrible consequences for his act”, 
and the narrative “seems jerky, disconnected, and pointedly old-fashioned (the Mariner speaks in archaic 
spelling, as it were).” (p. 69) 
186 McGann (1985) presents an overview of the process at the end of which Coleridge’s initial poem changed 
from a “literary ballad” to a “lyrical ballad”: “This 1798 version tries to adhere so closely to the conventions 
of ancient balladry, which Coleridge adapted from Thomas Percy, that the work sometimes approaches 
pastiche. This quality in the early ‘Rime’—its status as an imitation or literary ballad—sets it quite apart 
from all the other ballad-influenced poems written for Lyrical Ballads. The others are not literary ballads but 
lyrical ballads, a very different thing altogether. When a second edition of Lyrical Ballads was called for in 
1800, Wordsworth, as we have seen, urged Coleridge to make some alterations. His views carried the day, 
and the result was a conscious attempt, acutely registered by Lamb, to make the ‘Rime’ appear less a literary 
ballad and more a lyrical ballad” (p. 141). Stillinger (1994) also states that “The new title in 1800, ‘The 
Ancient Mariner, A Poet’s Reverie,’ calls attention, first on a separate half-title and again at the beginning of 
the poem, to the fact that, reverie or not, this is a work of artistic composition, by a poet, and not just (as it 
could have seemed in 1798) the recorded loose talk of a wild-eyed old seafarer.” (p. 69)  
187 Whereas in the first version “the sole authority for the events and the moral is the Mariner himself, and it 
is a manifestly powerful authority”, the revised version of 1800 “emphasizes the moral elements of the tale.” 
(Stillinger, 1994, 69, 63) 
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footnote” (Stillinger, p. 71) is quite awkward but serves his purpose of enabling dialogue 
with Wordsworth: “For the two last lines of this stanza, I am indebted to Mr. 
WORDSWORTH. It was on a delightful walk from Nether Stowey to Dulverton, with him 
and his sister, in the Autumn of 1797, that this Poem was planned, and in part composed” 
(PW I.I, p. 391). Considering “The Rime” had recently reverted back to its author,188 it can 
be held that in the 1817 version, Coleridge’s revisionary reaction was at work to 
reciprocate almost all the moves by Wordsworth during their symbiotic collaboration. 
Coleridge’s revisionary activity in the 1817 version of the poem was a solid enunciation of 
reclaiming a crucial part of his oeuvre, and transforming it from a joint composition to an 
independently transformed work. In Sibylline Leaves, “The Rime” is therefore the tangible 
manifestation of Coleridge’s dialogue with Wordsworth: it is dialogic when Coleridge 
resituated the poem to its opening position, it is dialogic when Coleridge “Prefaced” his 
poetic collection with an autobiographical account in which he provided criticism on 
Wordsworth’s works, it is dialogic when Coleridge published it under his own name, and it 
is dialogic when Coleridge gave way to a more vivid, divine conception of imagination 
through the notes in the margin. For Coleridge the role of notes in the margin of “The 
Rime”, I maintain, was to equip him with the means to create a tension in the poem and 
present it as a showcase for Unity in Multeity he had sought to achieve in the Lyrical 
Ballads. He was therefore on the verge of fulfilling, thanks to the gloss, the task of not 
only giving new means of attraction to mundane phenomena (defamiliarization), but also 
dealing with those supernatural themes resembling the truth in our “inward nature” (BL II, 
                                                 
188 “The opening poem following the preliminaries, just as in the original Lyrical Ballads, is The Ancient 
Mariner, but here it appears (for the first time publicly) under Coleridge’s name as author, and in a 
considerably worked-over text with, among other novelties, the addition of the Latin epigraph and the 
marginal glosses.” (Stillinger 20) 
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pp. 6). Coleridge’s revisionary insertion of marginal notes in 1817, among others, did not 
fail to serve this purpose.   
Coleridge formulated his revisionary reaction to Wordsworth by bringing back 
some of the archaic diction he had used in the first edition of Lyrical Ballads, 
“strengthen[ing] the original archaic aspect of the work” (McGann, 1985, p. 142) and 
enhancing the “gothic atmospehere” (Tee, 2009, p. 79) – in a way unfolding his 
desynonymization from Wordsworth and their joint projects.189 To this end, I argue that 
Coleridge in 1817 advanced towards realising on his own the division of labours he had 
envisaged in 1798 for Wordworth and himself for joint project of the Lyrical Ballads. That 
is, in the revised version of the poem, Coleridge’s alterations went so far that he not only 
re-emphasized the “supernatural” themes to remind the reader of the familiar, but also 
adopted Wordsworth’s task of “defamiliarization” in “The Rime”. Consider the split 
between the main text and the marginal note in the following:  
Till a great seabird,    At length did cross an Albatross 
called the Albatross,    Through the fog it came; 
came through the snow-fog,   As if it had been a Christian soul,  
and was received with great   We hailed it in God’s name.  
joy and hospitality.    (PW I.I, p. 377) 
Here, whereas the poem itself is focused on the supernatural features of the bird through 
the familiar religious allusions to the reader with words such as “cross”, “God” and 
“Christian”, the gloss treats the Albatross just as a “seabird” we are mundanely familiar 
with and mentions how it was hailed by the ship crew as a sign of good omen190 – 
defamiliarizing for the reader the bird as it is. After the Mariner kills the bird, the poem 
                                                 
189 Tee explains that “The new nine-line stanza on the fall of night after the departure of the ‘spectre-bark’ is 
a case in point. In 1800, Coleridge had changed his depiction of the sun from being like ‘God’s own head’ to 
‘an Angel’s head’ because the British Critic had been offended by the impiety of the expression. In 1817…he 
restored the phrase.” (2009, p. 79) 




attributes a supernatural quality to the Albatross and says “I had killed the bird / That made 
the breeze to blow” (PW I.I, p. 379), whereas the gloss is more cautious about such 
metaphysical implications and uses more daily language: it is just “the bird of good luck” – 
the bird we are ordinarily familiar with, but a bird that is placed out of its usual context. 
The revised version, I therefore maintain, not only works to activate the reader’s 
“suspension of disbelief” through its supernatural atmosphere, bringing the reader down to 
earth by associating the uncanny with the familiar; but it also defamiliarizes and disrupts 
the stability of association between objects of mundane experience. 
The function of the marginal gloss has been heavily scrutinized in the literature: 
some scholars argue that the gloss acts as the complementary other (or an intimate friend) 
throughout the poem, some suggest that the gloss intervenes since the narrator has 
forgotten to provide details of the story, and there are others arguing that the narrator 
misremembers a fact and the gloss acts as the witness that corrects it.191 In order to 
demonstrate the larger argument in this study, I would like to engage with Coleridge’s 
hermeneutical project described in Jerome McGann (1985) and later expanded by 
Elizabeth Rubasky (2004). 
McGann (1985) states that just as all texts including Scriptures progressed and 
evolved from their primitive states to a more modern versions by means of interpretation, 
the 1817 version of “The Rime” would lend itself to generation of new meanings and 
                                                 
191 To list only the major contributions: Huntington Brown (1945), “The Gloss to The Rime of the Ancient 
Mariner,” Modern Language Quarterly 6. pp. 319-24. Sarah Dyck (1973), “Perspective in ‘The Rime of the 
Ancient Mariner,’” Studies in English Literature 13. pp. 591-604. Lawrence Lipking (1977), “The Marginal 
Gloss,” Critical Inquiry 3. pp. 609-55. Frances Ferguson (1977), “Coleridge and the Deluded Reader: 'The 
Rime of the Ancient Mariner,'” Georgia Review 31. pp. 617-35. David Simpson (1979), Irony and Authority 
in Romantic Poetry (London: Macmillan). pp. 98-101. Anne K. Mellor (1980), English Romantic Irony 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press). pp. 143-48. Kathleen M. Wheeler (1981), Creative Mind in 
Coleridge’s Poetry, pp. 42-64. Wendy Wall (1987), “Interpreting Poetic Shadows: The Gloss of ‘The Rime 
of the Ancient Mariner,’” Criticism 29. pp. 179-95.  
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readings thanks to an external editor – no one other than Coleridge himself (pp. 139-144). 
Whereas Coleridge in 1798 was affected by the eighteenth century Biblical criticism and 
hence produced a primitive text resembling the Bible with its supernatural story, simple 
narration and non-interpreting characters, with the gloss in 1817 he acted not only as the 
writer of a Biblical narrative, but also as a critic adopting historical method of the Higher 
Criticm192 by means of inserting a rationalising and interpreting voice to the poem 
(McGann, 1985, p. 146; Rubasky, 2004, p. 19).193 Coleridge accordingly ensured in 1817 
that the gloss played a crucial role in this interpretative process: “The special significance 
of the gloss,” states McGann, “lies in its (imagined) historical relation to the ancient ballad 
which Coleridge has represented through his poem” (p. 153). The glosser in this way 
attempts to rationalise and historicise the events the Mariner undergoes (Rubasky, 2004, p. 
26). Consequently, I hold that there arose a tension between the Mariner’s tale constituted 
by an incomplex and lucid observation of his surrounding, a familiarising narrative and 
simple but effective “shadows” of Primary Imagination on the one hand, and the rational-
interpretive comments of the glosser on the other. In the 1817 revised text, Coleridge not 
only enriched the way the text proper was read through the hermeneutical method, he also 
called secondary imagination as described in the Biographia into action by means of the 
the tension created by the remarks of a fictional glosser. In other words, in 1817 the 
hermeneutical project Coleridge adopted by means of inserting the marginal gloss in the 
poem transformed not only the way “The Rime” has been received and interpreted by 
readers, but simultaneously his acclaimed formulation of imagination. A comparative 
                                                 
192 The Higher Critics required that literary works must be interpreted again and again, “based not only on the 
text proper, but also on established commentary, and new discoveries” (Rubasky, 2004, p. 27). 
193 Rubasky (2004) also points to the way Coleridge’s notes were by extension proved to be useful for those 
interpreting any type of text: “…the glosser is more than just a later historical foil to the uneducated Mariner; 
his methods help Coleridge to illustrate, and to comment on the type of person attempting to elucidate 
authentic medieval texts, and by extension any person interpreting a text.” (p. 25) 
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analysis of the main text of “The Rime” and the marginal gloss will play the vital role to 
illustrate my point more profoundly. 
My own reading of the gloss in the context of this study is immensely inspired by 
McGann (1985), who clarifies that whereas in its original form “a special theory of the 
historical interpretation of texts” was not clear, it was “when the glosses are added” that 
Coleridge was able to fully “extrapolate” and “[make] explicit his religious theory of 
interpretation which has its roots in the Higher Critical tradition” (p. 142). Accordingly, 
since the Scriptures are not fixed words of God but ever-changing, evolving historical 
records thanks to interpretation of pristine versions of texts, every text including the 
Scriptures should be approached, as McGann puts it, “with a double understanding” (p. 
150) due to the symbolical connotations language inherently brings about.194 The fictive 
voice in the marginal notes was intentionally inserted by Coleridge as the voice of a 
biblical critic, so that “the work developed under the dominion of Coleridge’s own 
hermeneutic models”, which has continued to underwrite “our dominant interpretive 
tradition” about the poem (McGann, 1985, p. 139). As Stillinger (1994) asserts, the 
marginal notes of 1817 as part of Coleridge’s revisionary journey helped new 
interpretations proliferate and stable meaning become increasingly unattainable – 
contributing to textual “instability” (pp. 72-73). Instability is the keyword that guides me 
here because I think that it was through this unstable nature of his new text with a fictional 
editor that Coleridge managed to create a “multi-layered narrative (or set of narratives) 
                                                 
194 “In the Confessions, for example, Coleridge argues at length that the Scriptures are not an unmediated and 
fixed biblical text but an evolved and continuously evolving set of records which include the Church’s later 
glosses on and interpretations of the earlier documents. The entire project of textual transmission and 
elucidation is a symbolic, revelatory act: ‘all the intermediate applications and realizations of the words are 
but types and repetitions—translations, as it were, from the language of letters and articulate sounds into the 
language of events and symbolical persons’ (AC, p. 303). As a result, Coleridge goes on to argue that every 
person should approach the Scriptures with a double understanding. (McGann, 1985, p. 150) 
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saturated with historical, social, moral, and theological significance, involving themes 
like… the creative imagination, for which it sets out a developed theory” (p. 60). Taken 
from this perspective, the fictive editor becomes a highly crucial figure in Coleridge’s 
hermeneutic model due to its role, I hold, as the reader catalysing the Coleridgean 
conception of Secondary Imagination in the intended audience of the poem. 
The main text of the 1817 “The Rime” invites primary imagination, which is “the 
living Power and prime Agent of all human Perception” (BL I, p. 304). Consider the 
following lines:  
  The ice was here, the ice was there, 
The ice was all around: 
It cracked and growled, and roared and howled,  
Like noises in a swound! (PW I.I, p. 377) 
The lines are unshakably observational on the part of the Mariner; hence combined with 
the primitive text, sublime atmosphere and bardic narrative style of the poem they emerge 
as “repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM”. On the 
other hand, combined with the gloss, the text as a whole spurs the generative, secondary 
imagination by inviting the reader’s interpretation and filling of in the gaps. Rubasky 
(2004) notes that “the glosser is not Coleridge’s ideal interpreter, because he often imposes 
meaning on the text not explicitly stated in the Mariner’s verse. It is this gap between his 
evaluations and the Mariner’s own narrative that compels the reader to take an active part 
in interpreting Coleridge’s poem” (p. 25). Indeed, the presence of two distinct, sometimes 
contesting and sometimes complementary voices at once “dissolve”, “diffuse” and 
“dissipate” the narrative in its totality, activating readerly interpretation and re-creating the 
terms through which we can make sense of recalcitrant elements in the revised text of 
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1817. Consider the effect of the glosser’s judgemental tone on the main text, and on the 
readerly perception of the story:  
The ancient   “God save thee, ancient Mariner! 
Mariner inhos-   From the fiends, that plague thee thus! –  
pitably killeth    Why look’st thou so?” – With my cross-bow 
the pious bird of   I shot the Albatross. (PW I.I, p. 377) 
good omen.  
Coleridge is demonstrating in the 1817 version of the poem that “every person should 
approach the Scriptures” as well as literary works “with a double understanding” 
(McGann, 1985, p. 150). In other words, the activation of secondary imagination is 
expected through the reader’s participation.This is possible through an awareness on the 
part of the readers that they themselves are, just like textually-transmitted materials and 
their writers, bound by their own delimited concepts and contexts. According to McGann, 
therefore, readers are not only supposed to see the “primitive texts, interpolations, 
commentaries” and “report historically mediated materials”, but they are also required to 
recognise their own “time-specific cultural limitations” (p. 150). The reader steps in 
between the contesting voices of the Mariner in the main text and the glosser, thereby 











CHAPTER FIVE – REVISING A PRE-EXCURSION PERIODICAL: THE FRIEND 
AS “RIFACCIAMENTO” IN 1818 
What is [Coleridge’s] Friend itself but an enormous title-page; the longest 
and most tiresome prospectus that ever was written; and endless preface 
to an imaginary work…One number consists of a grave-faced promise to 
perform something impossible in the next; and the next is taken up with a 
long-faced apology for not having done it. Through the whole of this 
work, Mr. Coleridge appears…the Prince of preparatory authors!  
William Hazlitt, 08 September, 1816. (Political Essays, p. 120) 
The last chapter of this study is devoted to an investigation of Coleridge’s second attempt 
(after the short-lived The Watchman of 1796) at issuing a weekly paper in 1809-10, The 
Friend, and the revisions of it that he published in 1812 and especially in 1818.195 The 
examination of these two versions and their contexts will be presented in a way to 
demonstrate the impact, resulting from the collapse of Coleridge and Wordsworth’s joint 
project, The Recluse, had on Coleridge’s constitution of a discrete oeuvre through the 
revised version of The Friend in 1818.    
 
A Brief Background to the The Friend of 1809-10, 1812 and the rifacciamento of 1818 
The Friend was first mentioned in Coleridge’s notebooks and letters among the planned 
works as early as 1803-1804.196 In a letter of 1804, several months before Coleridge sailed 
for Malta, he planned the title for his work as “Consolations and Comforts from the 
exercise and right application of the Reason, the Imagination, and the Moral Feelings” (CL 
II, p. 1036). When Coleridge finally returned from his Mediterranean interlude (1804-
1806), now relatively older and with health much worse than the time he left the country, 
                                                 
195 Coleridge saw through three editions of The Friend: 1809-10, 1812 and 1818 versions. The Bollingen 
edition of The Friend consists of two parts: Part I is based on the 1818 text, and Part II is an appendix 
covering the 1809-10 periodical version of The Friend, with the assembled version of 1812 provided in the 
footnotes.    




he had surely changed not only in terms of his expectations from others, but also from 
himself. Combined with an emotional turmoil worsened due to his marriage as well as his 
love for Sara Hutchinson, unemployment, and addiction Coleridge now “floundered”, as 
Kathleen Coburn (1973) states, amidst the “extreme ups and downs” of his life; he was 
also “criticized by the Wordsworths and Mrs Clarkson”, “upbraided by Southey”, 
quarrelled with Poole and Josiah Wedgwood, and differed from “his West Country 
Unitarian friends and also his Calvinistic ones” (CN III, pp. xix-xx). I would like to remind 
that it was after such a period that Coleridge heard The Prelude (1807), which brought 
about a powerful revival of his expectations of the joint project with Wordsworth. 
Barbara E.Rooke (1969) informs that the “notebook jottings for the ‘Comforts and 
Consolations’ run into 1807” (TF I, p. xxxvi). It was not until 21 May 1808 that Coleridge 
mentioned in a letter to Wordsworth the idea of producing a periodical (CL III, p. 112). In 
another letter of circa 7 November 1808, referring to the prospectus of his weekly 
periodical, Coleridge put his desire to bring together his ideas, philosophical reflections, 
literary opinions as follows:  
…I shall myself play off my whole Head & Heart, such as they are, in this 
work, as from the main pipe of the Fountain. Indeed, it is high Time. 
Hitherto, I have layed my Eggs with Ostrich Carelessness and Ostrich 
Oblivion – the greater part indeed have been crush[ed under] foot; but some 
have crawled into light to furnish Feath[ers] for other men’s Caps, and not a 
few to plume the shaf[ts] in the Quivers of my Calumniators. (CL III, p. 
126) 
The quotation lays bare the ebbs and flows in the face of professional capacity and 
“constitutional indolence” Coleridge was experiencing in the process: he obviously felt he 
was unwittingly donating ideas to others, and now it was high time he produced for 
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himself. He had so far almost recklessly laid his eggs197 but now, in his mid-thirties, 
Coleridge decided that his weekly periodical, The Friend, would be “the main Pipe” 
through which he would convey “the whole reservoir” of his “collected Knowledge” and 
of “Genius” (CL III, p. 131). Towards the end of 1808 Coleridge settled in Allan Bank, and 
spent most of his time sending prospectuses and planning the launch of his periodical. 
However, Wordsworth’s initial reaction to Coleridge’s project was sheer 
hopelessness, as we can see in a letter addressed to Thomas Poole in May-June 1809 “…he 
neither will nor can execute anything of important benefit either to himself, his family or 
mankind…” (WL II, p. 322). In another letter of May 25, 1809, just before the periodical 
came out, Wordsworth wrote that Coleridge neither had the tenacity nor the patience to 
execute anything that necessitated regular focus on one project. He therefore wrote in a 
letter of June 1809 that the project should “never commence”, and if perchance begun, “the 
sooner it stops, also the better - the less will be the loss, and not greater the disgrace”, as he 
had the firmly-established a rather pessimistic view of Coleridge (WL II, p. 322). Even the 
arrival of the periodical’s first issue in June 1809 and concretization of Coleridge’s efforts 
were therefore not enough: Wordsworth at first said in June 1809 that he was sorry because 
he did not have “the least hope that it can proceed” (WL II, p. 323).198 Against all odds, 
however, The Friend of 1809-10 would indeed eventually become an invaluable medium 
for Coleridge to rehearse his own idiosyncratic adoption, definition and interpretation of 
                                                 
197 “Until 1808, he told his friends, he had laid his eggs with ostrich carelessness and ostrich oblivion, to be 
crushed underfoot or, if they crawled forth into life, to feather the caps of others. Now, however, at the age of 
thirty-six, he intended to be more careful; he would lay a main pipe through which to play off the whole 
reservoir of his collected knowledge and genius. He was not exaggerating, for that main pipe, The Friend, 
was an outlet for many of the ideas that had appeared in his former lectures and writings, and from its pages 
would come ideas for his later works. The Friend remained of prime importance for him after its original 
publication…Letters, annotated copies, and manuscript fragments show that his interest in both its content 
and style continued almost to the end of his life.” (Rooke, p. xxxv) 
198 Although he later slightly changed his opinion by writing hopefully of the project (See: His letter of 15 
June to Stuart) 
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such key concepts in his philosophical journey as the Truth, mind, Sense, Reason, 
Understanding, imagination, free will, politics and morality, and organic unity.  
The first number of the periodical finally appeared in 1 June, 1809 to be sustained 
over a period of ten months, during which Coleridge produced twenty-eight weekly issues 
in total, including a free supernumerary issue. He was working productively with Sara 
Hutchinson, who from the beginning acted as his amanuensis.199 On 4 January 1810, when 
the periodical reached the 20th issue, subscription payments were due. Yet, Coleridge’s 
expectations were dashed after he got much less subscription fee income than he had 
expected. That subscribers to the periodical largely failed to pay for the numbers had quite 
a plain reason: Coleman (1988, 2002) makes clear the contribution of Thomas Clarkson, an 
abolitionist dissenter and a writer himself, who “offered him a ready-made readership in 
the shape of dozens of well-off and well-read Quakers” to The Friend’s subscription 
figures (2002, p. 138). Nevertheless, happy as Coleridge was to receive their support and 
subscription, his publishing policy did not take the Quakers’ views and sentiments into 
consideration, resulting in the low number of subscription payments and cancellations.200 
On top of the financial impasse, Coleridge became even more exasperated when Sara 
Hutchinson left Allan Bank at the end of February 1810: In a letter to Mrs Clarkson, 
Dorothy Wordsworth wrote on 12 April 1810 that although it was true that Coleridge was 
                                                 
199 Dorothy Wordsworth wrote on February 28, 1810 that “… she has been with us more than four years” and 
“she has transcribed almost every paper of The Friend for the press.” (WL II, p. 390) 
200 “There is a general truth in the claim that the Friend marketed itself for a more establishment and 
professional coterie than the middle-class dissenters and friends of freedom targeted by the Watchman. But it 
is important to note that many of the Friend’s subscribers were friends and associates from earlier days, and 
that when the eminently practical Thomas Clarkson offered him a ready-made readership in the shape of 
dozens of well-off and well-read Quakers, the needy Coleridge was happy to accept their vote of confidence 
in him. But whilst willing to accept Quaker support, he would not then take direction about how to 
accommodate their special interests and views, with the result that they dropped their subscriptions, leaving 
Coleridge incensed by their desertion” (Coleman, 2002, p. 138). For a more comprehensive account of this 
process, also see: Rooke, 1969, pp. lxx-lxxii.  
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able to write The Friend for so long thanks to Sara, she could not believe that “it would 
have gone on if she had stayed. He was tired, and she had at last no power to drive him on” 
(WL II, p. 415). After two more issues following Sara’s departure, on 15th March, The 
Friend was given up. The last issue, though, ended in a bracket: “(To be concluded in the 
next Number)” (TF II, p. 369). Two months after the periodical ended, Coleridge left Allan 
Bank, which marked the close of Coleridge’s intermittent residence with the Wordsworths.  
Between the periodical and the 1818 book form of The Friend, there is yet another 
version also called the 1812 collection, which consisted of the the periodical’s revised 
versions of the issued numbers at the same time Coleridge was in the process of publishing 
the periodical version in 1809-10 (Rooke, 1969, p. xcii).201 In June 1812 The Friend was 
reissued by Gale and Curtis. However, the publication of The Friend in collected form in 
1812 was neither the emergence of a new book, nor a new content or a commercial 
achievement. It was an attempt on Coleridge’s part to bring his physically scattered issues 
of The Friend together. Although, unlike 1818 version, he did not re-order The Friend of 
1812, Coleridge himself called this version an “improved edition” in a letter of 1814, 
forming the basis of the 1818 edition (CL III, p. 503). This makes the 1812 version 
valuable considering the conditions under which the various numbers of periodical could 
have remained dispersed and forgotten. 
 Although Coleridge abandoned the The Friend project in 1810 and reprinted the 
1812 version, as Kooy states, “the idea of reissuing the work stayed with him” (2009, p. 
                                                 
201 As Rooke clarifies, “the first twelve numbers were reprinted in revised form after the printer had a supply 
of unstamped paper in mid-November 1809 and before Coleridge gave up writing the periodical in March 
1810” (p. lxxxviii). The copies of the first twelve numbers (from No 13, there are no revisions) were 
reprinted on 2000 unstamped sheets (amounting to one hundred copies of twenty numbers) and were to be 
“saved till they made a suitable volume and also were to supply new subscribers with back-numbers. From 
the evidence still extant, it also seems likely that the first twelve numbers were reprinted from early 
December on” (pp. lxvi-lxvii). 
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158). Although frustrated in June 1814 by the futility of his efforts to procure a copy of 
The Friend202, lamenting how his good qualities “diffuse themselves” (CL III, pp. 502-
503), Coleridge still pulled himself together to reissue The Friend in three volumes. In a 
letter of March 1815 to Joseph Cottle, Coleridge hence wrote: “‘The Friend’ has long been 
out of Print – and it’s (sic) republication has been called for by numbers. Indeed, from the 
manner in which it was first circulated, it is little less than a new work –. To make it a 
compleat and circular work it needs but about 8 or 10 papers...which had I even 20£ only 
to procure myself a week’s Ease of mind I could have printed…” (CL IV, pp. 551-552). In 
another letter of 8 July 1816, Coleridge wrote that probably owing, he guessed, to people’s 
“disposition to enquire after [his] works” which, he hoped, would “become still more 
extended”, he was “spoken to by an eminent publisher concerning the republication of the 
Friend” (CL IV, p. 650). He reported to have responded by saying that his intention was 
“never to publish it except under such alterations of form and arrangement, of omissions 
and additions, as would almost amount to the re-writing of it”. In another letter of 
September 1816, he wrote to Hugh J. Rose: 
I have sent to Gale and Fenner to know whether it is possible to procure a 
copy of the Friend from any private hand – I fear not. I do not possess a 
copy myself; but borrowed one from an acquaintance. I mean to republish 
it, omitting what can not be completed within a work of three small 
volumes, completing what I can, and as far as is consistent with the subjects 
and the nature of my mind... (CL IV, p. 669) 
An ingrained sense of the loss and wastage of his ideas illustrated through the egg analogy 
in 1808 was combined by the literal loss of even his published ideas. By December 1816, 
Coleridge had begun re-designing and revising it into a three-volume book form and in the 
Biographia Literaria, he advertised that a revised edition was on its way (BL I, p. 235n). 
                                                 
202 It was, as a London correspondent informed him, “Out of Print, & the Publishers, Gale, Curtis & c, have 
long given over the hope of inducing the Author to prepare a second Edition” (CL III, pp. 502-3).  
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 Prior to Coleridge’s embarkment on the revision of The Friend of 1818, his 
incessant quest for attachment to other persons was relatively at rest thanks to his residence 
with the Gillmans (where he settled in April, 1816). In April 1817 the second volume of 
Lay Sermons had been published, followed by the publication of the Biographia and 
Sibylline Leaves in July 1817, and Coleridge was also corresponding with Rest Fenner for 
publication of an Encyclopaedia Metropolitana. Although the discussions had led nowhere 
as he refused to leave Highgate and they had to drop the plan of his editorship, Coleridge 
contributed to the project with a “Preliminary Treatise on Method”, published in January 
1818 (Rooke, 1969, p. lxxxiii). Especially after having revised his life and opinions as well 
as poems, Coleridge was now in a good position to have another look at the messy body of 
his “intellectual reservoir” and recreate it appropriately.   
A three-volume version of The Friend was published in November 1818. The new 
organisation of it meant, for Coleridge, “its logical growth, a unity organic rather than 
mechanical” (Rooke, 1969, p. xcv). Since the essays in their original sequence in the 1809-
10 and 1812 versions were frequently interrupted due to the intervention of poetry, 
anecdotal pieces and letters - leading to a chaotic impression for readers - Coleridge 
decided to make considerable omissions.203 He dropped as much as four complete issues of 
the earlier versions of The Friend while restructuring the 1818 edition.204 Coleridge also 
re-organized the old and new material at hand and to divide the 1818 version into three 
volumes. The first volume contained sixteen essays showcasing The Friend as an 
                                                 
203 “Many other omissions” Rooke (1969) notes, “are mere mechanical adjustments to the new form of the 
work: Coleridge scrapped all appeals to subscribers, apologies for lateness of publication, answers to 
correspondents, and promises of future essays”. (TF I, p. xcvi)  
204 The 1809 version had almost 450 pages in total, roughly 130 of which were omitted by 1818. Moreover, 
1818 version contained almost 350-pages-long new additions out of a thousand pages. “Of the fifty-eight 
essays comprising The Friend,” Rooke says, “only two have not been added to, and even they do not appear 
in their original form” (Rooke, 1969, p. xcv). 
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enterprise with a rhetorical agenda, the second volume laid out the principles of 
Coleridge’s political philosophy, and the third one (consisting of new material) drew on 
the method of thinking and its theological determinants. Each volume ended with a 
“Landing Place”, containing essays “interposed for amusement, retrospect and 
preparation” (TF I, p. 127). The 1818 version of The Friend was therefore a thoroughly-
revised edition with “a new title-page, shifting the emphasis from the ‘Literary, Moral, and 
Political’ to aids ‘in the Formation of Fixed Principles in Politics, Morals, and Religion’” 
(Rooke, 1969, p. xciv). 
 
Previous Scholarship 
The academic focus on comparative revisions of The Friend’s different versions and the 
grounds of revisions mainly in 1809-10 and 1818 is rather limited. Much as it has been 
mentioned in monographs and collections handling Coleridge’s prose works, The Friend is 
mostly brought up to provide context (Christensen 1979; Kooy 1999; Coleman 2002; 
Worthen 2010),205 to underscore its rhetorical method (Christensen 1981 and 1995; Myers 
1987)206, or to support the main argument (Class, 2012) – the work per se with its different 
versions is usually not dealt with as the main subject of inquiry. In what follows, I will lay 
                                                 
205 Christensen, Jerome. (1979). “Politerotics: Coleridge’s rhetoric of war in The Friend”. Clio, 8 (3). pp. 
339-63.  
Kooy, Michael John. (1999). “Coleridge, Malta and the ‘Life of Ball’: How Public Service Shaped ‘The 
Friend’. The Wordsworth Circle, 30 (2) (Spring), pp. 102-108.  
Coleman, Deirdre. (2002). “The Journalist”. In L. Newlyn (Ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Coleridge 
(pp. 126-141). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Worthen, J. (2010). “Mid-life works and contexts: 1803–1814”. The Cambridge Introduction to Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge (pp. 62-72). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
206 Christensen, Jerome. (1981). Coleridge's Blessed Machine of Language. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
---- (1995). “The method of The Friend”. In Don H. Bialostosky and Lawrence D. Needham (eds.) Rhetorical 
Traditions and British Romantic Literature. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 11- 27. 
Myers, Victoria. (1987). “Coleridge’s ‘The Friend’: An Experiment in Rhetorical Theory. The Journal of 
English and Germanic Philology. 86 (1) (January). pp. 9-32.  
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emphasis on a review of the scholarship specifically focused on the differences between 
the two versions of The Friend. 
Earl Leslie Griggs in his 1938-article “The Friend: 1809 and 1818 Editions” and 
Dudley Bailey in the 1961 article “Coleridge’s Revision of The Friend” provide analyses 
of Coleridge’s revisionary activity on the two versions of The Friend: 1809-10 and 1818. 
Griggs argues that the difference between the 1809-1810 and 1818 versions is mainly 
about the change of order of the essays, omission of parts that proved to be redundant by 
1818, and important additions (especially to the third volume of 1818) that indicate the 
development of Coleridge’s thoughts from 1809 to 1818. He goes on to claim that this 
development took place in terms of philosophy; political passages remained unchanged in 
the meantime, undergoing no substantial textual alterations.207 Bailey’s approach, on the 
other hand, largely falls at odds with Griggs. “Tabulations of the 1809 edition in terms of 
the 1818 edition and of the 1818 edition in terms of the 1809 edition” he argues, “will 
show that much of the 1818 edition was not much revised, but rather appropriated, in 
order, from 1809” (p. 91). Stating that “about a fourth of the 1809 edition was omitted in 
1818” and that “about a third of the later edition is new material”, Bailey holds that “we 
must scale down somewhat the usual estimates of the difference between the editions” (pp. 
98-99). When it comes to the “development” of Coleridge’s views, Bailey claims that the 
reflections Coleridge wrote in The Friend of 1809-10 were already part of his thinking 
                                                 
207 “From the foregoing evidence, then, the following conclusions may be drawn: (1) By 1818 Coleridge’s 
interest in politics, as distinct from a moral system, seems to have diminished, whereas his interest in 
philosophy and theology had become almost an obsession. (2) When he came to revise The friend, therefore, 
he merely rearranged the order of the political passages, without attempting to modify his political 
philosophy. (3) His metaphysical thinking, however, had led him to religious and scientific problems; and he 
added a fuller definition of the reason and a long dissertation on method to clarify his point of view. (4) The 
1818 Friend, then, is a “rifacciamento” of the first edition in so far as the political passages are concerned, 
but a new work in its fairly consistent pursuit of an attempted philosophical system” (Griggs, 1938, p. 373) 
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from the early 1800s.208 In addition, Bailey goes on, “several of the leading ideas in the 
essays of the ‘Second Section’ may be found stated or suggested in the 1809 Friend; and 
several others had apparently been in Coleridge's mind even before 1809” (p. 95),209 and 
because they can still be seen even in the 1818 version, we cannot talk about any 
substantial development from 1809 version to the rifacciamento210 of 1818: the additions 
merely “constitute an extension of the 1809 text” and they worked to “keep continuity 
among broken and sometimes reordered essays” (p. 94).211 “The lesser revisions which 
Coleridge made in his rifacciamento are confined to grammatical and rhetorical problems” 
argues Bailey, carried out with an aim to “clarify and simplify his prose, to sharpen the 
focus of his point of view, and with these things, to make more incisive his criticism of the 
reigning political and moral philosophies of his time” (pp. 97-98). Bailey thereby 
                                                 
208 Bailey clarifies this by saying, “Additional evidence that Coleridge had arrived at some of the conclusions 
of the 1818 essays by 1809 may be found in writings and letters which antedate the first edition of The 
Friend” (Bailey, 1961, p. 96). 
209 “Taken together with the findings from an examination of lesser additions to the 1818 edition, these 
pieces of evidence modify the novelty of this large addition and indicate that Coleridge’s thinking between 
1809 and 1818 was more of a piece than a cursory look at the two editions of The Friend would lead one to 
believe. The central point made in the 1818 essays on method-that any productive method is mentally 
initiated-had been very clearly implied in an 1809 essay in which Coleridge mentioned the scientific method 
of Sir Humphry Davy” (Bailey, 1961, p. 95) 
210 Coleridge’s own spelling of the term derives from the Italian “rifacimento”, meaning “remaking”, 
“reconstructing” and “rebuilding”. Coleridge wrote in the advertisement to the 1818 edition that “The present 
volumes are rather a rifacciamento than a new edition. The additions forming so large a proportion of the 
whole work, and the arrangement being altogether new, I might indeed hesitate in bestowing the title of a 
republication on a work, which can scarcely be said to have been ever published, in the ordinary trade 
acceptation of the word.” (TF I, p. 3)  
211 “Certainly no one can assume that between the first and twentieth issues of The Friend in 1809 Coleridge 
had moved from a belief in absolute predestination to one of modified meliorism. Obviously, on the contrary, 
Coleridge was aware of no change in his opinions at all. Whatever Coleridge’s reasons for omitting [a] 
passage in 1818 were, a change in his opinions is, in this case, not one of them. And the fact of his retention, 
in large part and without substantial revision, of much of the 1809 Friend in the 1818 edition argues a similar 
consistency in Coleridge's thought; it should lead us to deal warily with the temptation to see a change which 
so large an addition as represented by the third volume suggests to us. The additions of more than sentence 
dimension which Coleridge made in the 1818 edition of The Friend also fall into groups: introductory and 
transitional passages were required to keep continuity among broken and sometimes reordered essays, and 
many additional mottoes were needed to give conformity to the presentation; other passages were added to 
elucidate points of the 1809 text, ranging from credit-line footnotes to sizable emendations in the text; and 
the bulk of the third volume was added to extend the scope of The Friend to the area of the principles of 
morals and religion. This last, the bulk of which is given to a series of essays on intellectual method, is about 
the only addition in 1818 which may be properly said to constitute an extension of the 1809 text.” (Bailey, 
1961, p. 94) 
207 
 
contravenes the developmental approach by endorsing the idea of constancy in Coleridge’s 
thought beginning from the early 1800s. 
Barbara E. Rooke (1969) in her introduction to the Bollingen edition of The Friend 
provides an account of the writing process of both the periodical (1809-10) and the book 
version (1818). In the body and footnotes to The Friend volumes (I and II), Rooke 
provides useful technical details about the revisions (such as what words/passages were 
replaced from one version to another). However, they are not analytical enough and fall 
short of presenting a comprehensive argument about the versions. For example, Rooke 
takes the 1818 version as the main authoritative text in the first volume, and relegating, as 
it were, the obscure and chaotic periodical versions to an appendix in the second volume – 
just in case readers might want to compare the alpha-text with its secondary prototype.212 
Hence, rather than thoroughly meddling with the previous versions that made the 1818 text 
possible in the first place, and presenting their distinct characteristics considering what 
Coleridge thought he was doing from one version to another, Rooke misses out on the 
process in which Coleridge quite radically revised his periodical as well as his earlier self 
and affiliations. I therefore hold that such editorial primacy of a version over another 
misses out the chance to elaborate on the differences between the two versions and the 
motivations behind Coleridge’s refashioning of his oeuvre in 1818. As a result, whereas 
the first volume is taken as the standard and most refined version of The Friend, the 
“Appendix” provides the historical background to it. On the other hand, Deirdre 
Coleman’s Coleridge and The Friend, 1809-10 (1988) is devoted to the exploration of 
personal and intellectual context during the time of the 1809-10 Friend’s composition. 
                                                 
212 As Rooke maintains, she prioritizes the last edition “Coleridge saw through the press” since the excerpts 
disrupt not only the “flavour” but also the “continuity” of the periodical version, and the 1809 -10 text is 
therefore appendixed (1969, p. lxxxvi). 
208 
 
Coleman also criticizes Rooke for appreciating The Friend from an uncritical viewpoint 
based predominantly on the latest version (pp. 77-82). However, she inversely adopts a 
similar approach to that of Rooke by dealing only with the periodical version of The 
Friend. Due to the lack of a holistic approach to different versions, Coleman’s work is 
quite antagonistic towards the 1809-10 version of The Friend. She holds that it is one of 
the examples of “mismanagement and failed goals, an exercise not so much in principles as 
in muddy thinking and anxious equivocation” (1988, p. 1). Coleman hence cannot but 
overlook the comparative aspect of Coleridge’s pursuits while composing and revising the 
versions of The Friend, which can only emerge when one considers them together.  
More recently, Michael John Kooy (2009) has provided a comparison between the 
1809-10 and 1818 versions of The Friend in terms of their involvement with a “primary 
motivating force”: Political theology (p. 148). According to Kooy, the periodical was 
prudentially concerned with secular politics, suppressing political theology and continually 
“prioritizing…principles over policies and events” (p. 155). Pointing out that Coleridge’s 
endeavours to play a role in public affairs in different periods of his life was always 
fraught, Kooy outlines how his disillusionment compelled Coleridge to seek “fixed 
principles” both in The Watchman (1796) and The Friend (1809-10, 1818) by addressing 
this “nagging feeling of disenchantment” (2009, p. 144). “These concerns” Kooy adds, 
“are amplified by the new material Coleridge added to the 1818 edition” because the 
additions shifted “The Friend’s burden of argumentation away from the themes of his 
wartime ‘liberal republicanism’ and towards a novel conception of Christian 
communitarianism as an answer to postwar anomie” (p. 159). The 1818 version hence gave 
prominence to Coleridge’s political theology:  
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The secular inflected ‘liberal republicanism’ of the 1809-10 edition, with its 
appeal to violence, fascination with the market economy and commitment 
to ‘national unity’, remains amply evident, notably in the recycled essays on 
taxation, on war and international law and in the ‘Life of Ball’. But 
theological concerns that pull in an opposite direction also have an 
increasing presence in the 1818 Friend, evident in the revised essays on the 
freedom of the press, education and the political role of the conscience. (p. 
159.) 
Kooy holds that revisions in the 1818 changed the periodical in a way that enabled the 
dominance of Coleridge’s theological concerns in 1818 and their direct correspondence in 
“the rough and tumble of political life” (2009, p. 144). In this respect, Kooy contributes to 
Griggs’s and Bailey’s argument of whether Coleridge developed his ideas from one 
version to another, and holds that the rifacciamento is a considerably improved version of 
the periodical in these terms. However, although Kooy does bring up Kant a few times in 
his discussion of the periodical version,213 he fails to provide an analysis of the role 
Kantian critical philosophy played in constitution and revision of the two versions. It is 
Monika Class (2012) who deals with Coleridge’s engagement with morality and 
conservative politics by taking into consideration the radical political implications of 
Kant’s ethics and the notion of “categorical imperative”. Stating that “the tensions between 
Coleridge’s lasting admiration for Kant’s philosophy and his conservative reorientation 
have been overlooked” , Class draws attention to the fact that “despite the radical and 
transformative power of critical philosophy”, Coleridge made use of the Kantian moral 
principles to undergird his own conservative judgement in 1818 (p. 145). Class hence quite 
explicitly puts, and in a way complements Kooy’s suggestion above, that in his attempt to 
“suppress Kant’s and his own Jacobinism”, Coleridge favoured the politics of expedience 
                                                 
213 “My interest is to show how Coleridge tries to articulate political theological responses to a variety of 
contemporary crisis situations (revolution, war, anomie). These responses fluctuate between different forms 
of Christian materialism on the one hand (modelled on the perfectionism of Unitarianism and then, later, the 




in the versions of The Friend, “making Kant known as a proponent of conservatism” 
(2012, p. 148).  
 
Gap in Scholarship 
The scholarship about the differences or continuities of The Friend’s periodical (1809-10) 
and rifacciamento (1818) versions fall short of discussing the extent to which Coleridge’s 
attitude towards the function of a “Friend” underwent a substantial and long-sought change 
after the publication of Wordsworth’s The Excursion in 1814. It is within this framework 
that I will examine the two versions of Coleridge’s The Friend, and I think compared to the 
periodical, in the revised version Coleridge managed to form a more sober relationship 
with not only his own past but also with Wordsworth by means of dissociating his corpus 
of works as a result of revisionary activity. As was the case during the period he collated 
Sibylline Leaves and composed the Biographia, the determining factor of such a schismatic 
attitude stemmed largely from the fact that Coleridge came to realise the virtue of 
speaking to a friend rather than habitually speaking through a partner. 
Taking Coleridge’s idiosyncratic response to Immanuel Kant’s critical philosophy 
into account, I will argue that the already-existing “radical differences” between Coleridge 
and Wordsworth ever since the Lyrical Ballads (1798) gradually sharpened following the 
“Preface” of 1800. We can hold that this situation was even more intensified in the period 
paving the way for the periodical version itself. Coleridge’s philosophical views, as 
reported by himself to Poole in 16 March 1801, underwent a substantial change as he 
claimed to have “overthrown the the doctrine of Association, as taught by Hartley, and 
with it all the irreligious metaphysics of modern Infidels” and promised to do even more in 
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a short span of time (CL II, p. 706).214 However, as it turned out, he would continue to 
cherish a prolonged respect for Hartley for years to come and this claim was only 
tentative.215 Noting it was at “Wordsworth’s advice” that Coleridge had “intermitted the 
pursuit” (p. 706), and considering Coleridge’s intellectual development and unsteady (and 
even “muddled” in the sense Perry uses the term) system of thought from the early 1800s 
up until the time he wrote the first version of The Friend in 1809, I hold that even the first 
version of The Friend interestingly contained quite a sharp rupture with Wordsworth, even 
though I also simultaneously maintain that Coleridge was at the time still had faith in the 
joint project with his partner. On the other hand, in addition to the debacle of 1810216, 
Wordsworth’s failure in 1814 to bring their grand scheme for a first “genuine” 
philosophical poem into completion disheartened Coleridge: The Excursion fell short of 
meeting Coleridge’s expectations because whereas his organic view of the world involved 
the recognition of an active mind seeking the universal “Truth” through the inner synthetic 
faculties as well as the empirical laws in nature, Wordsworth’s poem was founded upon an 
obscurely precarious ground between the outside world and the inner self, thereby being 
closer to the Kantian critical philosophy rather than Coleridge’s organic approach. By 
comparison, I argue, the 1818 version of The Friend unexpectedly moved much closer to 
Wordsworth by virtue of the dialogic revisionary activity Coleridge carried out. 
Coleridge wrote on 11 January 1810 in the supernumerary “Essay” of The Friend 
that for months, he had been giving “the History of [his] own mind” (TF II, p. 277). The 
                                                 
214 Coleridge clarified this by saying “that I shall be able to evolve all the five senses, that is, to deduce them 
from one sense, & to state their growth, & the causes of their difference ----- & in this evolvement to solve 
the process of Life & Consciousness. (p. 706)     
215 As shown by scholars such as Griggs (1938), Richard Haven (1959), Christensen (1981) and Wendling 
(1995). 
216 This is when Coleridge heard the disparaging remarks of the Wordsworths about himself after the 
periodical version of The Friend came to an end in 1810. 
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Friend of 1809-10 was indeed a work that displayed Coleridge’s thought processes in the 
least ‘cooked’ form possible. It was as if Coleridge was inviting the reader to watch him 
think in real time,217 and some unsurprisingly found the experience and the invitation very 
rebarbative indeed. After The Watchman of 1796, Coleridge’s second experiment in 
periodical writing, The Friend (1809-10), was notoriously obscure but, it still purported to 
address the difficulty of communication by Coleridge. The periodical version of The 
Friend insisted that the truth was transformative but that “the reception of Truth” was beset 
with difficulties few understood or even knew existed.218 In Hamilton’s terms, what is 
offered is a model of relationship, one that few people could live up to. In 1809-10, these 
difficulties were presented largely in “psychological” terms, derived from Wolff and 
Moritz.219 However, rather than explaining his psychological method conceptually, 
Coleridge proceeded by illustrations of the mind’s apparently often motiveless resistance 
                                                 
217 In the Biographia, Coleridge exemplifies this with the following illustration: “Now let a man watch his 
mind while he is composing; or, to take a still more common case, while he is trying to recollect a name; and 
he will find the process completely analogous. Most of my readers will have observed a small water-insect 
on the surface of rivulets, which throws a cinque-spotted shadow fringed with prismatic colours on the sunny 
bottom of the brook; and will have noticed, how the little animal wins its way up against the stream, by 
alternate pulses of active and passive motion, now resisting the current, and now yielding to it in order to 
gather strength and a momentary fulcrum for a further propulsion. This is no unapt emblem of the mind's 
self-experience in the act of thinking. There are evidently two powers at work, which relatively to each other 
are active and passive; and this is not possible without an intermediate faculty, which is at once both active 
and passive. In philosophical language, we must denominate this intermediate faculty in all its degrees and 
determinations, the IMAGINATION. But, in common language, and especially on the subject of poetry, we 
appropriate the name to a superior degree of the faculty, joined to a superior voluntary control over it.” (BL I, 
pp. 124-125) 
218 Hamilton states that “Truth is one thing, according to The Friend, and the ‘reception of Truth’ is its 
further realization by which ‘we became what we are’.” (2007, p. 90) 
219 It must be noted here that “psychology” was a word virtually unknown in English at the time, at least in 
the sense intended by Coleridge. As Neil Vickers (2007) explains: “At the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, the word implied two things. The educated would have known it as one of the two major branches of 
medicine, the other being physiology…Most often it meant the science in which ‘the actions of the soul or  
mind are investigated’…The actions of the soul or mind needed to be investigated because of their effects on 
the body…The term ‘psychology’ was known to be German in origin and this gave rise to a second set of 
associations. OED notes that the word entered most European languages from Germany in the late sixteenth 
century and that the first person to use it in the modern sense was the German philosopher Christian Wolff 
(in his Psychologia Empirica of 1732 and Psychologia Rationalis of 1734). Wolff used the term to mean the 
study of mental experience but his interest in it was philosophic. He wanted to know what the soul o r mind 
was capable of experiencing…By Coleridge’s time, it had become associated with the study of mental 
experience of all kinds. The key figure here was Karl Phillipp Moritz (1756-93)…” (pp. 274-275)  
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to truth. I therefore think that a consideration of the psychological bias of the periodical 
version sheds light on a number of big contrasts emerging with the 1818 version, in which 
the German psychological tradition was intended to be replaced by the scientific method. 
The Friend as a periodical was an experimental enterprise Coleridge aborted, with numbers 
ending in the middle of sentences and full of unfulfilled promises to its readers. With its 
tangled-prose, the periodical was fairly digressive, full of distractions both for Coleridge 
and the reader, thought-provoking inasmuch as perplexing. I think part of the problem was 
the matter was so obscure that it was not always clear if he was sticking to the point or 
digressing. The version of 1809-1810, as a result, was physically and intellectually too 
demanding and, at first glance at least, all about irrationalism. Considering this 
background, my investigation on the 1818 version of The Friend will draw on Coleridge’s 
theories of language and imagination as guiding spectacles through which we can assess 
his revisionary activity from the 1809-10 to the rifacciamento in its fullest sense. 
 
Coleridge’s Revisionary Activity from the Periodical (1809-10) to the 1818 
“rifacciamento” 
An investigation of both versions of The Friend is a simultaneous comparison between two 
distinct Coleridges: one expectantly hopeful, one bitterly frustrated. By 1809, he had heard 
The Prelude (1807) and written “To William Wordsworth” to celebrate the poem, and the 
reason for referring to Wordsworth’s mind as “superior” stemmed from the firm hope that 
it was only his partner who could accomplish writing the grand philosophical poem. In The 
Friend of 1809, “hope” was therefore presented as the chief virtue and a significant 
medium that sustains all the others: “What an awful Duty, what a Nurse of all other, the 
fairest Virtues, does not hope become!” (TF II, p. 70). As a symbolic indication of his 
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lessening of hope, or a reference to his need for hope he wrote the word in small capitals 
“HOPE” in the 1812 and 1818 versions (TF I, p. 103). It is only in the 1818 version that 
Coleridge mentioned “hope” in pessimistic terms, when he wrote of “having hoped 
proudly of any individual, and the having been miserably disappointed” (TF I, p. 90). 
Although he was in expectation of “the excitement of Hopes that could not be gratified” 
(TF II, p. 86) by Wordsworth due to their radical differences respecting poetry and “hopes 
plucked like beautiful wild flowers” (TF II, p. 263; TF I, p. 397), in the periodical 
Coleridge refers to his partner as the “one still more and more deservedly dear to me” (TF 
II, p. 26) – a statement which was omitted in the 1818 version. Wordsworth, in this sense, 
was a figure who was in some way present during not only Coleridge’s writing process but 
also his revisions in different versions of The Friend. 
Coleridge’s most thorough revision of 1818, right after the publication of the 
Biographia Literaria and Sibylline Leaves in 1817, decidedly came as a reaction to 
Wordsworth’s two Prefaces of 1815 and his Poems. With the revised version of the 1818 
Friend, Coleridge surely managed to infuse “new blood into it” (Rooke, Introduction, 
1969, p. xciv), inciting an organic proliferation of bits and pieces that were already there 
since the original composition. He did this through additions and omissions, but this time 
to a considerable extent. A re-consideration of his relationship and collaboration with 
Wordsworth especially after The Excursion, I assert, was prominently reflected in the 1818 
The Friend. Coleridge’s major revisions for the 1818 version therefore also aimed to 
achieve his revision of their collaboration and simultaneous emancipation from symbiotic 
relationship with Wordsworth so that he could build a proper friendship with his former 
symbiotic partner. For example, Coleridge removed Wordsworth’s poems as well as his 
“Essays on Epitaphs” from the rifacciamento. In addition, the rifacciamento version of The 
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Friend was dedicated to Mr and Mrs Gilman of Highgate, with whom Coleridge had been 
living for two years and whose friendship, Coleridge’s dedication goes, “had its strongest 
foundations in hope” (TF I, p. 4). The most important point for us in this dedication is that 
there is no reference to any of the circumstances under which, and people with and through 
whom, he wrote the periodical in the first place. 
As early as 1800, on the other hand, overwhelmed by Wordsworth’s poetic genius, 
Coleridge with a seeming self-sacrifice had announced to the world that he was going to 
abandon writing poetry and “leave the higher & deeper Kinds to Wordsworth, the 
delightful, popular & simply dignified to Southey; & reserve for myself the honorable 
attempt to make others feel and understand their writings” (CL I, p. 623). Although this 
role of a mere “Metaphysician” was, I hold, a cloak for Coleridge’s tacit intention of 
“division of labours”, Coleridge did not fail, indeed, to make critics take for granted that at 
this time he lost his poetic powers. “Coleridge did not,” states Stillinger (1994), “after 
Dejection in 1802, write another poem of the quality and reputation of the seven to be 
studied in this book. Instead, at a relatively early age, he hung out his shingle as a thinker, 
and for the rest of his adult life the projects he was most concerned with were contributions 
to systematic philosophy” (p. 5). Stillinger’s approach revolves around the “solitary 
genius” image of Coleridge, which he thinks evolved from his ingenuity in writing verse 
into, basically, philosophically-laden prose. Morton D. Paley (1996) likewise states that 
“In any consideration of Coleridge’s later poetry a blocking figure will be encountered: 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge” (p. 2) because Paley believes that Coleridge, from the time he 
wrote “To William Wordsworth” in 1807, effectively disguised himself as a poet of the 
eighteenth century in deference to Wordsworth. The point I diverge from Stillinger and 
Paley is my ongoing argument that this was not at the expense of giving up on poetry; 
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Coleridge’s poetic ambitions just transformed into the joint oeuvre ideal, which made him 
think that he was already speaking through Wordsworth by virtue of their joint venture. In 
this respect I agree with Christensen (1978) when he claims that it is via Coleridge that 
“Wordsworth’s genius is presented as whole and complete…in every sense of the word”, 
and it has hence been a tricky occupation to determine “what in Wordsworth’s poetry is 
truly Wordsworthian and what is not” (p. 227).220 At times, there might be no distinct 
voice or identity at all. 
Coleridge once said of The Friend that it was a secret he had entrusted to the public 
and that “unlike most secrets, it hath been well kept” (TT II, p. 374). I subscribe to 
Hamilton’s recognition (2007) that for Coleridge, it could “scarcely be human” to have a 
“consciousness that remains mutely uncommunicative”, and his “re-creation of [The 
Friend] in 1818 shows the perennial quality of his communicative ambitions” (pp. 17-18). 
Having been unable to fully achieve the dialogic reader-perspective in the “obscure” 
periodical of 1809-1810, Coleridge aimed to make up for this aspect when he brought out a 
new version of The Friend in 1818. Whereas he had assiduously depended on others in a 
manner that characterized his habit of speaking through the other during the time he issued 
the periodical,221 in the rifacciamento version Coleridge’s dialogic and revisionary 
approach to Wordsworth had considerably replaced this pattern, as his philosophical views 
had grown relatively more mature, if not totally stable. Considering my overall argument, 
it can therefore be held that even the meaning of the title underwent a transformation from 
                                                 
220 “The genius in the Biographia Literaria.” Studies in Romanticism, 17: 215-31. 
221 He dictated the periodical to Asra, who served as his amenuensis (Rooke, 1969, p. lv); he made use of the 
Kantian critical philosophy and German idealist tradition in order to develop and distinguish his own line of 
thought in the periodical, he had used Nitsch’s interpretation of Kant to be able to understand and formulate a 
response to Kantian philosophy (Class, 2012, pp. 33-4), and he also collaborated with Wordsworth and at 




1809-10 to 1818. Whereas Coleman (1988) takes the title The Friend in 1809-10 merely as 
a cunning ploy on Coleridge’s part to appeal to the Quakers (1988, pp. 80-83), and 
Christensen argues that the title represents the narrative voice throughout the work itself 
(1981, p. 210), I would like to establish my own argument here and investigate the extent 
to which the title in the 1809-10 addressed to Coleridge’s concerns with readership, 
whereas the title in the 1818 version had more subtle ramifications. 
Elinor Shaffer (1990) argues that it was when Coleridge dedicated the 1818 version 
to the Gillmans by addressing them as “Friend”, and also “signing himself ‘Friend’” that 
he was able to link the author with the “reader-dedicatee” with its “reciprocal, even 
circular” title (p. 213). Shaffer also argues that it is only “when in intimate conversation 
with a friend that one is closest to knowing the mind with which one is engaged” (pp. 205). 
Regarding the argument of my thesis, Shaffer’s statements shed light on how the title for 
Coleridge in 1818 must have been the means to achieve a proper dialogue with 
Wordsworth and his mind, which was necessary in the aftermath of the former’s 
desynonymization from his once symbiotic partner. In other words, just as the reader is the 
addressee of Coleridge’s work, Wordsworth in 1818 also took on the same role, a “fellow -
labourer” (TF I, p. 183) and a friend to communicate, rather than being a symbiotic partner 
to collaborate with and speak through during the work’s composition (or revision, for that 
matter) process. Hamilton (2007) therefore holds that having established “his 
communicative premise” in the 1818 version of The Friend, Coleridge was able to “make a 
striking transition from his own work into Wordsworth’s poetry” by, for example, 
elevating a passage222 in which he provided his insights by using the lines from a poem of 
                                                 
222 “Men are ungrateful to others only when they have ceased to look back on their former selves with joy 
and tenderness. They exist in fragments. Annihilated as to the Past, they are dead to the Future, or seek for 
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Wordsworth’s, “from the footnote to which it was consigned in August 1809 to the main 
body of the text in 1818” (p. 99). Provided that Coleridge connected the constituent 
elements of his life and works by bringing them together and highlighting their 
“relationship”223 with one another, “the rationale of” his rifacciamento could be 
established. Not only does, for example, the “Quakerish title” connect Coleridge with his 
“Dissenting past”; it also enables him to safeguard “the friendly relationship of that past 
with his present philosophical concerns” (Hamilton, 2007, p. 100). 
Taking the overall publication process of the 1809-10 edition into account, it is 
obvious that Coleridge was cautious about touching upon current political or social issues 
in an attempt to establish the “true principles” and higher truths. The periodical hence was 
announced in the title page of the 1809-10 version to be “a literary, moral, and political 
weekly paper, excluding personal and party politics and the events of the day” (TF II, p. 1). 
As for the reason for this apolitical stance in general, Coleman holds that “He was afraid 
that talking about social and political problems might cause the loss of subscribers”, which 
caused a tension between the private and the public worlds for Coleridge (1988, pp. 11, 
                                                                                                                                                    
the proofs of it everywhere, only not (where alone they can be found) in themselves. A contemporary Poet 
has exprest and illustrated this sentiment with equal 
fineness of thought and tenderness of feeling: 
My heart leaps up when I behold 
A rainbow in the sky! 
So was it when my life began; 
So is it now I am a man; 
So let it be, when I grow old, 
Or let me die. 
The Child is Father of the Man, 
And I would wish my days to be 
Bound each to each by natural piety.” (TF I, p. 40) 
223 “Relationship appears preserved at all stages of this composite passage. Self and other, self and past, and 
even the production of self through time define each other oppositionally through a kind of religious 
affection and friendship.To Coleridge, these relations seem necessary for human flourishing, and friendship 
is what keeps their symbiosis healthy. The biographical facts of Coleridge’s relationship withWordsworth 
also emphasize the friendliness belonging to his use of this quotation, epigraph to the “Immortality Ode,” 
which must have intended some amends after the criticism of the pantheism of the ode itself in Biographia.” 
(Hamilton, 2007, p. 100) 
219 
 
13). Coleman goes on to say that Coleridge adopted the language of “studied neutrality” so 
that his work paved the way for “consensus rather than controversy (p. 60). It is true that 
the recognition of Coleridge’s financial expectations is considerably important dur ing any 
kind of analysis of The Friend (and of practically all his works).224 However, I challenge 
those opinions assessing Coleridge’s seemingly apolitical attitude and exclusion of 
material of transient nature solely on such pragmatic grounds as not losing subscribers or 
not causing ideological clash.225 After all, excluding an explicit discussion of politics from 
the journal, considered from a pragmatic point of view, in fact would do him disservice. As 
Rooke notes, The Friend was planned to differ markedly from its predecessor, The 
Watchman (1796), in that the latter had become “avowedly concerned with events of the 
day and current politics. Even at the risk of losing three quarters of his readers, he planned 
to exclude just those things” because the initial endeavour was to keep the new periodical 
engaged with broader and more philosophical issues (p. xxxvi). The Friend of 1809-10 was 
surely political, but Coleridge’s primary objective at the time was to address to people who 
formed the opinions of the masses: the first issue of The Friend on June 1, 1809 hence 
began with a revealing quotation from Petrarch’s On the Life of Solitude about Coleridge’s 
inward intentions: 
Believe me, it requires no little Confidence, to promise Help to the 
Struggling, Counsel to the Doubtful, Light to the Blind, Hope to the 
Despondent, Refreshment to the Weary…But it is my earnest wish, I 
confess, to employ my understanding and acquirements in that mode and 
                                                 
224 It cannot be overlooked that Coleridge did plan to earn money with his weekly, and Stuart’s estimates 
before publication was as follows: “A sale of 250 would probably pay all current expences & if you sold 500 
you would probably have a profit of 300£ per ann: - if 1000, of about 800£” (letter from Stuart to Coleridge, 
17 Dec 1808, qtd. in Rooke, p. lxxi). 
225 A paradoxical example for Coleridge’s risking money and subscribers for the sake of disclosing his 
mindset is, quite interestingly, his treatment of the Quaker audience of The Friend: Thanks to Thomas 
Clarkson, Coleridge had an assured number of Quaker subscribers at the very beginning. However, in time, 
as Coleridge got more and more involved in conservative politics, he apparently provoked his Quaker 
subscribers (by “sneering at the Quakers’ pacifism.” (Coleman, 1988, p. 19)  
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direction, in which I may be enabled to benefit the largest number possible 
of my fellow-creatures. (TF II, p. 5) 
For Coleridge, publishing The Friend was an important mission to enlighten himself as 
well as others.  That Coleridge abstained from having a political agenda (at least an overtly 
publicized one) demonstrates that he obviously wanted to present his opinions as a 
philosopher and opinion-former, therefore he took pains to abstain as much as possible 
from commenting on current affairs, or writing for people from all walks of life. In a letter 
to Humphry Davy written prior to the publication of his weekly paper, Coleridge 
explicated his objectives in establishing a periodical with the following words:  
My Purposes are widely different. I do not write in this Work for the 
Multitude; but for those who by Rank, or Fortune, or official Situation, or 
Talents or Habits of Reflection, are to influence the Multitude. I write to 
found true PRINCIPLES, to oppose false PRINCIPLES, in Criticism, 
Legislation, Philosophy, Morals, and International Law. (CL III, p. 143)  
Coleridge hence does not seem to be randomly opportunistic at all. His aim was to address 
a privileged group of cultivated people capable of acting as opinion-formers in the society, 
and he hoped to accomplish this by establishing political, social and philosophical 
principles.  
The work in his mind was, unsurprisingly, to be highly elitist, exclusive and 
intellectually demanding. In this respect, Coleridge distinguished himself from Cobbett’s 
Weekly Political Register (another periodical that was started in 1802) by writing to Stuart 
in 14 December 1808 that they were going to have two major differences: 
[Cobbett] applies to the Passion[s that] are gratified by Curiosity, sharp & 
often calumnious Personality, the Politics and the Events of the Day, and 
the names and characters of notorious Contemporaries. From all these 
Topics I not only abstain as from guilt; but to strangle these Passions by the 
awakening of the nobler Germ in human nature is my express and 
paramount Object. (CL III, p. 141)  
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Nonetheless, The Friend was in fact never meant to be an apolitical register at all: We can 
gather from Coleridge’s letters, for example, that his intention was to keep on the side of 
the political authority in power rather than swim, as he wrote in a letter to Stuart in 15 
April 1809, in “the muddy yet shallow stream” of the Whigs (CL III, p. 195). Coleridge 
hence was not altogether abstaining from meddling with political issues in the periodical, 
neither was he making practical politics his main focus.226 On the other hand, following 
Kooy (2009) and Class (2012)227, it can be established that Coleridge principally aimed to 
sever the ties between morality and politics to a considerable extent in 1809-10. For 
instance, he made use of the Kantian concept of categorical imperative and reduced it into 
a non-political and individual moral dictum (Class, 2012, pp. 7-11). While revising the 
periodical in 1818, however, his religious views dominated his views, hence making his 
views less limited to individual conscience and more involved in political ideas governed 
by religion and God. 
By 1818, the role of religion in establishing fixed principles and methodological 
enquiry in the philosophical as well as the political arena became more dominant and less 
private.228 Coleridge now sought to provide a moral foundation for those fixed principles 
and develop a method for the sake of grounding his views on the universal truth. For 
                                                 
226 As Class (2012) states, “It is true that this search for a metaphysical ground in politics proved so 
complicated that it tended to undermine Coleridge’s ability to call for specific political actions. However, 
Coleridge’s failure to make a decisive impact on contemporary politics should not be misunderstood as a lack 
of concern. On the contrary, his insight into the difficulty of combining morality and politics appears to be 
one of the major reasons which prevented Coleridge from committing to any manifestation of Realpolitik, 
one of the corresponding societies or a political party.” (pp. 55-56) 
227 “Coleridge was a contradictory Kantian, at once sociable and solitary, public and hidden, radical and 
conservative, genial and copying, and it was in these conflicting terms that Coleridge used critical philosophy 
consistently, and at times intensively as well as emotionally. Nevertheless, his public mediation had one 
effect in particular: it contributed profoundly to a conservative image of Kant in England, which remains one 
of Coleridge’s lasting legacies.” (Class, p. 190) 
228 And Kooy (2009) pinpoints the reason for this: “For the 1818 Friend, conscience is no longer the private 
moral reflection…but the catalyst for communitarian solidarity…Community arises from the experience of 
expressing shared values, not (as the 1809-10 Friend would have it) from the experience of fighting for 
them.” (p. 160) 
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example, in the Essay 13 on Law and Religion, which was a new addition to the fifth essay 
of the periodical version, Coleridge seems at the onset more focused on “blend[ing] and 
harmoniz[ing] the most discordant elements” (p. 91) hence positing Law and Religion not 
only as distinctive entities but also as “THE TWO POLAR FORCES OF ONE AND THE 
SAME POWER” (TF I, p.  94). I find this later distinction as an improved manifestation of 
Coleridge’s commitment to multeity in unity as well as a more mature sense of his 
adoption in the 1809-10 version of an elevated notion of “Understanding” vis-à-vis Sense 
and Reason. Therefore, as Kooy states, “Abandoning his earlier Idealist dualism between 
politics (Understanding) and conscience (Reason), Coleridge now argues that Law without 
Religion (modern liberalism) is as politically disingenuous as Religion without Law 
(theocracy)” (2009, p. 159). As he also stated in the rifacciamento: “…religion and morals 
cannot be disjoined without the destruction of both: and that this does not take place to the 
full extent, we owe to the frequency with which both take shelter in the heart, and that men 
are always better or worse than the maxims which they adopt or concede” (TF I, p. 444). 
As will be discussed shortly, it was yet another substantial insertion in the last third of the 
1818 version, “Essays on the Principles of Method”, that allowed Coleridge to be even 
more explicit about the religious agenda of the rifacciamento (which also became more 
orthodoxly Christian), by placing it in a non-Kantian framework.  
 
Linguistic Grounds for Revisions 
In the second number of the periodical Friend Coleridge claimed to detail “the settled 
convictions of my mind for the last ten or twelve years, with some brief intervals of 
fluctuation” (TF II, p. 24-5). He announced right in the first number that his aim was to 
“uphold those Truths and those Merits, which are founded in the nobler and permanent 
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Parts of our Nature, against the Caprices of Fashion, and such Pleasures, as either depend 
on transitory and accidental Causes, or are pursued from less worthy Impulses” (TF II, 
p.18 ). However, in fact Coleridge’s scattered views and ineffable arguments as presented 
in The Friend were visibly in the process of becoming. This is why Hazlitt in 1816 
retrospectively complained about the work for being an “endless preface to an imaginary 
work” and the “most tiresome prospectus” and ever written, hence vilified Coleridge for 
appearing as “the Prince of preparatory authors” (Political Essays, p. 120)! Whereas to 
Coleman (1988), the source of this problem was Coleridge’s “anxiety-ridden inability to 
carry out his stated intentions” (p. 3), it must be considered as the more definitive aspect of 
what Coleridge called “the History of my own mind” (TF II, p. 277) – rather than simply a 
product of pure inhibition. In other words, it was an attempt to take the reader through a 
complex and unfamiliar train of thought by attempting to illustrate how we can, 
psychologically speaking, think about thinking process itself. Coleridge’s conception of 
language had the biggest role in this process because he thought, as McKusick suggests, 
that the periodical Friend would emerge “not simply as a miscellaneous collection of 
essays, but as a coherent and many-faceted attempt to remedy the contemporary abuse of 
language by reestablishing the proper meaning of words” (2009, p. 580 ). A notebook 
statement of June 1810 bears witness to this because Coleridge was anxious that the 
preliminary “Hints & first Thoughts” he put down on “this & [his] other Memorandum 
Books” could be “understood as…fixed opinions”, as they were rather mere “Suggestions 
of the disquisition; & acts of obedience to the apostolic command of Try all things: hold 
fast that which is good” (CN III, §3881). This note, I think, can be applied to his periodical 
which had ended several months ago: rather than seeking fixed principles in language and 
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philosophy, Coleridge sought to present incongruous material in the weekly version of The 
Friend.  
On the other hand, Coleridge in the early years as well as around 1809-10 already 
cherished a firm belief in the power of language in terms of constituting thought and 
according meanings to words by bringing the mind into action. “Language” he stated in a 
notebook entry of April-June 1803, “give outness to Thoughts / & this the philosophical 
essence & purpose of Language” (CN I, §1387). In another entry of October 1803, 
Coleridge asked,  
What is it, that I employ my Metaphysics on? To perplex our clearest 
notions, & living moral Instincts? To extinguish the Light of Love & of 
Conscience, to put out the Life of Arbitrement – to make myself & others 
Worthless, Soul-less, Godless? – No! To expose the Folly & the 
Legerdemain of those, who have thus abused the blessed Organ of 
Language – , to support all old & venerable Truths, to support, to kindle, to 
project, to make the Reason spread Light over our Feelings, to make our 
Feelings diffuse vital Warmth thro’ our Reason – these are my Objects – & 
these my Subjects. (CN I, §1623)  
Coleridge re-worked on this notebook entry in the periodical, and then kept it in the 1818 
version as well (TF I. p. 108; II. p. 73): the word “Organ” underwent a metaphoric shift, 
and replaced by “Machine”. I think this replacement is critical in terms of showing 
language’s non-subjective but transcendent role in constitution of thought and guidance 
towards profound truths.229  
 By the time he revised The Friend (1818), Coleridge had come to the recognition 
that he had originally lacked an essential element in the periodical version, which he 
retrospectively thought was among those works consisting of “arrangement guided by the 
light of no leading idea” and “mere orderliness without METHOD” (TF I, 513).  It was a 
prerequisite for Coleridge in 1818 that he set down fixed principles that would guide his 
                                                 
229 See: Christensen, 1981, p. 244. 
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intellectual offspring and, by extension, his literary works. In January this year, 
Coleridge’s essay titled “General Introduction: or Preliminary Treatise on Method”, a work 
of applied logic in which Coleridge presented his brainwork on the proper method of 
philosophy, was published in the Encyclopaedia Metropolitana (Jackson 1969, Myers 
1987). However, because the introductory piece was “bedeviled”, “interpolated” and 
“topsy-turvied” (CL IV, p. 825) by the editors, Coleridge included the revised version of it 
in The Friend in November 1818 because the piece was to serve as “the groundwork of 
[his] philosophic opinions” (CL IV, p. 860). Coleridge now acceded to the view that 
although the periodical was a success in terms of its content and distinctive line of thought 
in the essays, they were, and might “remain for ages limited in their uses, insecure and 
unproductive” because they were able to neither “excite some master IDEA” nor “lead to 
some LAW” (TF I, p. 478). The rifacciamento was meant to compensate for this gap with 
the revised version of the preface to the Encyclopaedia Metropolitana by establishing 
fixed principles in philosophy. 
Whereas Coleridge in the periodical version sought to pour down his intellectual 
reservoir in a rush to produce his weekly, the rifacciamento was committed to achieve 
fixed principles by pursuing “the science of Method” that could be extracted from “the 
grounds and essential principles of” the philosophical works of such groundbreaking 
figures as Lord Bacon or Plato, “which constitutes their true systems of philosophy” 
because at their cores “they are radically one and the same system… which is of universal 
and imperishable worth” (TF I, p. 487). This idea presupposes that attentive readers are 
capable of detecting the epistemological origin of those systems within their own minds as 
this knowledge is inexctricably connected with faith in the Absolute governing power. The 
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rifacciamento in this respect aimed to provide a methodological venue for Coleridge’s 
lifelong exploration of the nature and source of language. 
In the 1818 version of the periodical, Coleridge pursued a scientific method in the 
service of fixed principles, through which his habit of considering all possible thoughts at 
once could ideally be systematised and the thoughts could be properly organised in relation 
to one another. Waka Ishikura (2004) suggests that Coleridge’s “Essays on the Principles 
of Method” can be seen as “his philosophical response to Davy’s scientific endeavor” 
because, as he puts, it was “Davy who opened Coleridge’s eyes on the newly developed 
practical sciences” (p. 69). Therefore, in his awareness of how widely scientific knowledge 
in the age of industrial revolution was already applied to the “practical manners” (p. 68), 
Coleridge proposed in The Friend (1818) that the “Method” to be expounded was bound to 
be scientific in terms of mediating the distinguishing potentials of the phemomenal and 
spiritual worlds alike. As Schlutz (2009) confirms, according to Coleridge, “true 
philosophical insight can thus only be achieved if the relations that are the material of 
Method originate not in empirical observation, but in the mind of the observer”, and 
Coleridge termed this “superior kind of relation” as “Law”, granting it “the foremost place 
in the science of Method” (p. 220). This is because the principles of Law simultaneously 
“account for the relations between and for the very existence of the objects of empirical 
reality” by virtue of being “the divine causes of empirical phenomena… The science of 
Method is thus firmly grounded in religious faith” (pp. 220-21). It must have been such a 
conception of constitutional relations of things with one another230 that induced Coleridge 
                                                 
230 “It is the idea of the common centre, of the universal law, by which all power manifests itself in opposite 
yet interdependent forces…that enlightening inquiry, multiplying experiment, and at once inspiring humility 
and perseverance will lead him to comprehend gradually and progressively the relation of each to the other, 
of each to all, and of all to each (TF I, p. 511).  
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to provide methodological framework for his opinions, since Coleridge explains that the 
root of the word “Method” in Greek literally denotes “a way, or path of Transit” (TF I, p. 
457) and this was Coleridge’s own path to converge the laws of science with his religious 
faith. 
To Coleridge, because “all Method supposes A PRINCIPLE OF UNITY WITH 
PROGRESSION; in other words, progressive transition without breach of continuity” (TF 
I, p. 476), scientific principles hence presuppose that “the whole is of necessity prior to its 
parts” (TF I, p. 497). In this respect, through the transcendent-deductive orientation of his 
“method”, Coleridge also sought to ground his linguistic views concerning “Multeity in 
Unity” and, by extension, his practice of “desynonymization” in relation to his quest for 
fixed principles and knowledge of Law.231 That is to say, whereas the method he pursued 
in the revised version of The Friend would help Coleridge firmly keep his faith in 
existence of an all-governing divine principle, multiplicities could also be vindicated by 
means of the same “scientific” method so that Coleridge could come up with universally-
binding fixed principles. This is why he asserted in the rifacciamento that “the material 
world must have been made for the sake of man, at once the high-priest and representative 
of the Creator” provided that he is guided by the reason “in which the essences of all things 
co-exist in all their distinctions yet as one and indivisible” (TF I, p. 516). Therefore, in an 
attempt to provide an accurate correspondence between the words and the objects they 
signify (so that he could also prove the coexistence of multeity and unity at once), 
Coleridge adopted this method through which he could, without violating the principles of 
                                                 
231 Ishikura (2004) holds that this is “indispensable to method, pointing to a scientific investigation. This is a 
fine example of Coleridgean thinking, methodical or not, in which all thoughts are diversified and unified in 
the light of one idea.” (p. 71) 
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unity, separate the concepts that have been seen as synonymous in everyday use of 
language.  
The proposed method in The Friend amounts to an epistemological claim to 
certainty, which was absent in the 1809-10 version and, by extension, I suggest that the 
method hence corresponded with the linguistic concerns of Coleridge in 1818. The method 
was a way for him to scientifically establish the implicit connection between language and 
the absolute, divine Truth. After all, Coleridge’s language in the periodical version was 
intensely criticised for being too obscure to understand, and Coleridge must have thought 
the method could remedy this, when he put “the art of METHOD…is the clue, without 
which it would be difficult to exculpate the noblest productions of the divine philosopher 
from the charge of being tortuous and labyrinthine in their progress, and unsatisfactory in 
their ostensible results” (TF I, p. 472). On the other hand, considering Coleridge’s search 
for the grounds to his ontological argument of language, Kant’s critical philosophy would 
obviously not take him far due to the fact that he sought to establish those ideas that had 
been exiled from the transcendent realm of Kant’s philosophy. Therefore Coleridge in 
1818 was relying on the laws of a method instead in order to bring his theory of language 
and philosophical inquiry in line with the scientific method imbued with moral principles. 
This is why, as Ishikura argues, he expected Davy “to prove scientifically that the work of 
nature was pertinent to the work of the mind, and to find something in the electrochemistry 
analogous to the work of human consciousness” so that he could endorse the view that “If 
one power governs the universe, the human mind may exert a power that is ultimately the 
same as one that governs external nature, and all powers will converge in God” (2004, p. 
72). Therefore, Coleridge held that pursuit of the absolute Truth or moral concerns could 
not be excluded from this scientific method; on the contrary, the scientific method had to 
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follow the moral foundations in order to be a reliable “method”: “The naturalist, who 
cannot or will not see, that one fact is often worth a thousand, as including them all in 
itself, and that it first makes all the others facts; who has not the head to comprehend, the 
soul to reverence, a central experiment or observation…will never receive an auspicious 
answer from the oracle of nature” (TF I, p. 481). The method sought in the rifacciamento 
was also a response to Wordsworth’s conception of language in the sense that he was 
theoretically more invested in copying the ordinary language consisting of arbitrary signs 
and this, for Coleridge, gave way to his once symbiotic partner’s distrust for language to 
express the inner thoughts. It is almost as if Coleridge in the 1818 Friend was working out 
what he should have said in the first part of the Biographia. He obviously thought that 
Wordsworth possessed the genius, but instead of producing “the strongest impressions of 
novelty” in his poems and rescuing “the most admitted truths from the impotence caused 
by the very circumstance of their universal admission”, his language theory lost “all the 
life and efficiency of truth” and lay “bed-ridden in the dormitory of the soul, side by side, 
with the most despised and exploded errors” (TF I, p. 110; II, p. 74). The problem to 
Coleridge lay in the idea that considers language, which for him springs forth “at the first 
creative fiat”, and thought as distinct binaries (TF I, p. 109; II, p. 73). In The Excursion, as 
discussed before, the dramatic method Wordsworth adopted disappointed Coleridge even 
more because of the split between the language of the author and that of his characters. 
For Coleridge language contains within itself the power of bringing the natural and 
the spiritual realms together so that it can attain the core principles enabling the 
conceptualization of both. Religious faith, therefore, was indispensable for any quest for 
method because the idea “That we acknowledge a method…results from the religious 
instinct” (TF I, p. 497). Coleridge with his ardent search for fixed principles of method in 
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the rifacciamento aimed to establish his insights on the transcendent relationship between 
language and mind.232 His conception of the constitutive function of Reason depended on a 
view of mind that not only shapes but is also shaped by the external world: for if man 
wants to recognise “himself in nature”, he must “learn to comprehend nature in himself, 
and its laws in the ground of his own existence” in the first place (TF I, p. 511). Coleridge 
found that this was the only method through which reduction of “Phaenomena to 
Principles” could be made possible (p. 511). This was highly crucial for Coleridge’s 
theologically-inclined philosophical pursuits because, he thought, he would in this way be 
able to establish the mutually-nurturing bond between the phenomena and man’s Reason, 
and prove Kant’s Copernican Revolution epistemologically flawed. By virtue of the 
science of method, Coleridge thought it was possible to found permanent parameters to 
gauge the way language, our thoughts and the external world organically relate to one 
another. Therefore for Coleridge, linguistic structures in the mind must also rely upon the 
exhanges between mind, word and phenomenon. By extension, language ideally activates 
mind to perceive the existence of the phenomenal as well as noumenal world. As Coleridge 
asked in “The Essays”:  
Hast thou ever raised thy mind to the consideration of EXISTENCE, in and 
by itself, as the mere act of existing ? Hast thou ever said to thyself 
thoughtfully, IT is! heedless in that moment, whether it were a man before 
thee, or a flower, or a grain of sand? Without reference, in short, to this or 
that particular mode or form of existence? If thou hast indeed attained to 
this, thou wilt have felt the presence of a mystery, which must have fixed 
thy spirit in awe and wonder. … There is that within us which repels the 
                                                 
232 “When the naturalist contemplates the structure of a bird”, Coleridge illustrates his objective, “the hollow 
cavity of the bones, the position of the wings for motion, and of the tail for steering its course, &c, he knows 
indeed that there must be a correspondent mechanism, as the nexus effectivus”; however, Coleridge adds, “it 
must not be overlooked, that the assumption of the nexus effectivus itself originates in the mind, as one of the 
laws under which alone it can reduce the manifold of the impression from without into unity, and thus 
contemplate it as one thing; and could never…have been derived from outward experience, in which it is 
indeed presupposed, as a necessary condition.” (TF I, p. 499)  
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proposition with as full and instantaneous light, as if it bore evidence 
against the fact in the right of its own eternity. (TF I, p. 514) 
Coleridge is suggesting that language is inherently and mysteriously in accord with the 
noumena, which philosophically confirms the truths we pursue via more laborious means 
by its very nature. However, no such guarantee was offered to the reader of the first 
version of The Friend. In the 1818 version, Coleridge built up on the premise that language 
reveals the way our mind works – hence enabling us to gain access to immediate 
knowledge of the things in themselves, Ding an Sich.  
 
The Role of Imagination in Revisionary Activity 
In the first Critique Kant draws attention to the theory that direct knowledge of objects is 
obtained by the understanding (CPR, A 645 / B 673). On the other hand, Reason, as Alison 
Laywine (1998) explains, is preoccupied with attaining “the highest principle of all—that 
principle from which all the laws of nature might be seen to follow” (p. 282). Laywine 
adds that the Kantian Reason is not allowed to “do just anything to achieve its ends; it can 
only do rightly what it has been permitted to do by the understanding” (p. 309). Kant’s 
transcendental idealism hence excludes noumena (thing in itself) from the realm of 
epistemology as it takes for granted that we are not capable of cognising anything that is 
beyond the sensible and wholly intellectual – hence not-filtered by understanding in the 
first place. As delineated in the first chapter of this study, however, such a philosophical 
approach postulating that Reason is beset by epistemological delimitations, being 
subservient to the constitutive function of understanding, was simply not satisfactory for 
Coleridge’s quest for a transcendent argument inclusive of noumena, religion and, 
obviously, God. Whereas Coleridge was committed to transgressing the limits of 
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knowledge set by the critical philosophy on grounds of a transcendent configuration of 
metaphysics, Kant’s transcendental deduction required that reality is attained through the 
machinations of understanding, which basically moulds the way we experience and learn 
about the reality. Coleridge’s conception of the reality was far removed from Kant’s 
deduction because in his idiosyncratic philosophical schema, the noumena could be 
accessed through Reason, which had a constitutive role in the acquirement of knowledge. 
In other words, prioritisation of the constitutive power of Reason was the means to find out 
about the laws of noumena and the possibility of arriving at knowledge of non-sensible 
realm. 
The first conception of The Friend in and around 1804 came with a long title 
emphasizing its dedication to the “right application of the Reason, the Imagination, and the 
Moral Feelings”.233 Shortly after this, Coleridge’s distinction between Reason and 
Understanding was to grow systematically at odds with the Kantian epistemology: in a 
letter of October 1806, Coleridge made an explicit statement about the function of 
understanding as “that Faculty of the Soul which apprehends and retains the mere notices 
of Experience” whereas Reason was defined as “most eminently the Revelation of an 
immortal soul, and its best Synonime” (CL II, p. 1198). He radically held Reason sharply 
superior to Understanding in terms of having a divinely-ordained constitutive function as 
opposed to the materialistic, regulative Reason in Kant’s philosophy. The relegation of 
understanding to the secondary position in 1806 was relatively softened in the periodical 
                                                 
233 In a letter of 15 January 1804 he wrote that the work would be titled as “Consolations and Comforts from 
the exercise and right application of the Reason, the Imagination, and the Moral Feelings, addressed 




Friend, where Coleridge gave “the Understanding credit for forming cognitions” (Class, 
2012, p. 185). We can see Coleridge aligning Understanding closely with Reason: 
From Reason alone can we derive the Principles which our Understandings 
are to apply, the Ideal to which by means of our Understandings we should 
endeavour to approximate. This however gives no proof, that Reason alone 
ought to govern and direct human beings, either as Individuals or as 
States… Reason never acts by itself, but must cloath itself in the Substance 
of individual Understanding and specific Inclination, in order to become a 
Reality and an Object of Consciousness and Experience. (TF II, p. 131) 
Although this passage was used verbatim in The Friend’s 1818 version (TF I, p. 199), the 
primary position of Reason in his mind remained unchanged for the rest of his life and in 
his later works (Class, 2012, p. 185), including the rifacciamento.234 On the other hand, the 
role previously ascribed to Understanding (as the medium informing Reason by 
experiencing the world) was replaced by senses.  
In the Coleridgean universe governed by a transcendent perception of every single 
philosophical concept, his adoption of Reason, Understanding and Sense enabled 
Coleridge to conduct his ontological quest for the source of knowledge. I maintain that the 
process in which Coleridge adapted Kant’s tripartite division in The Friend 1809-10 
contributed to his conception in 1815 of the acclaimed separation between the concepts of 
fancy, primary imagination and secondary imagination. The periodical version of The 
Friend hence played yet another crucial role in his career since it at times became an outlet 
for Coleridge’s adaptation of Reason, Understanding and Sense perception. Later, these 
views were recycled in his formulation of budding theory of imagination.  
                                                 
234 He extravagantly extolled Reason, which he held was the “best and holiest gift of Heaven and bond of 
union with the Giver. The high Title by which the Majesty of Man claims precedence above all other living 
Creatures! Mysterious Faculty, the Mother of Conscience, of Language, of Tears, and of Smiles! Calm and 
incorruptible Legislator of the Soul, without whom all its’ other Powers would “meet in mere oppugnancy.” 
Sole Principle of Permanence amid endless Change! in a World of discordant Appetites and imagined Self-
interests the one only common Measure!” (TFII, p. 125; TF I, p. 190) 
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To Coleridge senses always precluded the active elements of the mind, he hence 
announced in both versions of The Friend that “Under the term SENSE, I comprise 
whatever is passive in our being, without any reference to the questions of Materialism or 
Immaterialism, all that Man is in common with animals, in kind at least- his sensations, 
and impressions whether of his outward senses or the inner sense” (TF I, p. 177; II, p. 
104n). The important distinction between fancy and imagination in the Biographia 
presents a similar understanding of fancy to sense: Fancy is described as a mode of 
“ordinary” Memory that deals with “fixities and definities” relying on “the law of 
association” so that it can present its productions under these terms (BL I, p. 305). Fancy is 
a copyist, elaborating on the previous perception of images and combining them into 
refreshed new forms, and in this respect its functions fall in line with the most basic form 
of the Kantian epistemology, the sense. Understanding, on the other hand, has a more 
complicated history in the process of Coleridge’s philosophical maturation. In a letter of 
October 1806, understanding was held to be a faculty that acts upon “the mere notices of 
Experience” (CL II, p. 1198). On the other hand, from the periodical version, 
understanding emerged as an active medium of knowledge for Coleridge. His definition of 
“understanding” in 1809 illustrates the Kantian way in which he held this faculty above 
sense perception: “By the Understanding,” stated Coleridge, “I mean that faculty of 
thinking and forming judgements on the notices furnished by the Sense, according to 
certain rules existing in itself, which rules constitute its distinct nature” (TF I, p. 177; II, p. 
104n). In addition to “forming cognitions”, such an “enhanced role of the Understanding” 
now ensures that an order is secured through enforcement of rules on the senses (Class, 
2012, p. 185). However, Coleridge’s conception of the Understanding never had the 
“constitutive” function Kant assigned to it; Coleridge’s religious sensibility accorded only 
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a regulative function to Understanding so it does not infringe in the territory of Reason. 
Along the similar line, his definition of the primary imagination in 1815 correlates with his 
definition of understanding in 1809: It is “the prime Agent of all human Perception” and it 
only partakes in “the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM” through repetition, hence 
reproduction (BL I, p. 304). This is surely not mere copying, the function of primary 
imagination can be more closely associated with imitating in the Aristotelian sense: It is at 
work in every act of perception (although we may or may not have consciousness of it), 
and turns the material of sense experiences into an imaginative activity. 
For Coleridge, the place accorded to Reason did not undergo a tremendous change 
in 1809, which is due to its constitutive function that enabled him to build an intrinsic 
connection with the divine Absolute, God. As Coleridge defined it, Reason is “the power 
by which we become possessed of Principle, (the eternal Verities of Plato and Descartes) 
and of Ideas, (N. B. not images) as the ideas of a point, a line, a circle, in Mathematics; and 
of Justice, Holiness, Free-Will, &c. in Morals” (TF I, p. 177; II, p. 104n). Reason hence 
follows the eternal, fixed principles rather than mere images or sense experiences,235 and it 
has the power to constitute knowledge and function as a non-representational agent of the 
Truth and emerge as an epistemic authority superior to sense and understanding. Such a 
view of Reason would later serve Coleridge’s metaphysical and philosophical pursuits 
more profoundly, as he made explicit in the 1818 rifacciamento of The Friend: “…God, 
the Soul, eternal Truth…are themselves reason” (TF I, p. 156). In this respect, Reason’s 
exalted position in Coleridge’s vocabulary brings in his definition of secondary 
imagination, which is equally divine and related to the soul, to mind. Differing from its 
                                                 
235 “Preserve the pure Reason pure & debase it not by any mixture of sensuality - the sensuous Imagination.” 
(CN III, §3293) 
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primary counterpart “only in degree” and “in the mode of its operation”, Coleridge’s 
secondary imagination exists side by side “with the conscious will”, vitalizes the stable and 
cadaverous phenomenon by means of dissolution, diffusion and dissipation, so that it can 
re-create, idealize and unify (BL I, p. 304). Unlike the primary imagination that is 
reproductive, the secondary re-creates, hence instead of participating in the repetitive act, it 
has the power to create the eternal act again, by the power of constitutive Reason. Hence 
the willed conscious activity of the intellect (primary imagination combined with 
understanding) dissolves the illusionary divisions of empirical consciousness in order to re-
create ideal unity, for example, in the works of the artist or the poet. 
Coleridge’s two imaginations in the Biographia could be properly established once 
they were grounded by an all-encompassing method governed by fixed rules and 
principles, and the “Essays” on method in the rifacciamento of 1818 emerged as the 
antidote to this relatively shortcoming, half-grounded theory. Coleridge’s proposed method 
and desired system in 1818 was solidly transcendent in that it sought to explore 
imagination’s potential to converge the mind of man with the divine, hence philosophy 
would also be merged with religious faith. It is this divine principle that would distinguish 
imagination from fancy, or divine language from mere signs. In this respect, Coleridge also 
differs from Wordsworth’s poetic practice, for example, in The Excursion (1814) because 
his friend excluded the Godly potential of imagination, holding it similar to fancy in his 
1815 Preface to Poems. I take the following excerpt from the “Essays” as his criticism to 
the “law” of Wordsworth’s “understanding and fancy” through which  
he is impelled to abstract the outward relations of matter and to arrange 
these phenomena in time and space, under the form of causes and effects. 
And this was necessary, as being the condition under which alone 
experience and intellectual growth are possible. But…by the same law he is 
inevitably tempted to misinterpret a constant precedence into positive 
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causation, and thus to break and scatter the one divine and invisible life of 
nature into countless idols of the sense; and falling prostrate before lifeless 
images, the creatures of his own abstraction, is himself sensualized, and 
becomes a slave to the things of which he was formed to be the conqueror 
and sovereign. (TF I, pp. 517-518) 
From the periodical to the rifacciamento, Coleridge was able to establish a more 
idiosyncratic response to Kant, and thanks to his revisionary activity in the Biographia 
Literaria and Sibylline Leaves Coleridge desynonymized not only his views of language 
but also his views of imagination from Kant and Wordsworth. In 1818, therefore, the new 
addition to the volume, Essays on Method, “his most refined published attempt at 
presenting his view of systematicity” (Schlutz, 2009, p. 219), helped Coleridge revise and 
revive his theory of imagination. 
By means of dissociating himself from Wordsworth and Kant in the revised version 
of The Friend (1818) , Coleridge’s distinction between Reason, Understanding and Sense 
became relatively more settled, especially considering his theory of fixed principles in the 
“Essays on Method” part, whereas in 1809-10 the tripartite distinction was still immature 
and less integrated with his views of imagination. Having written the Biographia and 
formulated his theory in chapter 13, new implications of the distinction would follow in the 
rifacciamento. Coleridge hence made yet another diagnostic separation of Sense, 
Understanding and Reason as follows:  
The Sense, (vis sensitiva vel intuitiva) perceives: Vis regulatrix (the 
understanding, in its own peculiar operation) conceives: Vis rationalis (the 
Reason or rationalized understanding) comprehends. The first is impressed 
through the organs of sense; the second combines these multifarious 
impressions into individual Notions, and by reducing these notions to Rules, 
according to the analogy of all its former notices, constitutes Experience: 
the third subordinates both these notions and the rules of Experience to 
ABSOLUTE PRINCIPLES or necessary LAWS: and thus concerning 
objects, which our experience has proved to have real existence, it 
demonstrates moreover, in what way they are possible, and in doing this 
constitutes Science. (TF I, pp. 157-58) 
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Through his more settled discussion of the tripartite divison, Coleridge was able to 
establish the connection between Reason and secondary imagination, even though he did 
not explicitly mention his theory of the latter in 1818. Just as Coleridge’s search for fixed 
principles and scientific method in 1818 aimed to explain the phenomenal reality through 
the spectacles of faith, the secondary imagination, as Schlutz emphasizes, “‘dissolves’ the 
habits of empirical perception in order to recreate the customary relations between 
thoughts and things in order to return the self to its true origins in the divine and living 





















CHAPTER SIX – CONCLUSION 
In the past five chapters, I have endeavoured to demonstrate the extent to which 
Coleridge’s revisionary activity from 1814 to 1818 was informed by the collapse of his 
hopes for a joint oeuvre with Wordsworth once The Excursion, as part of The Recluse 
project, was published in 1814. Coleridge was aware of the implications of Kant’s critical-
transcendental philosophy in the process leading up to his desynonymization from 
Wordsworth and a joint corpus of works with his once symbiotic partner. He therefore 
developed his unique response to the Kantian handling of especially “language” and 
“imagination”, which he thought resembled closely the way Wordsworth approached the 
terms and made use of them in not only his own poems, but also his joint venture with 
Coleridge, The Recluse. Through the works examined in the previous chapters, the 
Biographia Literaria, Sibylline Leaves and The Friend, I aimed to articulate Coleridge’s 
desire to gradually distance himself from Wordsworth through his reactionary and dialogic 
revisions between 1814 and 1818.         
The first chapter of my study thus primarily investigated how Coleridge’s 
engagement with Immanuel Kant informed his authorship, in what way his response to the 
critical-transcendental philosophy mediated by the radical figures in his youth enabled his 
idiosyncratic adoption. To this end I explored how Coleridge’s organic approach and his 
religious views, especially after the Mediterranean interlude, considerably impinged on his 
reaction to Wordsworth’s poem of 1814, The Excursion, written as one of three parts of the 
Recluse project, especially on the grounds of language and imagination. Taking 
Wordsworth’s publication of the poem as my touchstone, and considering the role of 
Kantian philosophy in Coleridge’s assessment of his friend’s poem, I analysed in the 
second chapter the grounds for Coleridge’s re-writing practice and dialogic-comparative 
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interpretation of his previous self-conception in the aftermath of The Excursion. While 
Coleridge through his revisionary activity earnestly aimed to bring unity to his body of 
works and system of thought, the outcome was almost always yet another fragment or 
fragments. Drawing inspiration from Seamus Perry’s description of the “muddle” (1999) at 
the heart of Coleridge’s poetic, political, philosophical and metaphysical pursuits, I have 
investigated to what extent his erratic revisionary activity from 1814 to 1818 unwittingly 
contributed to his canon. 
The following chapters engaged closely with the works through which Coleridge 
conducted an enormous and ingenuous revisionary activity between 1814 and1818. In 
Chapter 3, I argued that the Biographia Literaria was fundamentally dialogical, and the 
dialogue was a four-sided one, involving not only Coleridge himself and his past self, but 
Wordsworth and his past self as well. The Biographia thus was not only a revisionary 
account of Coleridge’s life and opinions, it also was a critique of Wordsworth’s poetical 
works and principles, which Coleridge thought were extensively rooted in the ideas he first 
expressed to Wordsworth in the 1790s. The Biographia was as much a response to The 
Excursion as it was to the poetics in Wordsworth’s Poems of 1815, including Lyrical 
Ballads, and The Miscellaneous Pieces of the Author. Just as The Prelude236 explained 
how the poet projected himself as future author of The Recluse, the Biographia attempted 
to relate Coleridge’s “practical criticism” (a term invented and first used in the volume) to 
his philosophico-theological odyssey in the book. I suggested that the writing of 
the Biographia embroiled Coleridge in a contradiction he had already been acutely aware 
of: the greatness of Wordsworth’s verse was inseparable from the notion of “Unity Entire” 
(the ultimate inter-relatedness of all things) in which the two had once believed. But 
                                                 
236 The thirteen-book Prelude of 1805-06, or “The Poem to Coleridge”, as it was then known. 
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Coleridge, as a result of his abstruse preoccupation with the Kantian critical philosophy, 
and the post-Kantian and Schlegelian organic synthesis, had grown discontented with the 
pantheism implicit in the concept of unity entire and was now committed to “Multeity in 
Unity”. Whilst Coleridge’s willingness to collaborate with Wordsworth from the initial 
stages of their friendship is intrinsically connected with his search for unity in religion and 
primacy of Reason in philosophy, his later appreciation of Multeity refers to his adoption 
of “both ways”, as Perry calls it (1999, p. 104), within years: he acknowledged the validity 
of Trinitarianism and Orthodoxy while he also retained Unitarian and even pantheistic 
elements in his creed (even as he vociferated against Socinianism). 
In Chapter 4, I investigated how Coleridge’s idea of writing about (and revising) 
his literary life and opinions in the Biographia created a domino effect in his handling of 
the poetic collection, Sibylline Leaves. This was an attempt to distinguish himself from 
Wordsworth and establish his own reputation as a writer with critical as well as poetic 
genius in his own right. In addition to the case studies throughout the chapter to illustrate 
the objective and extent of Coleridge’s revisions of his past affiliation with Wordsworth, 
the inclusion of a revised version of “To William Wordsworth” into the collection has also 
been analysed against the backdrop of Coleridge’s unfavourable reaction to The Excursion.  
In the final chapter, I dealt with Coleridge’s second experiment in periodical 
writing after The Watchman, The Friend. I mainly examined the two versions of 
Coleridge’s The Friend: The periodical version of 1809-10 and the rifacciamento of 1818. 
My argument predominantly focused on the idea that compared to the periodical, in the 
revised version Coleridge managed to form a more sober relationship with not only his 
own past but also with Wordsworth in terms of building a dialogue and realizing an 
alternative meaning of the “Friend”. In addition, considering Coleridge’s response to 
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Kant’s transcendental philosophy in the periodical version where he gave up the earlier 
habit of prioritizing “Reason” and stigmatizing “Understanding” as mere sense experience 
from 1809 The Friend (Class, 2012, pp. 169-190), I have investigated how his tripartite 
recognition of Sense, Understanding and Reason as epistemological mediums may have 
eventually led Coleridge to formulate his famous theory of two imaginations and fancy 
later in the Biographia Literaria.   
In a broad sense, this dissertation significantly contributes to the revaluation of 
Coleridge’s joint project with Wordsworth and the reasons behind its dissolution. It is now 
common knowledge in Coleridge studies thanks to McFarland (1981) that the symbiotic 
relationship between these two important figures of the English Romantic Literature 
existed during the annus mirabilis. I observed, however, that for as long as their joint 
project remained to be completed, their symbiosis (though not actively) continued to be 
there for Coleridge and Wordsworth. As a result, my dissertation exhibits a close reading 
of the works Coleridge heavily revised between 1814 and 1818 from the perspective of 
Coleridge’s theological and transcendent conception of language and imagination vis-à-vis 
Kant’s transcendental method of philosophy.    
Nevertheless, it seems to me that Coleridge scholars have not yet sufficiently 
explored the definitive role of Coleridge’s dialogic and reactionary revisions in the post-
Excursion period of his career (compared with the symbiotic reactions prior to it). Much 
work remains to be done if we are to fully exhaust the ways Coleridge and Wordsworth 
mutually defined their authorship both during their collaboraton in The Recluse project and 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG IN DEUTSCHER SPRACHE 
Die Dissertation untersucht Samuel Taylor Coleridges Praxis der Selbstredaktion in den 
Jahren von 1814 bis 1818 und beleuchtet dabei die zentrale Rolle, die William Wordsworths 
The Excursion, 1814 als Teil von The Recluse erschienen, in der Herausbildung von 
Coleridges Œuvre einnimmt. Die Arbeit entwickelt ihre zentrale These zu Coleridges 
Überarbeitungspraxis durch eine detaillierte Analyse der Verfahren, über die Coleridge 
aufhörte, durch Wordsworth zu sprechen. Ich beziehe mich dabei in erster Linie auf die 
Überarbeitungen von Biographia Literaria (1817), Sibylline Leaves (1817) und dem 1818 
erschienenen rifacciamento zu dem Periodikum The Friend, das ursprünglich 1809–1810 
publiziert worden war. 
Vor dem Hintergrund von Coleridges in den 1790er- und 1800er-Jahren neu aufgekommener 
und sich später weiterentwickelnder Rezeption von Immanuel Kants kritischer Philosophie 
werde ich argumentieren, dass sich die „radikale Differenz“ zwischen Coleridge und 
Wordsworth, die seit den Lyrical Ballads (1798) und dem „Preface“ (1800) bestand, weiter 
verstärkte, nachdem es Wordsworth nicht gelungen war, das groß angelegte Konzept eines 
„first genuine philosophical poem“ – The Recluse – zu vollenden. Insbesondere nachdem 
Coleridge 1807 The Prelude gehört hatte, enttäuschte The Excursion nach den Maßstäben 
seiner „vergleichenden Kritik“ seine lang gehegten Erwartungen. Während sein organisches 
Weltbild einen aktiven Geist kannte, der nach universaler „Wahrheit“ sowohl durch innere 
synthetisierende Kräfte als auch empirische Naturgesetze strebt, gründete sich Wordsworths 
Gedicht auf ein obskur-labiles Fundament zwischen Außenwelt und Selbst. Coleridges aus 
seinen eigenen Theorien zu Sprache und Einbildungskraft erwachsene Enttäuschung über The 
Excursion und die nachfolgende Loslösung von Wordsworth und ihrem gemeinsamen Werk 
verschafften ihm letztendlich die notwendige Autonomie, die einerseits einen nüchternen 
Blick auf die eigene Vergangenheit und andererseits eine dialogische Freundschaft zu 
Wordsworth ermöglichten, innerhalb derer Coleridge die Bedeutsamkeit erkannte, zu einem 
Freund zu sprechen. 
